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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Robust and Energy Efficient Hardware-Oriented Security
for IoT Systems and Applications
by
Hongxiang Gu
Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor Miodrag Potkonjak, Chair
Internet of Things (IoT) is a revolutionary network that is envisioned to connect physical
entities to the cyber world. IoT technology has fundamentally changed how we interact with
our world. Worldwide spending on IoT is forecast to reach $745 Billion in 2019, and it is
expected that investments in the technology will maintain double-digit growth rate for years
to come.
Despite wide adoption and strong anticipation in the technology, two major obstacles
heavily constrained the further development in IoT, respectively security and energy chal-
lenges. From the security perspective, the entire lifecycle of an IoT device could potentially
be vulnerable to various types of attacks. Since many devices are deployed in an insecure
environment, attackers could gain unauthorized access to the exposed hardware, which in-
validates many security assumptions made in traditional security research. From the energy
perspective, many IoT devices are incapable of affording traditional cryptographical protec-
tion due to low energy and computation budget. Energy efficiency is therefore crucial for
designs and establishments of IoT.
To address IoT security problems, we explore and propose novel hardware-oriented se-
curity primitive designs and optimization techniques in this thesis. We first investigate the
vulnerabilities of physically unclonable function (PUF), a popular low power hardware se-
curity primitive used in IoT devices, through the creation of a hardware emulation platform
ii
using programmable delay lines (PDL). To address vulnerabilities in PUFs, we propose a
novel security primitive, Interconnected PUF Network (IPN), that interconnects small seg-
ments of strong PUFs in a reconfigurable network, limiting the single-bit prediction accuracy
to as low as 53.19% against a wide range of modeling attacks. We demonstrated that the
interconnections in an IPN can be optimized to maximize output randomness and stability
using our proposed evolution-strategies-based algorithm. Looking beyond PUF-based secu-
rity, we designed content-driven injective functions (CRIF) that rearrange compositions of
hardware injective functions based on previous messages, providing secure message encryp-
tion/decryption between IoT devices.
Facing the energy challenges, we propose “computing while racing” technique that re-
duces 40.4% of area overhead and 7.69% of power when implementing arbiter PUF and
arbitrary logic on field-programmable-gate-arrays (FPGAs). This is achieved through en-
coding digital signals in analog forms and achieves a high percentage of hardware sharing,
suggesting resource sharing could potentially be a promising direction for power/energy re-
duction in IoT devices.
Eventually, we propose two practical IoT applications. We first design a device anomaly
detection utilizing the inconsistency in environmentally sensitive PUF challenge-response
pairs. We show that our detector is more flexible and more power-efficient compared to state-
of-the-art system monitors. Secondly, we demonstrate that our proposal of PUF-assisted
group key management protocol securely protects IoT group communications while reducing
global energy consumption by 47.3% compared to cryptographic key management solutions.
iii
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
After decades of development, the Internet has connected countless computers in a global
network system, carrying a vast range of information resources and services. Researchers
and engineers in recent years have looked beyond the Internet and came to realize that our
physical world is an information system by itself. Much information can be collected and
utilized using sensors and actuators. The idea of proliferating physical entities in a new
network creates the concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) [1].
The growth in globally connected devices is now mainly driven by IoT devices on both
the consumer side and the enterprise side. By the end of the second quarter of 2018, the total
number of IoT devices globally has reached 7 billion, and this number is expected to exceed
10 billion by 2020 and 22 billion by 2025 [2]. Globally, over $745 Billion were spent in 2019,
and it is expected that the double-digit growth rate would be maintained for years to come
[3]. IoT has been envisioned to be a revolutionary network that connects physical devices
around us to perform intelligent tasks such as monitoring, communication, operation, and
optimization.
Despite the ambitious master plan behind the idea of IoT as well as its rapidly growing
speed, security challenges have always been a major concern in the process of further de-
velopment of the technology. The IoT security problems are particularly challenging due to
two seemingly irreconcilable objectives.
On the one hand, IoT requires a maximum level of security. IoT technology has enabled
a broad spectrum of applications in a variety of environments. From smart appliances in
homes to Industry 4.0 in factories, to intelligent clinical management in hospitals and smart
city systems on city streets. In almost all IoT related applications, sensitive data of large
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scale are collected, stored and transferred through IoT networks. In case of a security breach,
whether it is invasive, semi-invasive or non-invasive [4], in an IoT system, adversaries could
potentially gain private information such as identity, health-related records, business secrets,
and even military records. The compromise of IoT devices that are associated with cyber-
physical systems could be even more dangerous or even lethal in some cases. For example,
security researchers Billy Rios and Jonathan Butts have shown that it is possible to hack
into pacemakers and control the electrical impulses that are sent to the heart to regulate the
patient’s heartbeat [5].
On the other hand, security always comes with a price; it takes energy and computational
power to detect and defend against adversarial actions. Many IoT devices have highly con-
strained energy and computational budget due to harsh requirements on device size, weight,
and portability, leaving little resource to comply with the high-security requirement. Adopt-
ing conventional security approaches in IoT could consequently lead to low performance and
high maintenance cost.
In this thesis, we focus on the problem of designing and improving hardware-oriented
security subsystems in IoT to perform a variety of crucial security tasks under a highly
constrained environment. In defiance of the seemingly contradictory requirements, we show
that it is feasible to provide the highest possible level of security under the lowest energy
and computational power budget using our proposed methods.
1.1 Objectives
We believe this thesis is an adventurous exploration in three strongly correlated directions.
We intend to make our contributions in meeting three objectives, respectively from the
perspectives of security, energy, and applicability.
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1.1.1 Security Objectives
IoT is a complex system that consists of several layers of abstraction spanning in multiple
dimensions. From the physical layer of hardware sensors and controllers to the application
layer that utilizes the collected IoT data for specific tasks, security vulnerabilities could be
exploited anywhere, resulting in catastrophic compromise of the entire system. Majority of
the current attacks on IoT systems are software attacks. Software attacks on IoT are popular
because many similar security vulnerabilities are shared with other systems. In most cases,
these exploited vulnerabilities are general software security problems instead of IoT specific
issues. In recent years, the rise of IoT regime creates new attack surfaces as well as new
security challenges at the hardware level.
Hardware security is a natural starting point for research in IoT systems as hardware is
the basis of all IoT devices. Protecting IoT systems at hardware level grants system designers
great flexibility to minimize energy and area cost. Security at the hardware level also provides
a solution to the problem that classical cryptography could not resolve, presenting a new
level of protection against emerging attack methods such as side-channel attacks [6] and
physical attacks.
The security objective we claim to meet is to examine vulnerabilities in hardware security
subsystems and propose robust and secure protection to these subsystems.
1.1.2 Energy Objective
A large portion of IoT devices are compact and powered by batteries due to the high require-
ment of mobility. Therefore the energy budget for security subsystems is minimum if not
none. Devices such as smartphones, tablets, and smartwatches require daily recharging. The
high energy consumption in these devices is a major obstacle in terms of adopting advanced
security modules to the system. Devices such as wireless sensors have much lower energy
consumption but usually equipped with an ultra lightweight power source. These low power
devices are often massively deployed over a broad area; recharging or replacing the power
source is extremely costly. To reduce the cost and prolong the lifespan of each device, most
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device manufacturers leave no room for security subsystems.
All devices are in great need for energy efficient security subsystems to defend against
evolving attack techniques. In this thesis, we focus on both creating techniques that could
boost energy efficiency in existing security primitive as well as designing novel and ultra
lightweight security solutions in IoT devices and IoT applications.
1.1.3 Applicability Objective
IoT system is playing an increasingly irreplaceable role in countless numbers of applications
from home automation to city infrastructure management. Newer and more creative applica-
tions that could utilize IoT technology is booming at an enormous speed. Our applicability
objective is to explore how we could use our efficient and robust hardware-oriented security
solutions to protect and secure some of the emerging IoT-based applications.
1.2 Contributions and Organization
The dissertation is organized into three major parts, where each part explains our contri-
bution to meet security, energy and applicability objectives. Note that even though each
part focuses on its theme, the underlying logic beneath is coherent and consistent: we aim
to design energy efficient hardware-oriented security subsystem for IoT and its applications.
We analyze energy efficiency when introducing our proposed security techniques while we
also investigate the security impact on our energy efficiency improvement techniques. The
detailed organization can be viewed in Table 1.1.
The first part of the dissertation discusses low power hardware security primitives in
IoT devices. We investigate security properties in hardware security primitives using two
different approaches, respectively improving existing designs and creating novel architectures.
We first focus on security primitives based on a promising technology - PUFs. PUF is a
category of hardware functions that utilize the inevitable process variation introduced during
manufacturing to create unique mappings between inputs and outputs. Recent research on
4
Security Objective
Optimization of PUFs Non-PUF-based Primitives
• Stable PUF Emulation Platform Using
Programmable Delay Lines (Chapter 2)
• Securing PUFs with Interconnection and
Reconfigurability (Chapter 3)
• Optimizing PUFs with Evolution Strate-
gies (Chapter 4)
• Content-driven Reconfigurable
Injective Functions (Chapter 5)
Energy Objective
Hardware Sharing between PUF and Digital Logic (Chapter 6)
Applicability Objective
Lightweight Environmental Anomaly Detection (Chapter 7)
PUF-based Group Key Management (Chapter 8)
Table 1.1: Organization of the dissertation chapters matched three major objectives.
PUFs indicates that PUFs mainly suffers from stability issues and vulnerabilities against
modeling attacks. To exploit vulnerability issues and stability weakness in some PUF designs,
we first propose to utilize programmable delay lines (PDL) technology to create a platform
that emulates stable arbiter PUFs with matching accuracy of 87.42% in Chapter 2. We
propose the design of interconnected PUF Network (IPN) that connects multiple small PUFs
in a network in Chapter 3 as an attempt to defend PUFs against modeling attacks. The
interconnections in IPN can be reconfigured from time to time to completely remap the input-
output pairs with low latency and low energy. We show that reconfigurable IPN is capable
of preventing adversaries from collecting sufficient training data to apply modeling attacks
and therefore providing robust security to protected hardware. The maximum single-bit
prediction accuracy is less than 53.19% against a wide range of modeling attacks. We address
the stability issues in IPN by proposing a novel mechanism that uses evolution strategies
(ES) to find the best combination of PUF segments in Chapter 4, improving randomness
and stability by 220.8% and 22.62% compared to unoptimized configuration. Taking a step
forward, we also applying similar reconfiguration ideas to non-PUF-based security primitives.
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We eventually propose Content-driven Reconfigurable Injective Function (CRIF) to conduct
lightweight encryption/decryption tasks in IoT devices and communication between them
in Chapter 5. We demonstrate that CRIF is an excellent alternative to cryptography-based
and PUF-based competitors due to stability, efficiency, and reconfigurability, especially on
IoT devices where computational power and energy are constrained. We measured CRIF
achieves at least 75.04% of power savings compared to popular AES-based schemes.
The second part of the thesis is reducing energy cost in existing security primitives. We
propose a novel technique called hardware “free riding” to significantly reduce area and
energy overhead of analog-based PUFs. While PUFs are low power and low energy on
application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), on reconfigurable hardware platforms such
as field-programmable-gate-arrays (FPGA), implementation can be costly. In Chapter 6, we
address this problem by introducing a technique that allows arbiter PUFs to be implemented
together with any arbitrary logic on the same piece of hardware on FPGA. The evaluation
shows our technique reduces 40.4% of area overhead and 7.69% of power consumption when
implementing 128-bit arbiter PUFs and eight 32-bit linear-feedback shift registers (LFSR)
on FPGAs.
Lastly, in the third part, we propose two applications that could greatly benefit from our
proposed designs and techniques introduced in the first two parts. We first present an ultra
lightweight onboard anomaly detection mechanism that has excellent potential to accurately
detect suspicious voltage and temperature changes in Chapter 7. By actively monitoring sta-
bility variations of onboard analog PUFs, our design could perform flexible, fine-grained chip
monitoring service while reducing 63% of area and 13% of power compared to sensor-based
Xilinx System Monitor. Lastly, we investigated the well-known problem of key management
in IoT systems in Chapter 8. We propose to use multistage interconnected PUF (MIPUF)
to assist the protection of key management system at both software and hardware level. Our
experimental result indicates that our design provides physical protection when compared to
Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) based solutions and reduces global energy consumption
by 47.33%.
We believe this thesis provides inspirations, insights, and tools for IoT device designers
6
and application developers who seek to provide sufficient protection in heavily constrained
environments.
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CHAPTER 2
Stable PUF Emulation Platform Using Programmable
Delay Lines
2.1 Motivation
It has been widely acknowledged that physically unclonable functions (PUFs) as a type of
hardware security primitive have great potentials to be used in many applications. A PUF
is a device implementing a one-way function which takes advantage of process variation to
guarantee the property uniqueness of each piece.
Modern research has shown that some PUF designs are not as perfect as what they
seem to be. Many PUFs can be modeled using software or hardware approaches based
on characterization results. This process is generally noted as PUF emulation. Though
PUFs can be emulated, most state-of-the-art emulation techniques are both inefficient and
inaccurate due to complication in PUF architecture and unstable nature of analog systems.
Software simulations with high precision are generally slow and power-hungry, especially
for complicated PUF designs. Table 2.1 shows the time required to generate 10,000 CRPs
with a 64-bit arbiter PUF and a hardware description language (HDL) simulator. A software
simulation of PUF needs significantly more time to produce a response compared to the use
of the PUF implemented on a piece of hardware. Physically matching a PUF to a target
PUF is an alternative technique. Many studies have taken place in attempting to match two
PUFs using device aging technology [7], which require fine-grained control in laboratories.
Since aging is a unidirectional process, both overage and underage could lead to low precision
in the emulation. Thus, a highly stable operational environment is required.
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Type Latency (s)
HDL simulator 98.38
Hardware PUF 0.001
Table 2.1: Time required to generate 10,000 CRPs with a 64-bit PUF simulation using a
HDL simulator and a 64-bit FPGA-based arbiter PUF implementation.
2.2 Technical Goal and Contributions
Our technical goal is to create a new emulation platform to resolve the above issues in
standard PUF emulation techniques. The key idea is to emulate an existing PUF using
hardware to achieve low latency overhead as well as resilience against operational variations.
We achieve our goal by using the look-up table (LUT) based PDLs. We believe the highly
stable and low latency PDL serves as an ideal building block as our PUF emulation platform.
The PDL is used as a clone that shares similar delay characteristics of each segment in the
standard PUFs. By accurately emulating every single segment of the target PUF, the whole
emulation is capable of predicting the corresponding responses of the target PUF when
provided with an arbitrary challenge.
In this chapter, we first review the related literature on PUFs and PDLs. Then we give
the preliminaries of the basic PUF model we use as well as the design of PDL on FPGA.
We also provide a motivational example of our PUF emulation scheme. We then propose
a high precision PUF characterization mechanism that enables a PUF emulation platform.
Later we demonstrate in detail our PUF emulation platform in the subsequent sections.
Eventually, we provide our analysis of the reliability and accuracy of our proposed design by
presenting experimental results on Spartan-6 XC6SLX45 platforms.
2.3 Related Work
2.3.1 Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)
PUF was first proposed by Pappu et al. using mesoscopic optical systems [8]. Gassend et
al. developed the first silicon PUFs through the use of intrinsic process variation in deep
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submicron integrated circuits [9]. A variety of other types of PUFs have since been proposed,
including arbiter PUFs [9], ring oscillator PUFs [10], SRAM PUFs [11], and butterfly PUFs
[12]. Xu et al. has also propose to digitalize PUFs and create digital PUFs [13]. Another
popular robust PUF design is proposed by Maiti et al. with a selected PUF challenge-
response set [14]. More recently, PUF designs have been focusing on improving randomness
and learning-resilience, including [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]. Nozaki et al. even designs more
side-channel attack resilient PUFs using statistical tests [20].
Numerous traditional protocols can be interpreted using PUFs, ranging from the tra-
ditional security key communication and authentication [21] to more sophisticated public
key communication [22] with the vital idea of employing the high unpredictability of PUF
responses to secure the information. More recently, efforts have been made to enhance the
security and randomness of PUFs. Devadas et al. have proposed to use a syndrome coding
scheme to reduce the amount of information leakage caused by the traditional PUF key
generation system [23]. At the system level, Zheng proposed to use PUFs as an instruction
authentication tool for embedded systems [24].
PUFs have also been well studied in many novel hardware security applications. Devadas
et al. proposed to use PUFs in RFID for anti-counterfeiting applications[25]. Gu et al.
propose several low power applications based on PUF including computing-while-racing PUF
[26] and PUF-based system anomaly detector [27]. Zhang et al. proposed a PUF-FSM
binding scheme for IP-protection [28]. Xu et al. proposed an ultra-low energy PUF matching
scheme using programmable delay lines [29] and device aging [30]. Gao et al. proposed to
use SRAM PUF for key generations [31], Huang et al. proposed a PUF-based identity
verification [32]. Gope et al. also applied PUF to RFID authentication protocols [33].
Tajik et al. designed a system monitor using PUFs [34]. Aman et al. embedded PUFs in
IoT systems for mutual authentication purposes [35]. PUFs can also be used to construct
Recursive Inverse Functions(RIF) that provide fast and ultra-low energy encryption and
decryption for data protection [36].
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2.3.2 Programmable Delay Lines (PDL)
Programmable delay lines are a series of digital delay lines with electrically programmable
and trimmable delay times [37]. Taking advantage of internal structures of LUTs, Majzoobi
et al. proposed to implement PDLs through creating and controlling delay biases on FPGAs
[38]. PDLs are used in many different applications, including bus timing adjustment [39],
programmable pulse generator at high resolution [40] and metastability characterization on
FPGA [41]. Since PDLs are usually controlled at ps-level, accurate delay measurements is
required. Tsai et al. proposed vernier delay line-based built-in delay measurement circuits
with a small area overhead and can provide high-resolution delay measurement [42]. Ray-
chowdhury et al. proposed on-chip delay estimation of segment path delays in [43]. Majzoobi
et al. designed a delay characterization circuit with clock synthesis that can measure delays
at picosecond resolution on FPGAs through probabilistic estimation[44].
2.3.3 PUF Attacks
Even though unclonability and unpredictability are the main characteristics of PUFs, previ-
ous work has shown that PUFs are vulnerable to three types of attacks: modeling attacks,
physical attacks, and side-channel attacks.
Modeling attacks are a commonly adopted approach for PUF characterization. Ruhrmair
et al. proved that arbiter PUFs are weak against machine learning attacks [45]. They further
analyzed the PUFs in the context of security protocols in [46]. Ganji et al. proved that ring
oscillator PUFs could be completely learned using a Probably Approximately Correct (PAC)
learning framework [47].
Physical attacks correspond to gate and transistor level characterization (GLC) where
delay, leakage, or some other device metrics are analyzed [48]. Tajik et al. proposed a
photonic emission analysis mechanism to characterize an arbiter PUF with extremely high
precision [49].
Side-channel attacks have also been studied in breaking existing PUF designs. Mahmoud
et al. proposed to combine modeling attacks with power side-channel attacks to better
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characterize PUFs [50].
2.3.4 PUF Emulation
Many attacks on PUF designs have enabled a large number of studies in emulating a PUF
device. Software simulation is one of the most popular methods to predict responses based
on a given challenge. All research mentioned in Section 2.3.3 adopts software simulation to
evaluate characterization accuracy. However, software simulation suffers from high latency
and high energy consumption, thus not capable of providing a lightweight real-time emulation
of a target PUF.
Another way of emulating a target PUF is through PUF matching (creating a physical
clone of a PUF). Helfmeier et al. proposed a mechanism to produce a physical clone of
an existing SRAM PUF using Focused Ion Beam circuit edit [51]. Meguerdichian et al.
proposed a method to match a PUF to another PUF using device aging techniques [7].
Creating a physical clone of a PUF using the above methods requires laboratory equipment
and environment, thus very expensive and difficult to achieve.
2.4 Preliminaries
2.4.1 PUF Model
The PUFs we intend to emulate are standard arbiter PUFs. Figure 2.1 shows the schematic
diagram of the PUF model. The basic structure of an n-bit PUF consists of n delay segments.
The four propagation delays in the ith segment are denoted as diAC , d
i
BD, d
i
AD and d
i
BC
respectively. diAC and d
i
BD are considered a delay pair, and d
i
AD and d
i
BC are considered as
another delay pair. The delays within each delay pair are designed to be nominally equal
to each other. After manufacturing, however, process variation causes unpredictable delay
difference within each pair. When built on an FPGA, each delay pair in each segment is
directly implemented using LUTs with the same size. Two identically designed overall paths
are generated by connecting delay components in each segment in a chain, and an arbiter is
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appended at the end of the two paths. The two paths can be modified using the control bit of
each segment. For example, in Figure 2.1, if the control bit of the ith segment is 0, then diAC
is appended to the upper segmental path and diBD appended to the lower segmental path. If
the control bit is 1, diBC is appended to the upper segmental path and d
i
AD is appended to
the lower segmental path. The control bit decides which two delays inside a PUF segment
is appended to the PUF paths.
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C
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dAC
dBD
d
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d B
C
...
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Response
Stimulus
Signal
Challenges
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment n
Figure 2.1: The model of an n-bit arbiter PUF.
The vector consisting of all control bits is denoted as the PUF challenge. When an n-bit
challenge (c1c2 . . . cn−1cn) is provided to the PUF, two nominally identical paths are thus
configured. To retrieve a response, an impulse signal is fed into the system to excite both
paths simultaneously. Because of process variation, the signal traveling along one of the two
paths reaches the arbiter earlier, generating a corresponding arbiter output denoted as the
PUF response. For an n-bit PUF, there exist 2n challenge-response pairs.
2.4.2 PDL on FPGA
Majzoobi et al. [38] proposed a general design of PDL on FPGA platforms implemented
using a single LUT-2. Figure 2.2 shows an example PDL implemented with LUT-2 with two
selection bits S0 and S1. The propagation delay from A0 to Oi when A0 = 0 is displayed in the
blue line, and the same delay when S0 = 1 is shown in the red line. The path represented in
the red line seems longer than the path marked in blue according to the figure, representing
the propagation delay from S0 to Oi is longer when S0 = 1. This result indicates that
different input value, although completely digital, could result in a slight difference in the
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Figure 2.2: The internal structure of a 2-input LUT.
analog propagation delays. We utilize the design of the slightest asymmetry in PDL design
to emulate delay-based PUFs.
2.5 A Motivational Example
Segment	Si	
PDLai	
PDLbi	
PDLci	
Δdi	
ΔdPDLi	
Δdi-1	
ΔdPDLi-1	
Matched	PDL	
Segment	
0	
1	
Figure 2.3: An example of using PDLs to emulate a PUF.
Now we illustrate our PDL-based PUF emulation platform using a motivational example
in Figure 2.3. We assume the PUF to be emulated the same structure as we explained in the
Preliminaries section, where each PUF segment uses a user-provided control bit to configure
the competing paths within the segment. For example, if the control bit of segment i is
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zero then the delay difference between the upper and lower path ∆di = diAC − diBD; if the
control bit of segment i is one then the delay difference between the upper and lower path
would instead be ∆di = diBC − diAD. To clone segment i in the target PUF, we create three
PDLs to form an emulation segment. We carefully choose the selection bits for each PDL
so that the three PDLs (PDLia, PDL
i
b, PDL
i
c) are configured to obtain delays d
i
A, d
i
B and
diC respectively. Similar to segment i in the target PUF, the ith emulation segment also
takes a control bit to select which two PDL delays are appended to the path. If the control
bit is 0, PDLia and PDL
i
b are selected, producing d
i
PDL = d
i
a − dib ≈ ∆di = diAC − diBD
as output delay difference; if the control bit is 1 PDLia and PDL
i
c are selected, producing
diPDL = d
i
a−dic ≈ ∆di = diBC−diAD in output delay difference. The same emulation process is
thus repeated for all segments of the target PUF. To summarize, the basic idea of emulating
an n-bit PUF is to configure 3n PDLs where the delays of each PDL are configured in such
a way that all delay differences produced by each PUF segment can be reproduced using
PDLs.
2.6 PUF Characterization
It is well known that standard arbiter PUFs can be characterized using statistical methods
[52]. In this section, we first propose a linear model for an arbiter PUF design. We claim
that by solving a set of linear equations constructed by measuring PUF delay differences,
we can characterize a target PUF of our choice with low overhead. The resulting model can
accurately retrieve the delay differences in each PUF segment.
2.6.1 Creating Linear Equations
Assume that the characterization target is an n-bit arbiter PUF with n segments. We use
the same notation as we declared in Figure 2.2. The ith PUF segment has 4 different delays.
The four delays are respectively diAC , d
i
AD, d
i
BC and d
i
BD. The control bit of the segment
decides which pair of delays is appended to the segmental paths shown in Equation 2.1.
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Delay(Path 1), Delay(Path 2) =

diAC , d
i
BD ci = 0
diBC , d
i
AD ci = 1
(2.1)
The two paths generate one of the two possible delay differences depending on the chal-
lenge bit ci. For clarity, we denote the delay difference of the ith PUF segment to be ∆d
i,
defined in Equation 2.2.
∆di =

diAC − diBD ci = 0
diBC − diAD ci = 1
(2.2)
The value of ∆di can be either positive or negative. For example, when ci = 0, a positive
∆di indicates that diAC > d
i
BD and a negative ∆d
i indicates that diAC < d
i
BD.
We observe that the delay difference ∆d between the two PUF paths is merely the sum
of all segmental delay differences in the PUF. Based on this observation, we can create linear
equations if the delay difference between a pair of competing PUF paths is measured. Solving
the equations would thus provide accurate delay difference characterization for each PUF
segment.
Based on Equation 2.2, we create two variables representing the two possible delay differ-
ences in each PUF segment ∆di0 = d
i
AC−diBD and ∆di1 = diBC−diAD. For a 64-bit PUF, there
are in total of 128 unknown variables. We also generate 10,000 random challenge vectors
and measure the final delay differences between the two nominally identical PUF paths. The
delay differences are measured using a pico-second accurate delay characterization circuit.
For N challenges, we are capable of constructing N linear equations with m unknown vari-
ables. The jth linear equation is constructed from the jth challenge vector cj = {cj1cj2 . . . cjm}.
An example of a set of 10,000 linear equations on a 64-bit arbiter PUF is shown below.
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∆d1k11
+ ∆d2k12
+ . . .+ ∆dnk1m = ∆d
measure
1
∆d1k21
+ ∆d2k22
+ . . .+ ∆dnk2m = ∆d
measure
2
. . .
∆d1kN1
+ ∆d2kN2
+ . . .+ ∆dnkNm = ∆d
measure
N
N = 10, 000,m = 64
kji =

0 cji = 0
1 cji = 1
We split the 10,000 equations into 10 sets and apply a linear equation solver to find the
least square solutions to solve for a close approximate of delay differences in each segment
for each set. We take the average solution for each variable to be the delay difference value.
2.6.2 Improving Characterization Accuracy
PUF as a security primitive has suffered from stability issues. An unstable CRP might
alter the corresponding linear equation and eventually lead to a large error rate in the delay
characterization result. A stable CRP, on the other hand, is less likely to modify the linear
equation, making the solutions more consistent. To improve characterization accuracy, we
propose to create linear equations based on only stable CRPs.
Table 2.2 shows the CRP distribution of a 64-bit arbiter PUF. Overall, 87.94% of the
responses are stable when provided with the same challenge. We define stable CRPs as
CRPs that inverts its response with probability less than 10% when providing the same
challenge 1,000 times. 63.5% of 10,000 challenges provides stable responses. By creating
linear equations based on only stable CRPs, we believe the characterization accuracy can be
improved.
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Type Bit inversion rate range Frequency
Stable ≤ 10% 63.5%
Mostly Stable 10% - 30% 32.2%
Unpredictable bit inversion > 30% 5.3%
Table 2.2: CRP distribution of a 64-bit arbiter PUF. 10,000 randomly selected challenges
were fed into the PUF and the bit inversion rate is calculated over 1,000 measurement of
responses.
2.7 PUF Emulation - PDL Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the delay characteristics, process variation effect, and stability
properties of PDL to examine the feasibility of using PDL to emulate an arbiter PUF.
2.7.1 Delay Measurement Setup
To measure and verify the delay of PDL on the FPGA we use the circuit describe by Majzoobi
et al. [38]. The delay characterization circuit is shown in Figure 2.4. We assumes the clock-
to-Q delay at the launch FF is tclk2Q, the clock skew between the launch and sample flip-flops
(FFs) is tskew, the clock pulse width is denoted as T and the time that a signal propagate
through Circuit Under Test (CUT) and reach the sample FF from the moment the launch
FF is clocked is denoted as tp = tCUT + tclk2Q − tskew. Noted in our experiment the CUT
is essentially PDL segments connected in chains using the configurations to adjust its delay
characteristics.
The pulse generator sweeps through different frequencies and calculates the approximate
delay from the frequency of the clock signal that causes the timing error probability to be
50%. The measurement is valid because as we sweep the frequency of the function generated
from the pulse generator T and makes it approach tp, the sample FF enters a metastable
state because of the setup and hold time violations, and its output becomes nondeterministic.
The probability that the metastable state resolves to a 0 or 1 is a function of how close T is
to tp. The metastable state resolves to a 1 with a probability of 0.5 indicate that T = tCUT .
Through careful adjustment of the pulse frequency at high resolution, the circuit could
achieve pico-second resolution in delay measurements.
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Figure 2.4: Delay characterization circuit.
2.7.2 Delay Measurement Results
Average delay of each LUT are measured and calculated under 25 ◦C operating temperature,
1.2V FPGA core voltage. The results are shown in Figure 2.5. Figure 2.5a shows the delay
difference between any pair of configuration bits. Figure 2.5b shows the absolute value of the
delay difference between any pair of configuration bits and Figure 2.5c shows the Hamming
distance heatmap between each pair.
The largest difference is 13 ps, which occurs between 00000 and 11111, located at location
(x,y) = (0,31) and location (31,0) in Figure 2.5a and 2.5b. The diagonal line in both figures
from the lower left corner to the upper right corner is all 0s because we are comparing each
configuration bit to itself.
We notice that some patterns shown in Figure 2.5b can be observed in Figure 2.5c.
The upper left and the lower right corner of both heatmaps are very similar, indicating
that if two configuration vectors have a large delay difference in PDL, these two vectors
also have a large Hamming distance. We believe this is an accurate observation because
large Hamming distance indicates that the corresponding internal signal paths share very
few common routes. Consequently, it is more likely to generate a higher delay difference.
However, note that sharing a few common routes does not always indicate a large delay
difference. Two very distinct signal paths might produce a small delay difference. Thus, we
also see many patterns in the Hamming difference heatmap are not observable in Figure 2.5b
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(a) (b) (c)(a) Delay difference between any pair of config-
uration bits. Delay difference unit measured in
ps.
(a) (b) (c)(b) Absolute value of delay difference between any
pair of configuration bits. Delay difference unit
measured in ps.
(a) (b) (c)(c) Hamming distance between all pairs of config-
uration bits.
Figure 2.5: Delay Measurement Results
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2.7.3 Process Variation
We have run experiments on three difference FPGA boards to test the effect of process
variation. For each board, we implemented PDL on five different locations with the same
design. All PDLs are provided 00000 and 11111 as configuration bits. The average delays of
PDL on three boards are compared and presented in Table 2.3 indicating process variation
leading to approximately 1.6% of fluctuation. However, the delay differences stay relatively
stable, with variation less than 3ps. Thus, we believe it is safe to assume process variation
has limited impact on PDL when implemented on similar hardware, especially when the size
of PDL is relatively small.
00000 (ns) 11111 (ns) Difference (ns)
FPGA 1 0.555 0.568 0.013
FPGA 2 0.553 0.564 0.011
FPGA 3 0.546 0.556 0.010
Table 2.3: Delay measurement results on three FPGAs (XC6SLX45).
2.7.4 Stability
Ideally, any pair of configuration bits ci, cj (ci 6= cj) should produce a pair of delays with a
non-zero delay difference when applied to two PDLs, and the delay difference should remain
stable. However, this is not always true in reality. PDL is a timing-based scheme. Thus, it
is sensitive to environmental changes. Also, the environmental impact on delays may not be
equal for each path inside the PDL. Non-uniform impact on delays thus leads to instability
in pairwise delay differences.
As an example, Figure 2.6 illustrates two possible outcomes of temperature variations for
two PDL paths. Figure 2.6a shows a scenario where path 2 is more sensitive to temperature
than path 1. At lower temperature t1, the delay on PDL path 1 d
t1
Path1 is larger than the
delay on PDL path 2 dt1Path2 (∆d1 = d
t1
Path1 − dt1Path2 > 0). However, when the temperature
increases to t2, delay on path 2 increases at a faster rate, and at a point the delay on path
2 is greater than the delay on path 1 (∆d2 = d
t2
Path1 − dt2Path2 < 0). We intend to avoid this
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Path 3
Path 4
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Figure 2.6: Signal propagation delay of PDL vs. temperature of two PDL paths
scenario because this type of instability results in sign inversion of delay differences, creating
a significant error with a relatively large probability. Figure 2.6b shows an almost ideal
scenario where the sign of delay differences between path 3 and path 4 (∆d3 and ∆d4) does
not change as the temperature varies from t1 to t2. Also, ∆d3 ≈ ∆d4, which means that the
delay difference value stays relatively stable as well. Stable delay difference, in turn, leads
to low error rate in emulation results.
Similar to PUFs, PDL is primarily affected by temperature and voltage. To analyze how
PDL behaviors can vary, we test PDL in different environmental settings. Our experimental
results show that PDL is capable of producing relatively stable delay differences in normal
conditions. All delay measurements are done on a chain of four PDLs using the delay
characterization circuit. The PDL chain is connected serially as shown in Figure 2.7. All
delays are measured from the signal-in port to the signal-out port.
PDL1 PDL2 PDL3 PDL4
Configuration 
[19:15]
Configuration 
[14:10]
Configuration 
[9:5]
Configuration 
[4:0]
Signal-in Signal-out
Figure 2.7: PDL chain used for stability tests.
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2.7.4.1 Temperature
We evaluate the delays of PDL for 20,000 different configuration bits on a chain of four PDLs
at five different temperatures within the allowed operating temperature range (0 ∼ 85 ◦C).
The delays are measured using the delay characterization circuit as described in Figure 2.4.
We adjust the temperature by placing the FPGA device in a temperature controlled chamber.
To evaluate the delay characteristic variations as core temperature changes, we first collected
delay measurements for 10,000 PDLs on FPGA. Then, we observe the stability of PDL
in different temperatures through constructing 10,000 delay pairs (reference temperature
vs. tested temperature) and calculate the delay ratio between each pair. Ideally, if the
temperature impact on the PDL chain is uniform over all PDL paths, we should observe
those delay ratios stay unchanged as we adjust the temperature. We set the delay ratios
measured at 25 ◦C as our reference and compare all delay ratios at different temperatures
with it.
Figure 2.8: Delay characteristic variation under different temperature settings.
Figure 2.8 indicates the delay characteristic changes as core temperature varies. The
average delay slightly decreases by 6.89%, while the variance in delays increases by 4.25% as
temperature increase from 5 ◦C to 85 ◦C.
Figure 2.9 shows the comparison results in four different temperature settings: 5 ◦C,
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(a) Delay pair ratios
25 ◦C vs. 5 ◦C.
(b) Delay pair ratios
25 ◦C vs. 45 ◦C.
(c) Delay pair ratios
25 ◦C vs. 65 ◦C.
(d) Delay pair ratios
25 ◦C vs. 85 ◦C.
Figure 2.9: Delay ratio stability over 4 different temperature settings, VCCINT fixed at
1.2V. Red line: linear regression result. Green line: degree-2 quadratic regression result.
45 ◦C, 65 ◦C and 85 ◦C. Each blue point represents a specific delay ratio between two config-
uration vectors, where the x coordinate is the ratio calculated in the reference temperature
and the y coordinate is the ratio calculated in the test temperature. The black line in
each subgraph indicates the result of a perfectly stable PDL. Linear regression (red line)
and degree-2 quadratic regression (green line) were performed on the collected data. The
degree-2 quadratic regressions in all four settings are very close to straight lines, indicating
a linear relationship between the x-axis and the y-axis. To quantify the stability of PDL in
all temperature settings, we evaluate the slope, intercept, and standard error of all linear
regression results in Table 2.4.
In general, at 5 ◦C and 45 ◦C, the regression slope is very close to 1, the intercept is close
to 0, and the standard error is almost negligible, meaning the impact of temperature change
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Temperature Slope Intercept std err
5 ◦C 0.9795 0.0200 0.0027
45 ◦C 0.9813 0.0186 0.0030
65 ◦C 0.6304 0.3696 0.0075
85 ◦C 0.4450 0.5550 0.0093
Table 2.4: Linear regression results on PDL temperature stability evaluation.
is mostly uniform over all PDL paths so that the delay difference stays relatively stable.
At higher temperatures 65 ◦C and 85 ◦C, the regression slopes are respectively 0.6304 and
0.4450, far from 1, indicating some paths are much more sensitive to the temperatures than
others. This result means at very high temperature the PDL-based emulation segment result
has a much higher probability of being inconsistent with the results collected at 25 ◦C. In our
emulation platform design, we assume that the temperature varies at most 20 ◦C from the
room temperature. Thus, it is safe to claim that PDL is stable against reasonable thermal
fluctuation.
2.7.4.2 Voltage
Similar to the evaluation of thermal variations, we investigate the voltage variation impact
on PDL. Our experimental platform Spartan-6 does not contain a freely tunable DC-DC
converter in the power module, thus adjusting core voltage cannot be done internally. More-
over, the manufacturer of our experimental platform has a fairly stringent requirement on
FPGA core voltage (VCCINT = 1.2V), making it very difficult and risky to directly apply
an adjustable external power source to the FPGA core. Fortunately, Spartan-6 provides an
extended performance mode that applies to VCCINT = 1.26V. We first evaluate the changes
in delay characteristics as we change the VCCINT in Figure 2.10. We observe that the av-
erage delay slightly decreases by 11.19%, while the variance in delays decreases by 19.46%
as VCCINT increase from 1.2V to 1.26V.
We also evaluate the delay ratio between 10,000 PDL delay pairs in both normal mode
and extended performance mode. The result is shown in Figure 2.11.
Figure 2.11 shows that by increasing the FPGA core voltage from 1.2V to 1.26V, the im-
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Figure 2.10: Delay characteristic variation under two VCCINT settings.
Figure 2.11: Delay ratio stability when increasing FPGA core voltage from 1.2V to 1.26V,
operating temperature fixed to 25 ◦C. Red line shows linear regression result, green line
shows degree-2 quadratic regression result.
pact on each path is relatively stable and consistent. Also, both linear and degree-2 quadratic
regression were performed and the results are plotted in the figure. The quadratic regression
result (green line) is almost flat, indicating that a linear model is a better representation
of the data. The linear regression result (red line) indicates that the delay pair ratios stay
mostly stable as we increase the voltage. Linear regression has a slope of 0.9754, intercept of
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0.02463, and standard error of 0.0027, very close to the ideal result (black line). Based on the
results, we claim it is safe to assume that the PDL delay ratio stays relatively stable against
minor changes in voltage and the impact of voltage variation is uniform over all paths.
Also, it is interesting to notice that less variance is observed on both ends of the plot.
This phenomenon is also observed in temperature variation experiments. When the delay
ratios are further away from 1, meaning the delay differences are larger, the PDL is less likely
to behave differently when the environment changes.
2.8 PUF Emulation - Design
In this section, we discuss a PDL-based hardware emulation of a characterized PUF. We
first propose a segmental emulation approach that emulates each segment in the PUF. Later
we propose a method to scale the delay difference by a factor in the new emulation platform
while maintaining the challenge-response relationship. Lastly, we introduce a method to find
the scaling factor that maximizes emulation accuracy.
2.8.1 Perfect Segmental Emulation
The goal of perfect segmental emulation is to create an exact “clone” for each segment in
the PUF so that when connecting all emulation segments together, an accurate emulation
of the entire PUF is then constructed.
After the characterization process of a PUF, delay differences for each segment is re-
trieved. We use three PDL to create an emulation segment Ei with three different delays diA,
diB and d
i
C to emulate the ith segment of the PUF. We program the control bits of each PDL
so that the three delays are capable of producing two delay differences ∆di1 and ∆d
i
2 that
are identical to the two delay differences the ith PUF segment generates. The segmental
emulation is described in Equation 2.3 and 2.4.
∆di1 = d
i
a − dib (2.3)
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∆di2 = d
i
a − dic (2.4)
If we can guarantee the validity of Equation 2.3 and 2.4, then it is safe to claim that Ei
now behaves the same way the ith PUF segment behaves.
Control	bit	
PDLai	
PDLbi	
PDLci	
ΔdPDLi	
0	
1	
A	
B	
C	
D	
Figure 2.12: Internal design of the ith emulation segment Ei.
Figure 2.12 shows the internal structure of the ith emulation segment Ei. PDLia is
configured to have delay of dia, PDL
i
b is configured to have delay of d
i
b and PDL
i
c is configured
to have delay of dic. The entire segment takes a control bit to select a pair of PDL delays to
generate the desired delay difference: ∆di1 or ∆d
i
2.
2.8.2 Delay Difference Scaling
Perfect segmental emulation guarantees the correctness of the emulation; however, it is chal-
lenging to implement. The delay difference characterization results we eventually obtained
are relatively small, sometimes even less than the PDL resolution of 1 ps. Thus, it is not
possible to create a perfect clone (with the same delays) of a PUF segment using PDL on
an FPGA platform.
We observe that an accurate emulation can be created without a perfect segmental emu-
lation. The PUF response does not depend on actual delay value, but instead the sign of the
difference between competing for path delays. We can multiply the real delay difference by
any positive factor α, and the sign of the difference between path delays should remain the
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same. If d(p)− d(p′) > 0, then αd(p)− αd(p′) > 0 for α > 0. Delay difference scaling allows
adjustments of delays in each PDL so that accurate emulation can still be achieved. Note
once a suitable scaling factor α has been decided, this value should be applied consistently
to all emulation segments to ensure the correctness of the sign of final delay difference.
2.8.3 Scaling Factor
A PDL is able to create a delay dPDL that falls within a specific range [dmin, dmax]. This
range usually covers delay difference from 1-100 ps depending on the FPGA platform. Before
emulating a target PUF, all emulation segments should agree on a minimum delay difference
of ∆dminPDL. ∆d
min
PDL should not be less than the PDL resolution because a small delay difference
would lead to the domination of process variation and measurement errors over actual PDL
path difference, resulting in unpredictable and inaccurate results in the emulation.
The minimum delay difference can be used to identify the smallest scaling factor of αmin.
We define minimum scaling factor in Equation 2.5.
αmin =
∆dminPDL
∆dminPUF
(2.5)
Similarly, the maximum scaling factor αmax should be the ratio of largest delay difference
obtainable by two PDL and the largest delay difference in the characterization result as
shown in Equation 2.6.
αmax =
∆dmaxPDL
∆dminPUF
(2.6)
An ideal scaling factor α should be in the range [αmin, αmax]. Our experimental results
in Figure 2.9 and 2.11 show that a large delay difference usually results in better stability
against environmental changes. A larger scaling factor creates larger delay differences; thus,
in turn, making emulation more stable. Though a large scaling factor is favored for stability,
in theory, all scaling factors should provide the same emulation accuracy.
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2.9 Emulation Improvement
The newly created emulation should be able to predict a large number of CRPs of the target
PUF. However, basic segment-by-segment emulation fails to consider many unpredictable
factors. In this section, we provide two techniques that could potentially benefit our emu-
lation scheme in terms of overhead and accuracy. We first explore a mechanism to emulate
every two segments in the PUF to reduce the total number of PDLs required for the emu-
lation. We then propose to use multiple PDL emulations to vote for a prediction result to
eliminate process variation effects and environmental noise.
2.9.1 Two-Segment Emulation
Originally each PUF segment generates two delay differences ∆dia and ∆d
i
b, so three PDLs
are sufficient to emulate one PUF segment. To emulate an n-bit PUF, we require as many as
3n PDLs. However, when treating every two PUF segments as a group, the new group now
generates four different delay differences: ∆dia + ∆d
i+1
a , ∆d
i
b + ∆d
i+1
a , ∆d
i
b + ∆d
i+1
a and ∆d
i
b
+ ∆di+1b . Now in order to emulate these four delay differences, five PDLs are needed. To
emulate an n-bit PUF, only 5n
2
PDLs are needed, saving n
2
PDLs comparing to one-to-one
emulation scheme.
2.9.2 Output Voting
As shown in Section 2.7.4, PDLs are sensitive to environmental changes. Even though we
scaled the delay difference to a relatively large number to reduce the effects of environmen-
tal change, some errors are inevitable. Moreover, hardware malfunctions could also lead to
incorrect emulation results. To eliminate the errors, we propose to create multiple emula-
tions of the same PUF. When provided with a challenge, multiple emulations vote for the
corresponding response, and we adopt the most-voted response as the correct output. The
emulation process and the scaling factor for all emulation copies should be identical. If the
majority of emulation copies produces a response r, it is more likely that r is the correct
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response.
2.10 Experimental Results
We implement our PDL-based PUF emulation on Spartan-6 XC6SLX45 FPGAs. When
applying the same challenge vector to both the target PUF and the PDL-based emulation, the
probability that the original PUF (running at 25 ◦C and 1.2V) and the emulation generate the
same response is defined as emulation accuracy or prediction accuracy. PUF responses
are collected 10 times to rule out unstable CRPs.
2.10.1 Characterization Accuracy
Our characterization approach provides highly accurate delay characterization at the segment
level. We first test the precision of our results by solving 10 sets of linear equations generated
from random CRPs, we then characterize the PUF by solving 10 sets of linear equations
obtained from only stable CRPs. The results for the delay differences in the first 8 PUF
segments are shown in Figure 2.13.
Both characterizations provide very similar results. However, the variance for each vari-
able solution is different. For all obtained delay differences from random CRPs, the average
variance is 0.0145 ps, 64.77% greater than the average variance of solutions obtained from
only stable CRPs (0.0088 ps). This variance difference shows that characterizing using only
stable CRPs provide much better accuracy.
2.10.2 Baseline Emulation
The target PUF we intend to emulate is a 64-bit arbiter PUF. We first collect a set of 100,000
randomly selected CRPs to run the characterization. We then collect a set of 100,000 stable
CRPs and characterize the PUF only on stable CRPs. We create a software simulation using
characterization result on both datasets.
Based on the two PUF characterization results, we also emulate the PUF using PDLs
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Figure 2.13: Characterization results obtained from solving 10 sets of linear equations gen-
erated from random and stable CRPs. Boxes indicates 95% confidence interval.
without emulation improvement techniques (baseline emulation). For the baseline emulation,
we calculated the scaling factor range to be between 3 and 8. Based on our observation in
Section 2.8.3, we take the maximum value within the range 8 to be our scaling factor.
We measure the PUF prediction accuracy for both simulation and PDL-based emula-
tion. For simulation and emulation based on random CRP characterization, the accuracy is
measured by providing newly generated 100,000 random challenges to both the target PUF
and its emulation. For simulation and emulation based on stable CRPs, the accuracy is
calculated as the successful prediction rate on newly generated stable challenges.
Table 2.5 shows the prediction accuracy using both software simulation and PDL-based
emulation. Both random CRP characterization and stable CRP characterization were ap-
plied. Using stable CRP as the characterization dataset improves the software simulation
accuracy by 5.19%, for a corresponding characterization accuracy of 5.19%. Characteriza-
tion only on stable CRPs improves the emulation accuracy by 5.07% as well. Experimental
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results also show that our PDL-based emulation scheme loses approximately 5% accuracy
compared to software simulation.
Dataset Simulation Emulation
Random CRP 85.93±1.76% 80.72±2.27%
Stable CRP 91.12±1.49% 85.79±1.78%
Table 2.5: PUF prediction accuracy for software simulation and PDL-based hardware emu-
lation using random CRP characterization data and stable CRP characterization data. The
emulation accuracy is shown in the format of 95% confidence interval.
2.10.3 Improved Emulation
We measure the delay, area, and energy consumption for both the baseline and two-segment
PDL-based PUF emulation on a 64-bit PUF. The results are shown in Table 2.6. two-
segment emulation saves 16.67% LUTs, 47.01% in maximum delay, and 11.84% in terms of
energy consumption.
Type Baseline Two-Segment
LUTs 192 160
Slices 96 80
Max Delay (ns) 37.84 20.05
Energy (µJ) 3.04× 10−4 2.68× 10−4
Table 2.6: Overhead of Baseline and two-Segement PDL-based emulation of a 64-bit PUF.
We then apply an emulation voting mechanism. We create three identical PDL-based
emulation copies, and we always take the response generated by the majority party as the
output. We combined the two techniques and evaluated the overall PUF prediction accuracy.
Dataset Baseline Two-segment Voting Combined
Random 80.72±2.27% 80.97±1.92% 82.72±0.91% 83.15±1.79%
Stable 85.79±1.78% 86.09±2.06% 87.22±0.62% 87.42±1.59%
Table 2.7: PUF prediction accuracy for baseline emulation, two-segment emulation, and
voting. All emulation accuracy results are shown in the format of 95% confidence interval.
Table 2.7 shows our evaluation results. On average two-segment emulation does not
affect the emulation accuracy while saving overall area, delay, and energy overhead. The
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voting mechanism, on the other hand, produces approximately 2% and 1.43% improvement
for random and stable datasets. By combining the two techniques, we achieve approximately
2.43% improvement on a random CRP dataset and 1.63% on a stable CRP dataset.
2.10.4 Emulation Stability
We evaluated the stability of PDL in different temperature and voltage settings. We first
apply 50 randomly generated challenges to the PDL-based emulation scheme. Each challenge
is applied 1,000 times, and we observe the rate of output consistency. Our evaluation results
show that on average 98.45% of the produced responses stay stable where the target PUF
has only 87.94% of the responses stays consistent.
We then measure the emulation accuracy comparing to original PUF in different envi-
ronmental settings to show that our PDL-based emulation scheme is stable against more
substantial environmental variations.
Environment Accuracy
25 ◦C, 1.2V 85.79±1.78%
5 ◦C, 1.2V 84.17±2.55%
45 ◦C, 1.2V 83.78±3.36%
25 ◦C, 1.26V 82.42±2.05%
Table 2.8: Baseline emulation accuracy in different environments. Characterization done
using 10 sets of stable CRPs. All emulation accuracy results are shown in the format of 95%
confidence interval.
Table 2.8 shows the resulting accuracy slightly decreases by 1.62% and 2.01% when
adjusting the temperature by 20 ◦C in normal mode (VCCINT =1.2V). When controlling
the operating temperature to be consistent, by increasing the voltage to 1.26V, emulation
accuracy decreases by 3.37%. However, in general, the accuracy is still maintained at a high
level; thus, our proposed emulation scheme is stable against large environmental changes.
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2.10.5 Latency Overhead
We compare our design with both PUF simulations using HDL simulators and pure statistical
simulations regarding latency when predicting 10,000 CRPs. The results are shown in Table
2.9. The comparison indicates that our design is 9644x faster than HDL simulators and 827x
faster than software simulations while maintaining competitive prediction accuracy.
Type Latency(s)
HDL Simulation 96.44
Statistical Simulation 0.827
PDL-based Emulation 0.001
Table 2.9: Average latency comparison in generating 10,000 CRPs using software HDL
simulator, pure software simulation, and PDL-based emulation.
2.11 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a fast, compact and low energy PUF emulation platform using
programmable delay lines on FPGA. Our core idea is to characterize an arbiter PUF and
emulate the delay difference of each PUF segment using PDL. The PDLs are configured
such that the emulation has almost the same challenge-response mapping function. We
also evaluated the stability properties of our emulation platform and demonstrated that our
design and implementation is robust against environmental variation. Furthermore, we have
proposed two techniques that are capable of reducing overhead and increasing emulation
accuracy. Experimental results show that our design is 827x faster than software simulation
while providing comparable accuracy.
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CHAPTER 3
Securing PUFs with Interconnection and
Reconfigurability
3.1 Motivation
As of today, the amount of private information stored on and flows between electronic devices
is unimaginable. Adversaries are highly motivated to attack these electronics because of the
potential benefits they can gain from the stolen personal information. Secure and robust
protection of electronics, as a result, is essential for any individual who seeks security and
privacy.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) came to the stage when traditional cryptography
failed to stand its ground against physical attacks, side-channel attacks, and API attacks. A
PUF, different from traditional key-based cryptographic systems, does not require a secret
binary key; instead, the physical entity itself serves as the key. One huge advantage of a
PUF-based system is that the secret key hidden within the physical body is designed to
be unclonable since it utilizes uncontrollable, nanoscale process variations. The complex
structure of a PUF makes the output much harder to be predicted or derived comparing to
those digital systems that stores secret keys in non-volatile memories.
Strong PUFs is a major subtype of PUFs. Like all PUFs, a strong PUF implements a
complex function that maps some challenges to some responses. A PUF is considered as a
strong PUF if it is capable of meeting all the following requirements:
• Unclonability. Unclonability is the most fundamental feature of a PUF. A specific
strong PUF cannot be physically cloned or replicated by anyone. Even the manufac-
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turer who produces the PUF should not be able to manufacture a copy of the PUF
that implements the same mapping function between challenges and responses.
• Unpredictability. Predicting the response of a random challenge should be extremely
difficult, even if the attacker is capable of obtaining a large number of CRPs.
• Determination difficulty. A strong PUF cannot be fully measured or determined within
a reasonable amount of time. A PUF with a small challenge-response mapping set does
not meet this requirement since all mappings can be recorded given enough time (hours,
days or weeks). In most cases, this requirement is equivalent to a large set of possible
challenges and limited read-out frequency.
Several strong PUFs have been proposed and studied in the past, yet none have been
proven to be secure enough to hold all three requirements. The rise of machine learning
technology provides adversaries with a powerful weapon that is capable of creating a model
of the function a PUF implements. A mathematical model is a software program that is
capable of predicting the corresponding responses of a PUF when provided with random
challenges with high probability. Such a mathematical model can be easily established by
learning from a small subset of CRPs.
3.2 Technical Goals and Contributions
In this chapter, we intend to address this problem. We propose a reconfigurable intercon-
nected PUF network structure that is capable of providing sufficient robustness and resilient
against different types of machine learning attacks. Essentially the idea is to create a network
structure that interconnects multiple PUFs so that the system is so complex that current ma-
chine learning attack methods are unable to accurately predict the responses given arbitrary
challenges in a reasonable amount of time. The proposed design is capable of reconfiguring
itself so that challenge-response mappings completely alter. The reconfiguration of an IPN
forces an adversary to restart the attack to learn a new mapping function.
To the best of our knowledge, we make the following contribution in this chapter:
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• We have proposed a network structure that interconnects multiple PUFs. By doing
so, we significantly increase the system complexity as well as breaking the linearity so
that the interconnected PUF network shows high resilience against current machine
learning attack.
• Our interconnected PUF network is compatible with any strong PUF. In this work, we
simulated and implemented interconnected PUF network with only delay-based PUFs
and some well-known variations, however, the whole framework can be easily extended
to other strong PUFs such as Bitline PUF and current mirror PUF.
• We have tested our interconnected PUF network against different algorithms, with and
without the reconfiguration functionality. We show that the sample complexity of an
IPN is significantly larger than the state-of-the-art delay-based PUF and its variants.
Modeling an IPN requires a much larger training set as well as much longer time. We
are the first to propose to reconfigure a PUF-based system before an adversary could
collect the theoretical lower bound of the sample complexity.
• Our reconfigurable PUF network design can be reconfigured during runtime with much
lower latency and overhead comparing to other reconfigurable PUF design such as [53].
3.3 Related Work
3.3.1 Modeling Attack
PUFs are vulnerable to modeling attacks. Early works on modeling attack targeting PUFs
were focused on standard arbiter PUFs [54] [55]. Later on Rhrmair et al. presented modeling
attack results on multiple commonly seen PUFs, including APUFs, XOR PUFs, feed-forward
PUFs. The proved that all investigated PUFs are vulnerable to machine learning attacks
[56]. Vijayakumar et al. later presented more detailed insights on applying different machine
learning attacks to popular PUFs and why simple PUF structures are weak against modeling
attacks [57]. Our results show that the proposed IPN structure provides sufficient resilience
against modeling attacks proposed in the above papers.
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The rise of deep neural networks has imposed new challenges to arbiter PUFs and vari-
ants. A deep neural network is capable of training a model that simulates the function a
PUF implements with high accuracy within a short period of time. Yashiro et al. con-
ducted a security evaluation of authentication systems using arbiter PUFs and concluded
that an arbiter PUF and its variants are vulnerable against deep learning attack [58]. In
this chapter, we show that an IPN provides high resilience against deep learning attack. The
complexity of an IPN is significantly larger than other PUF-based systems so that a deep
neural network can easily fall into overfitting problems when attempting to model an IPN.
The reconfiguration functionality provides additional protection by changing the mapping
function regularly.
3.4 Preliminaries
3.4.1 Strong PUF Model
An IPN can use any strong PUF as fundamental building blocks. We use standard delay-
based arbiter PUFs as an illustrative example for simplicity considerations. An n-bit APUF
takes an n-bit vector as a challenge and produces a 1-bit response as output. The challenge is
provided to configure two nominally identically paths. Each challenge bit controls whether
a pair of paths should swap positions within a PUF segment. An impulse signal is fed
into the system to excite both paths simultaneously to retrieve a response. Because of the
uncontrollable, nanoscale process variation, the signal traveling along one of the two paths
reaches the arbiter earlier, generating corresponding output.
Assuming an arbiter PUF implements a function F that maps a set of n-bit challenges
C to corresponding response set R. We assume no delays on the connection wires and all
delays are contributed by the APUF segments. Given a specific challenge c ∈ C, the ith
APUF segment generates a pair of delays with delay difference of ∆dci . The corresponding
response r ∈ R can be mathematically represented as Equation chap3:eq:stable:
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F (c) = r =

0 if
∑n
i=1 ∆d
c
i > 0
1 if
∑n
i=1 ∆d
c
i < 0
(3.1)
3.4.2 IPN
3.4.2.1 IPN Node
An IPN consists of nodes and edges. A node consists of multiple arbiter PUFs of the same
length. We define an n-bit IPN node of size m consists of m n-bit APUFs. If m = n, a node
is denoted as a homogeneous node, otherwise it is denoted as a heterogeneous node. The size
of a node is the total number of arbiter PUFs running in parallel, and the length of a node is
the number of segments of each arbiter PUF in the node. A demonstrative diagram of a node
is shown in Figure 3.1. An IPN node takes an n-bit vector as the challenge and generates
m 1-bit responses. All APUFs within the same IPN node share the same challenges.
n-bit PUF P0
n-bit PUF P1
n-bit PUF P2
n-bit PUF P2
...
n-bit
Challenge
m-bit
Responsem
Figure 3.1: An IPN node of size m and length n. If m = n, the node is homogenous,
otherwise it is heterogenous.
3.4.2.2 IPN Edge
An IPN node connects to other nodes through edges. To achieve reconfigurability, an edge
is essentially designed to be a shuﬄer that takes the output from the previous node, shuﬄes
the order and feed them to the next node. The design of a shuﬄer is based on a crossbar
switch like architecture that redirects inputs to outputs. An conceptual illustration is shown
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in Figure 3.2. Each intersection of the crossbar is a tri-state buffer that controls how the
inputs can be routed to each output. A configuration vector is used to configure how the
connections between two nodes are shuﬄed, and each bit is used to switch each tri-state
buffer. For example, if an edge is an n-bit shuﬄer that directs the i-th bit of the input to
the j-th output bit, the tri-state buffer at the intersection of the i-th and the j-th bar is thus
set. All output port numbers are represented in the binary form. Note that our design of
the shuﬄer is non-blocking; thus conflicts are acceptable, though a large number of conflicts
could weaken the unpredictability of IPN. Starvation would also not be a problem as the
previous input would be buffered and applied in case of output starvation.
Using our design of the shuﬄer, the connections between nodes can be reconfigured easily
by changing the configuration vector. We define a configuration of an IPN as a collection of
all configuration vectors for all shuﬄers in the IPN.
r0
r1
r2
r3
In
pu
ts
Outputs
c0 c1 c2 c3
EN
B
IN
PU
T
O
UT
PU
T
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N
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G
Figure 3.2: A conceptual illustration of a crossbar switch like shuﬄer.
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3.4.2.3 IPN Chain
A simple network can be constructed by connecting IPN nodes using to form a chain. All
IPN nodes are connected through IPN edges. An edge from nodei to nodei+1 indicates that
the output of nodei is fed into a shuﬄer, then connects to all APUFs in nodei+1. Thus, each
APUF in nodei+1 depends on the outputs of all APUFs in nodei.
3.4.2.4 More Complex Connections
IPN nodes can be connected in more complex manners. IPN supports not only one-to-one
but also one-to-many, many-to-one and many-to-many connections between nodes.
One-to-many connections can be used to increase the output length as multiple nodes
take the output of a specific node as input. The n-bit output of node0 is used as input for
two n-bit homogenous nodes node1 and node2, eventually generating a 2n-bit response.
We borrow the idea of XOR PUFs to use logic like AND, OR or XOR to create many-
to-one connections in IPNs. Many-to-one connections can be used to break the linearity and
to increase system entropy. node0 and node1 takes the same input and generates two sets
of corresponding outputs. A logic operation such as XOR is applied to the outputs, and
the result is then taken by node2 as input. Many-to-one connections are expensive since
the input/output length ratio is significantly larger than that of a one-to-one connection,
resulting in requiring more PUF segments to build.
A many-to-many connection is a mixture of both one-to-many and many-to-many con-
nections. The XORed result of both node0 and node1 outputs is fed to both node2 and node3
as input. A many-to-many connection provides additional nonlinearity without sacrificing
the output size.
The combination of one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one and many-to-many connec-
tions enables the possibility of creating larger and more complicated IPN, providing addi-
tional resilience and robustness against various attacks.
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3.4.3 IPN Parameters
IPN nodes, edges and different connections provide tremendous freedom in constructing a
network. In this section, we intend to define some parameters associated with IPN structures.
3.4.3.1 Network Depth
We define the depth of an IPN as the length of the shortest path from an input node to an
output node. An IPN with greater depth theoretically creates more dependency within the
network, making the entire structure not differentiable so that machine learning techniques
based on differentiable models (e.g., Support Vector Machine) inefficient. Also, a deeper
IPN has multiple layers of dependency and requires more PUF segments, which increases
the system complexity and makes it more difficult to predict. The concept of levels in an
IPN is strongly associated with depth. The level of an IPN node is defined by one plus the
smallest number of connections between the node and the root node.
3.4.3.2 Network Width
We define the width of an IPN as the maximum number of nodes that shares the same
input. According to our design, a wider IPN would have more many-to-one or many-to-
many connections comparing to the slimmer topology. A wide IPN has more nonlinearity
since many-to-one, and many-to-many connections require nonlinear logics such as AND,
OR and XOR.
3.5 Attacks models
In this section, we first discuss the security assumptions we make in this chapter. We then
briefly explain some conventional modeling/characterization techniques on PUFs that have
been proven to be effective in state-of-the-art PUF-based systems. We later investigate
some newly proposed modeling methods including deep-learning-based attacks and autoML
modeling.
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3.5.1 Assumptions
We consider the same assumption for controlled PUFs [59] that physical attacks on the
control logic (which in our case is the reconfiguration logic) are more likely to alter or even
destroy the PUF itself. The adversary has physical access to the PUF and its public CRP
interface, as it is common in the established PUF attack model. The adversary can thus
repeat CRP measurements at will in order to gain output stability.
3.5.2 Logistic Regressions
Logistic regression is proven to be effective against conventional delay-based arbiter PUFs
and variations such as XOR PUFs and lightweight secure PUFs. Logistic regression-based
PUF attacks use a weight vector ~w to encode the internal parameters within the PUF system.
The conditional probability can be represented using sigmoid acting on the PUF function f
as shown below. c is a challenge, and r is the corresponding response.
p(c, r|~w) = sigmoid(rf(~w))
For a training set τ , the goal of the regression is to find a weight vector ~w so that the
likelihood of observing this set is maximized, which is equivalent to minimizing the negative
log-likelihood shown in Equation 3.2.
~ˆw = arg min~w−logL(τ, ~w) =
∑
(c,r)∈τ
−log sigmoid(rf(~w)) (3.2)
Different from general logistic regression problems, the optimal parameter vector ~ˆw can
not be analyzed analytically, the only option is to optimize iteratively. For the purpose of
attacking a single-bit output PUF, the problem can be tackled by transforming it to a binary
logistic regression problem and use iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS) to minimize
the Log-likelihood of a Bernoulli distributed process using Newton’s method. Other options
includes using optimization methods such as gradient decent and RProp etc. The above
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optimization methods requires gradient information represented in Equation 3.3:
∇L(τ, ~w) =
∑
(c,r)∈τ
r(sigmoid(rf(c, ~w))− 1)∇f(c, ~w)) (3.3)
3.5.3 Evolution Strategies
Evolution strategies is a commonly seen attack method on PUF-based systems. Evolution
strategies is a different type of machine learning algorithms that performs random search
intelligently. Inspired by evolutional adaption to environments, the evolution strategies
method always choose the best candidates from randomly generated models and further
develops on them. In the case of modeling a PUF-based system, one instantiation of inter-
nal delay parameters is denoted as an individual, and all instantiations together are called
the population. The population of each selection is called a generation and each selected
individual is allowed to produce offsprings by randomly mutating the instantiation of delay
parameters. The selection is performed based on how well an individual instantiation is
capable of reproducing the correct CRPs (fitness).
Fitness evaluation over the entire training set is expensive and slow. We borrowed the
mini-batch idea from stochastic gradient descent to select only a subset of training CRPs for
fitness evaluation purposes.
3.5.4 Multilayer perceptron
The development of deep neural network has made tasks that were once believed undoable
possible. From speech recognition to image captions, deep neural networks have made mirac-
ulous progress and is still improving. It is not surprising that adversaries use artificial neu-
ral networks to model a PUF-based system. A multilayer perceptron (MLP) is a type of
feedforward artificial neural network. An MLP consists of at least three layers of nodes,
respectively input layer, the output layer, and hidden layers. Each node within an MLP
is a neuron that uses a nonlinear activation function. MLP learns a model by iteratively
changing the connection weights based on the error between the output and ground truth.
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This type of supervised learning using MLP is carried out through back-propagation using
gradient descent.
For PUF attacking purpose, predicting PUF output is essentially a classification problem.
MLP is more advantageous comparing to logistic regression methods in terms of capability
to learn non-linear models.
3.5.5 Other Machine Learning Algorithms
As conventional attacks on PUFs depend on attackers to manually choose a model and hyper-
parameters, the results of modeling attack might not be optimal concerning both prediction
accuracy and speed. AutoML is a new concept that focuses on progressive automation of
machine learning. AutoML aims to create an automated process that intelligently performs
architecture search over a wide range of machine learning algorithms and choose the one that
best fits the data and the task including naive Bayes classifiers, decision trees, etc. AutoML
is also capable of performing hyperparameter optimization that aims to find the best-suited
hyperparameters for a given model. We choose to use auto-sklearn to search for an algorithm
along with corresponding hyperparameters to predict the behavior of an IPN [60].
3.6 Reconfiguration
IPNs benefit from the complex structure so that it requires much larger training set and
longer training time to model. We propose to reconfigure the entire network from time to
time by changing the connections between IPN nodes so that any obtained knowledge on
the IPN would be invalidated. Essentially, we are running a race with adversaries. Before
one can finish modeling an IPN or collect enough training set, we reconfigure it so that the
input-output mapping alters and the attacker would need to remodel the new IPN.
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3.6.1 Reconfigure Timing
We can initiate a reconfiguration either before an attacker could collect sufficient number
of CRP or before an attacker can finish modeling. However, since the speed of the attack
process is affected by many factors on the adversarial side that we have no control of, we
believe limiting the total number of generated CRPs is more secure and feasible. Thus, we
intend to find a lower bound for the size of the training set of IPN.
Sufficient size of the training set is also known as the sample complexity. We consider
models of all PUF-based system mentioned in this chapter as a binary function that takes a
challenge and generates a 1-bit output of either 0 or 1. Vapnik-Chervonenkis theory suggests
that a PUF-based system can be learned with a finite sample complexity and the minimum
required training size (N) follow the Equation 3.4:
N = O(
V C(H) + ln(1
δ
)

) (3.4)
where VC(H) is the Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension of the function H implemented by
the attacked PUF-based system, δ is the failure probability and  is the learning error.
For arbiter PUF, the VC-dimension is the total number of stages, meaning for a k-bit
arbiter PUF, V C(H) = k. Rhrmair et al. derived the VC-dimension for XOR PUFs as
V C(H) = k · l where k is the number of stages in each arbiter PUF and l is the total number
of XORs. For Feed-forward PUFs, V C(H) = k+ l can be used to describe the model better
where k is the total number of stages and l is the total number of feed-forward loops.
The sample space of an IPN on the other hand largely depends on the topology of the
network. We have to be conservative in terms of finding a uniform lower bound for all
topologies. The depth of the network conceptually is very similar to Feed-forward loops
in Feed-forward PUFs, whereas the width of the network can be analogized to the size of
XOR PUFs. Equation 3.5 describe a sample size lower bound in terms of the IPN model
parameters, where m is the depth of the IPN network, and n is the width of the network. To
be noted that we assume every single path within the network to be of width n and depth
47
m.
N ∼ (m · k +m) · n+ ln(
1
δ
)

(3.5)
For each IPN structure, we derive a empirical formula based on equation 3.5 by assuming
a linear y = ax + b relationship. The derived formula failed to match with the evolution
strategies result due to the random nature of evolution strategies. The data points we
collected from evolution strategies show a super-linear relationship between N and . Thus,
we adopt the method proposed by Rhrmair et al. and modify the relationship to equation
3.6 when applying evolution strategies to match the superlinear relationship. c is a constant
between 0 and 1.
N ∼ (m · k +m) · n+ ln(
1
δ
)
c
(3.6)
An IPN-based system requires much larger training set comparing to standard arbiter
PUFs, XOR PUFs and Feed-forward PUFs of the same size. This can be observed when com-
paring equation 3.5 to the lower bounds proposed in [56]. The conclusion is also confirmed
by our experimental results shown in Section 3.5.
3.6.2 Reconfiguration Logic
The reconfiguration is performed by reconfiguring interconnections between IPN nodes. Since
each edge is controlled by a shuﬄer, the interconnect can be reconfigured by changing the
configuration vectors in the shuﬄers.
We use a counter to count how many CRPs have already been generated, and we compare
it with a predefined threshold. To be more conservative, we set a reconfiguration threshold
Θ to a number that is smaller than the theoretical lower bound of sufficient CRPs using
equation 3.7. Instead of assuming the network has the maximum width n on every level
(Equation 3.5), we assume every single path within the network to be of minimum width n′
and depth m. Once Θ has been reached, a random number generator generates a new set of
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configuration vectors, and feed them to the IPN shuﬄers.
Θ =
m · k · n′ + ln(1
δ
)

(3.7)
3.6.3 Protecting Reconfiguration Logic
The configuration vectors are essential in such a way that an adversary could potentially
use the information to collectively train a model over different sets of samples even if each
sample size is intentionally limited below our calculated lower bound. An intuitive idea is
to store all configuration vectors in non-volatile memories that lay below PUF delay wires
so that damaging any one of those wires would change the PUF, rendering the adversary’s
attack useless [59]. However, in our reconfiguration logic, a new set of configuration vectors
are provided by a random number generator or the user, which is not secure if the adversary
has physical access to the device as we described in our assumption. We take a step forward
by securing these configuration vectors using existing IPN nodes in the system so that the
real interconnection remains hidden. We propose to encrypt the user-provided configuration
vector to an IPN node in the previous level. The configuration vectors for all shuﬄers
between level i and i+ 1 depend on the encrypted result of the user provided configuration
bits using the IPN nodes from level 1 to level i−1, for i > 1. To note that we use IPN nodes
in the previous levels to encrypt shuﬄer configurations to reduce the correlation between
the output of an IPN node and it’s immediate shuﬄers. An illustrative example is shown in
Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Encrypting random configuration logic using existing IPN nodes. Kj is the
configuration vector encrypted by a chain of nodes from node1 to nodej
All shuﬄers within an IPN are initialized at the beginning of the reconfiguration process.
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The random or user provided configuration vectors are passed to the nodes in the first level
propagate along the network to configure the remaining shuﬄers in the later levels. The
shuﬄers between the first and second layer have a non-reconfigurable static connection. The
attacker, even with physical access to the IPN device, cannot obtain information on actual
configurations in shuﬄers since without characterize each IPN nodes. On the other hand,
since the attacker cannot obtain enough training data given a specific configuration without
knowledge of real configuration vectors in each shuﬄer.
3.7 Evaluation Results
In this section, we apply all the attack techniques we introduced in Section 3.5.
Our evaluation is conducted on both simulated models as well as implementations on a
Xilinx Virtex-5 XC5VLX50T FPGA. Our simulation assumes a Gaussian distribution in all
delays and no error in contrast to real distribution and real errors in the implementation. As a
comparison, we compare different IPN setups along with standard arbiter PUFs, XOR PUFs,
and feed-forward PUFs. For fairness considerations, we maintain the total number of PUF
segments used in both simulation and implementation the same over different structures.
Since we intend to prove that an IPN structure itself is more resilient against machine
learning attacks, meaning it is much harder to predict using a machine learning model, we
provided all PUF-based system discussed in this section with the same number of challenge-
response pairs as well as same run-time/iterations. Our main focus is on single bit prediction
rate even though IPN generates multi-bit outputs. To be noted that the modeling of both
simulation and actual FPGA implementation was performed oﬄine, meaning the training
set and the test set of CRPs were collected before modeling. Querying the IPN is not allowed
during the modeling process.
3.7.1 Logistic Regressions
In our security evaluation of IPN using logistic regression, we use standard gradient descent,
IRLS, and RProp as the optimization method. In an attempt to model a simple IPN with
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reconfiguration functionality disabled, the difference between all three optimization method
is negligible.
We maintain the total number of PUF segments used in all settings to be around 1,024.
For all architecture except standard arbiter PUF, the training set contains 30,000 CRPs, and
the running time is set to unlimited. For each setting, we run 100 times and the simulated
results showed in figure 3.4 is chosen from the best of 100 runs.
Figure 3.4: Best results in 100 logistic regression attacks using 30,000 CRP training set on
five PUF-based systems. Error vs. iterations.
We observe that after around 20,000 iterations, the error for all five structures converges.
Logistic regression attack is capable of successfully predicting 1024-bit standard arbiter PUF
and 256-bit 4-XOR PUF with 99% accuracy. The simplest standard arbiter PUF architec-
ture compromises immediately after the attack begins, where the 4-XOR PUF eventually
converges after around 17,000 iterations.
IPN of depth 4 and width 1 provides better resilience against logistic regression comparing
to IPN of width 4 and depth 2, and this result is observed in all 100 runs. IPN of width 4 and
depth 2 on the other hand, shows the very similar result with a forward arbiter PUF with
1024 stages and 64 feed-forward loops. All three cases were allowed to run until time-out at
100,000 iterations, which roughly takes 7 days for each run.
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Based on the result, we believe it is safe to conclude on two observations. (1) Feed-
Forward loops provide excellent resilience against logistic regressions because the internal
dependency introduced by feed-forward loops makes the model of the whole architecture
no longer differentiable. Any attack methods that take advantage of linear separable or
differentiable models would be inefficient or not work at all. (2) A deeper IPN provides
better protection against logistic regression attack. The multiple layers of dependencies
make the system even more complicated so that gradient information is of no help regarding
modeling such a system.
3.7.2 Evolution Strategies
In our security evaluation of IPN using evolution strategies, we use both canonical versions,
respectively (µ/ρ, λ)−ES and (µ/ρ+λ)−ES with and without the mini-batch style of fitness
evaluation method implemented based on [61]. The difference between the two versions of
evolution strategies is that (µ/ρ + λ) − ES takes the parent population into consideration
during selection process where (µ/ρ, λ) − ES only selects from the offspring population.
Both canonical versions of evolution strategies were applied to all investigated PUF-based
systems, each with 100 runs. The best results among the 100 runs are shown in figure 3.5.
IPN of width 4 and depth 2 is the most difficult for evolutional strategies attack to tackle,
while the 1,024-bit arbiter PUF with and without feed-forward loops performs the worst. A
general trend for all curves in figure 3.5 is that the speed of progress is slowing down. The
probability of observing a huge decline regarding errors dramatically decreases as the total
number of generations increase. We can observe that for IPN of width 4 depth 2, the curve
is almost flat after 30,000 generations.
Based on the result, we believe it is safe to conclude on two observations. (1) Nonlinear
logic functions like XORs dramatically increase the difficulty for evolution strategies attack
models, whereas feed-forward loop provides limited additional complexity against evolution
strategies. (2) A wider IPN provides better protection against evolution strategies attack.
This conclusion is not surprising as a wider IPN introduces more XORs which provides much
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Figure 3.5: Evolution strategies attack result using 30,000 CRP training set on five PUF-
based systems.. Error vs. iterations.
more nonlinearity. Despite the nonlinearity introduced by XORs, we still observe that an
IPN of width 1 and depth 4 still performs better than 256-bit 4-XOR PUF when provided
with the same training set.
3.7.3 Multilayer perceptron
In our security evaluation of IPN using MLP, we reform the task as a binary classification
problem. We experiment with different network configuration parameters implemented using
Keras [62]. After some experiment, the following setup showed in Table 3.1 provides the best
results and speed.
Layers Layer type Units Activation
1 Dense m1 ReLu
... Dense ... ReLu
n Dense mn ReLu
n+1 Dense 2 Softmax
Table 3.1: MLP parameters when modeling IPN. n is the depth of the network and mi is
the total number of PUF segments on the i-th level.
The loss function used is binary cross entropy and we use Adam as the optimizer. We
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set the number of epochs to a constant of 100 so that we have a total number of CRPs/100
as our batch size.
Comparing to logistic regression and evolution strategies, an MLP does not necessarily
require details in PUF architecture; instead, it treats the entire PUF as a black box and
learns the function based on only input and output. Table 3.2 shows the result of applying
MLP modeling to all discussed PUF systems.
Architecture Training Acc. Test Acc.
IPN depth 4 width 1 99.93% 50.18%
IPN depth 2 width 4 99.77% 50.33%
256-bit 4-XOR PUF 99.73% 96.02%
1024-bit arbiter PUF 99.99% 98.28%
1024-bit 64-ff PUF 99.99% 95.68%
Table 3.2: Deep neural network attack results.
MLP with the structure described in section 3.5 is capable of fitting 30,000 CPRs with
above 99% training accuracy, and can predict 256-bit 4-XOR PUF, 1024-bit arbiter PUF and
1024-bit 66-ff PUF with above 95% test accuracy. However, it ran into an overfitting problem
when modeling IPNs. After attempting various overfitting prevention techniques including
regularization layers and dropouts, we conclude that the root of the overfitting problem is
insufficient training samples. IPNs is more complicated comparing to other PUF systems.
Thus, given a non-sufficient training dataset, the overfitting problem is more severe. When
provided with a much larger dataset (5,000,000 CRPs in simulation), the test accuracy can
be boosted to 86.49% for IPN with depth 4 width 1 and 78.01% for IPN of depth 2 width
4. When applying the same training set, the test accuracy converges at 54.77% and 62.54%
respectively, much lower than MLP attack results.
3.7.4 Other Machine Learning Algorithms
AutoML is still under development, yet it provides promising results compared to MLP
attacks in terms of modeling PUF-based systems. We provided only raw CRPs to the auto-
sklearn module, and the results for all tested architectures are shown in Table 3.3.
54
Architecture Best algo. Test Acc.
IPN depth 4 width 1 Decision tree 64.87%
IPN depth 2 width 4 Decision tree 67.27%
256-bit 4-XOR PUF K-NN. 83.88%
1024-bit arbiter PUF Multinominal NB 89.55%
1024-bit 64-ff PUF Multinominal NB 72.33%
Table 3.3: Auto-sklearn modeling results on raw CRPs.
In general, the best classifiers for IPNs are decision-tree classifiers, which is capable of
predicting over 65% of CRPs in the test set. XOR PUFs, arbiter PUFs, and Feed-forward
PUFs are much easier to model since auto-sklearn is capable of finding a classifier (such as
K-nearest neighbor or multinominal naive Bayes classifiers) that successfully predicts the
test set CRPs with accuracy over 70%.
3.7.5 Implementations on FPGA
Two differences distinguish a simulated PUF-based system and real implementations. (1)
The delays located within a PUF implementation do not necessarily follow a certain distri-
bution, whereas in simulations we assume a Gaussian or uniform distribution for all delays
in the PUFs. (2) Real-world implementations suffer from stability issues. Since PUFs are
extremely sensitive to environmental factors such as temperature and voltage, the response
generated by the same PUF might not be consistent when providing the same challenge
multiple times.
We repeated all experiments on data collected from FPGA implementations of all dis-
cussed architecture. The best results of both simulation and implementation are shown in
Table 3.4.
Based on the log provided by Xilinx System Monitor, the largest variations in the core
temperature and the core voltage are 2◦C and 2.78% respectively during the entire CRP
collection process. The environmental variations lead to 10.96% of CRPs being unstable in
the training set. By applying ECC on IPN, the amount of instability drops significantly to
3.67%. The stability issue along with random delays in the hardware reduces the prediction
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accuracy in almost all cases. MLP and autoML models suffer the most from the instability
in the training set while the reduction in evolution strategies attacks are minimal.
Regardless of network depth and width, IPN stays robust against all proposed attacks,
while XOR PUF and Feed-forward PUF can be modeled using different machine learning
algorithms. Standard arbiter PUF, on the other hand, can be accurately modeled by all
attack methods.
3.7.6 Implementation Result
We implemented a 64-bit reconfigurable IPN of depth 4 and width 4 (as shown in Figure
3.6) on a Xilinx Virtex-5 board. According to our derived formula on the sample complexity
of IPNs, the sufficient number of CRPs required to predict a single bit response with 95%
accuracy is 716,703 CRPs. We set the reconfiguration threshold to 358,350 CRPs, and
we collected 1,000,000 CPRs (with duplications) as our training set. Table 3.5 shows the
prediction accuracy of 10,000 test challenges with and without reconfiguration functionality.
IPN	
Node0	
IPN	
Node1	
IPN	
Node2	
IPN	
Node3	
S0	
S1	
S2	
S3	
IPN	
Node4	
IPN	
Node5	
IPN	
Node6	
S4	 S5	
16	
16	
16	
16	
16	
W
idth	=	4	
Depth	=	4	
Figure 3.6: A 16-bit IPN network with four nodes on the first level, and has 4 levels.
We excluded Auto-sklearn from our experiment as it is extremely slow when handling
very-large data. We observe that without reconfiguration enabled, no attack can reach the
theoretical 95% of accuracy. We believe that in addition to the complexity of the IPN
structure, the instability in the implemented PUFs increases the difficulty to accurately
modeling an IPN. When reconfigurability is enabled, MLP performs the best due to its
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Attack Method w/out Reconfig. with Reconfig.
Logistic Regression 64.62% 53.19%
Evolution Strategies 72.13% 49.99%
MLP 80.64% 51.89%
Table 3.5: Prediction accuracy of three attack methods. Results collected from a 100,000
test set. Logistic regression: 14 days; evolution strategies: 250,000 generations, 14 days;
MLP: 18 hours.
Resource With Reconfig. Without Reconfig.
LUTs 2,102 2,001
Occupied Slices 1,227 1,157
Flip-flops 1,525 1,399
Table 3.6: Area overhead for implementing a IPN shown in Figure 3.6.
ability to quickly adapt to the new labels. Evolution strategies perform the worst because at
each IPN reconfiguration all selected populations need to re-adapt the new fitness function
and the algorithm has to learn from scratch again.
The area overhead for implementing the IPN with and without reconfiguration function-
ality is shown in Table 3.6. The reconfiguration mechanism uses additional 5.04% additional
hardware; in return, it provides efficiently reduces the prediction rate by 11.43% at worst
and 30.65% at best. If all our assumption holds, modeling a large IPN with reconfigurability
is practically impossible.
3.8 Chapter Conclusion
We have carefully studied an interconnected PUF network structure that connects PUFs
to build a network in this chapter. Our simulation and implemented results show that
the IPN has a complex structure so that it enables itself to stay robust against not only
traditional PUF modeling methods like logistic regression and evolution strategies but also
to the state-of-the-art methods like deep neural networks and autoML.
To eliminate the possibility of being modeled with a large training set, we propose to
make an IPN reconfigurable by shuﬄing the interconnections between IPN nodes. Before an
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adversary can collect sufficient CRP sets for training purposes, the IPN reconfigures itself
so that the attacker would not be able to obtain enough information on the IPN. To avoid
storing the configuration vectors, we propose to use another set of PUFs to protect the
configuration vectors. Our experimental results indicate that no investigated attack could
accurately model an IPN. The single bit prediction accuracy for all attacks, when provided
with a training set larger than the theoretical lower bound and 14 days of time, is as low as
53.19% in the worst case scenario.
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CHAPTER 4
Optimizing PUFs with Evolution Strategies
4.1 Motivation
Security primitives and protocols are essential to embedded systems. Classical cryptography-
based primitives rest on the concept of secret keys, under the assumption that the secret key
can be securely preserved or completely hidden from adversaries. However, such security
assumption cannot be guaranteed in reality. Various physical attacks including but not
limited to invasive probing, side-channel attacks easily lead to secret key leakage and system
compromise.
The physically unclonable function (PUF) as a unique hardware cryptographic primitive
has the natural advantage of being resilient against secret key leakage. On the one hand,
PUFs do not require storage of secret keys in the digital form, but instead in the form of
nanoscale physical structure so that traditional attacks are inefficient; on the other hand,
PUFs depend on uncontrollable process variations during the manufacturing process so that
duplicating a PUF is nominally impossible.
APUF is a popular type of PUF which utilizes delay differences in transistors to produce
chip-unique outputs. Theoretically, random delay variations in hardware allow APUFs to
generate highly random outputs. In practice, however, high randomness cannot be achieved
without a randomness booster because the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of pro-
cess variation creates unbalanced delay path routing in APUFs. Unbalanced delay paths
potentially lead to symptoms such as unequal 0/1 frequencies in the outputs, repeated pat-
terns, etc., which greatly compromises the security properties of APUFs. Two main causes
lie at the root of the problems: (1) Some parts of the APUF generate extremely large delay
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differences between two delay paths. The delay difference is so large that it dominates over
the entire APUF so that it is more likely for the output of the APUF to be in favor of a
specific delay path. (2) During the manufacturing and aging process of the hardware [63],
certain bias can be introduced to the system that alters the behavior of the APUF, leading
to randomness problems.
APUFs outputs are also relatively unstable when environmental factors, such as supply
voltage and temperature, vary. As Zhou et al. reported when measuring and evaluating 1
million CRPs in arbiter PUFs, only 79.8% of CRPs are stable for a single bit [64], making the
adoption of arbiter PUFs in any applicable security applications unreliable. The instability
of APUF output is usually induced by small delay differences between a pair of delay path
segments. As slight variations in environmental factors change transistor delays in a non-
uniform manner, small delay differences could be easily altered. These small delay differences
could easily add up and result in inverted outputs.
4.2 Technical Goals and Contributions
To overcome the limitations and to realize the full potential of APUFs as a basis for the
security of lightweight systems, we propose to explore an optimal method to connect APUFs
so that we can significantly improve or even overcome the natural weakness of APUFs. In
this chapter, we utilize the IPN structure that interconnects APUFs in a network introduced
in the previous chapter. We observe that a subset of all connection configurations inside an
IPN could generate outputs that meet specific randomness or stability requirements. To
our best knowledge, our work is the first effort to optimize the security properties of arbiter
PUFs utilizing the IPN structure. In this chapter, we make three contributions:
• We show that different connections in an IPN could result in different output quality. A
good configuration could enable an IPN to generate highly random and stable outputs
that meet specific user requirement.
• We have proposed an evolution strategy method that is capable of effectively finding
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a network configuration generates outputs with high randomness. Our experimental
results show that our ES algorithm improves NIST randomness passing rate by 220.8%
comparing to an unoptimized configuration and outperforms standard search algorithm
an average of 8.5% with faster speed.
• We show that an optimized IPN provides highly stable outputs.
4.3 Related Work
4.3.1 PUF Randomness
Many attempts have been made to improve PUF randomness in the literature. O'Donnell
from MIT proposed to use PUF as a hardware random number generator (RNG) [65]. Direct
use of PUF generates outputs with mediocre randomness. Thus they proposed to use Von
Neumann correction to enhance the randomness. Maiti et al. proposed to combine a delay-
based PUF and jitter-based RNGs, where a delay-based PUF can be used to extract chip-
unique signatures and volatile secret keys, and the RNGs are used for generating random
padding bits and initialization vectors [66]. All past efforts use additional random boosters
to help to improve the randomness of PUF whereas our work improves output randomness
by configuring the connection of PUFs without any external resources.
4.3.2 PUF Stability
The stability problem of arbiter PUFs has been well recognized for decades. As Zhou et
al. pointed out in the study of 1 trillion CRPs, instability is a huge weakness in multiple
variations of APUFs [64]. Stable CRPs in a no XOR single-bit PUF (0.8∼1.0V, 0∼60 ◦C)
only count as low as 80% of entire CRP space where a 10-XOR APUF has only 0.0028%
of all CPRs being stable over a study of 1 million CRPs. A large number of new APUF
designs that address the stability problems have been proposed in the past decades such as
[67] [68] [12]. However, most of these PUFs are weak PUFs with a small number of possible
CRPs and require an external output stabilizer or error correction code to ensure the output
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stability [69]. Dodis et al proposed to use fuzzy extractors and large helper data to achieve
extremely low error (10−9) [70]. Pedersen et al. proposed to use the predetermined syndrome
of a PUF stored in non-volatile memory to stabilize PUF outputs [71]. Most recently, Yan
et al. proposed a novel mechanism to extract stable mappings of PUFs without the help
of error correction and is able to tolerate 0.08% of errors in outputs [72]. In this chapter,
we take a different approach to eliminate as many unstable segments as possible by actively
searching for an interconnection that provides the best stability in APUFs.
4.4 Preliminaries
4.4.1 APUF Model
We propose to construct an IPN using standard delay-based APUFs as building blocks. An
n-bit APUF takes an n-bit challenge as input and produces a 1-bit response as output. An n-
bit vector (challenge) is provided to configure two nominally identically paths are generated
along the APUF. Each challenge bit controls whether the pair of paths should swap positions
within a PUF segment. To retrieve a response, an impulse signal is fed into the system to
excite both paths simultaneously. Because of the uncontrollable process variation, the signal
traveling along one of the two paths will reach the arbiter earlier, generating corresponding
output.
Assuming an APUF maps a set of n-bit challenges C to corresponding response set R.
We assume no delays on the connection wires and all delays are contributed by the APUF
segments. Given a specific challenge c ∈ C, the ith APUF segment generates a pair of delays
with delay difference of ∆dci . The corresponding response r ∈ R can be mathematically
represented as Equation 4.1:
r =

0 if
∑n
i=1 ∆d
c
i > 0
1 if
∑n
i=1 ∆d
c
i < 0
(4.1)
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4.4.2 IPN
We have introduced IPN in the previous chapter, and as described, an IPN consists of nodes
and edges. We make no modifications to the shuﬄers previously introduced; however, in
this chapter, we assume that all IPNs nodes are homogeneous.An n-bit IPN node of size m
consists of m n-bit APUFs. If m = n, a node is denoted as a homogeneous node, otherwise it
is denoted as a heterogeneous node. The size of an IPN node is the total number of APUFs
running in parallel. A demonstrative diagram of an n-bit homogenous node is shown in figure
4.1. An IPN node takes an n-bit vector as the challenge and generates n 1-bit responses.
All APUFs within the same IPN node share the same challenges.
n-bit PUF P0
n-bit PUF P1
n-bit PUF P2
n-bit PUF P2
...
Challenge
n-bit
Response
n-bit
n PUFs
Figure 4.1: An n-bit homogenous node.
4.5 IPN Randomness
An IPN with direct connections, similar to a standard APUF, does not provide results that
meet randomness requirements. Take 0/1 frequency requirement for example. If the jth
APUF in nodei has much larger probability of producing a ”1” as output, all jth segment
in nodei+1 would prefer one delay path over another. If unfortunately, an affected segment
generates dominating a delay difference, the 0/1 frequency balance of the APUF in nodei+1
that contains such segment could be damaged.
To avoid such damage, we first propose to use brute force random search method to try
out different connections until an acceptable one is found. We propose to append a shuﬄer
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between every two IPN nodes to shuﬄe the input-output mapping as shown in figure 4.2.
Each shuﬄer uses a configuration vector to map each output bit from the previous nodes to
each input bit of the next node. Here, we define a configuration of an IPN as a collection of
all configuration vectors for all shuﬄers in the IPN. A good configuration is defined as a set of
configuration vectors that enables the IPN output to meet certain randomness requirement.
...
...
Sh
u
ffler
...
...
Sh
u
ffler
......
Sh
u
ffler
...Challenges Responses
n-bitn-bit
Figure 4.2: An example of a simple IPN chain with shuﬄed connection between nodes.
We ran simulations on 100 different IPN instances with the simple IPN chain structure.
Each IPN has two 32-bit homogenous nodes. We use multiple tests from NIST test suite [73]
as our randomness scoring function. Each test is modified to show the quality of IPN output
regarding a specific randomness property. For a given configuration, a sample of 10,000
bits is collected before evaluating it using the randomness scoring function. The maximum
number of configurations to test on each IPN instance is set to 100. Table 4.1 shows the
success ratio of passing a specific random test of all IPN instances.
Test Direct connection 100 Configs.
Frequency Test 32% 89%
Run Test 14% 76%
Linear Complexity 98% 100%
Approx. Entropy 1% 15%
Table 4.1: Success ratio of passing a NIST test for 100 IPN instances with two 32-bit
homogenous nodes. The maximum number of configurations allowed for each IPN is 100,
each configuration collects 10,000-bit result.
The result shows that allowing exploration of multiple IPN configurations significantly
increase the chance that an IPN is capable of passing a specific randomness test. This result is
intuitive and straightforward since delay characteristics in APUFs are unpredictable, certain
combinations of such APUFs provide better randomness results than others. For an IPN,
having the opportunity to explore more configurations naturally increase the chances of
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finding an arrangement of APUFs that provides highly random results.
4.6 IPN Stability
Stability is an essential factor of IPN, especially because all APUF segments are intercon-
nected in an IPN. Therefore, a single bit change in the first few nodes could cause significant
avalanche effect to the final output of IPN. We also ran simulations with the simple IPN
chain structure. We model the relationship between transistor delays and environmental
variations according to equation 4.2 described in [74]. Here, ktp is the delay-fitting param-
eter, CL is the sum of the intrinsic capacitance and the load capacitance, Vdd is the supply
voltage, n is the subthreshold slope, µ is the mobility, Cox is the oxide capacitance, L is the
effective channel length, W is the gate width, φ is the thermal voltage (φ = kT
q
), kfit is a
model-fitting parameter and IC represents the inversion coefficient. We fixed all parameters
as derived from a curve-fitting Spectre simulation results for a 65-nm CMOS technology
as described in [74] except Vdd and φ. We simulate voltage and temperature variations by
sample the value of Vdd and φ from a normal distribution where the mean and the variance
is collected from real chip measurement.
tp =
ktp · CL · VDD
2 · n · µ · Cox · WL · φ2t
· kfit
IC
(4.2)
We run our simulation on a single PUF, a 10-XOR APUF and a four-node IPN chain
with 1 million CRPs and we obtained 24.232%, 99.985% and 64.312% of unstable CRPs.
The first two observations are extremely similar to the results reported by [64].
4.7 IPN Optimization Algorithms
Knowing that exploration for a good configuration could greatly improve the possibility
for an IPN instance to pass a random test, we thus propose two algorithms to configure a
given IPN so that it can produce outputs that meet certain randomness requirements in this
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section.
4.7.1 Random Search
Based on our observation in section 4.5, we first formally propose a random search algorithm
as our baseline method in Algorithm 1.
Protocol 1 Random Search in IPN
Require: (1) An IPN with n nodes and n− 1 shuﬄers. (2) A set of configuration vectors
V = {V1, V2, ..., Vn−1} that configures each shuﬄer. (3) A randomness scoring function
f(x) where x is a sampled binary string of size s. (4) A passing threshold Θ. (5) Total
number of iterations L.
Ensure: A set of configuration vectors V = {V1, V2, ..., Vn−1} that enables IPN to produce
outputs that passes f(x). If no such set of vectors can be found in L iterations, returns
nothing.
while L > 0 do
Sample a binary string x of size s using IPN.
if f(x) < Θ then
for each Vi in V do
Randomly shuﬄes Vi
end for
else
return V
end if
L = L− 1.
end while
If no configuration is found in L iterations, return nothing.
The random search algorithm is a simple brute force algorithm that explores many con-
figurations until a good configuration is found. If no good configuration can be discovered
after a large number of iterations, the possibility of finding such configuration is assumed
to be low. It is also possible that dominating segments or hardware biases in some APUFs
make it impossible to construct a desired IPN. Thus, an upper bound is set as the maximum
number of iterations allowed. If no desired configurations are found after the maximum
number of iterations, the algorithm returns nothing.
67
4.7.2 Evolution Strategy
Random search shows significant improvement comparing to direct connection. However, the
searching process is entirely random so that the speed of finding a good configuration is based
on luck. Here we present an ES algorithm that does not necessarily test a completely different
configuration when randomness objective is not achieved, but instead, reconfigures only a
portion of the configuration based on how well current configuration performs. The essential
idea is not to recreate a new set of configuration vectors but to improve on the current
configuration. The ES algorithm is based on the observation that minor modification on a
fair configuration vector sometimes leads to better or even excellent results. The detailed
algorithm is described in Protocol 2.
The ES algorithm, like random search, uses a random configuration as a start. A swap
ratio index is used to determine what portion of the configuration should be shuﬄed to
achieve the desired randomness goal. If the result keeps improving, we gradually decrease
the swap ratio to make as few modifications as possible at each iteration so that past progress
could be preserved. If the results are worsening, we increase the swap ratio, and in an extreme
case, randomly shuﬄes all configuration vectors.
A key feature of our ES algorithm is the backtracking mechanism. If a shuﬄer config-
uration vector V already generates a fair result that is only slightly below expectation, we
expect minimum modification could provide sufficient results. If multiple modifications to
configuration vector V leads to decrease in the randomness score, we conclude that it is
unlikely that slight modification to V provides desired results, so we backtrack to V and
increases the swap ratio to 1.
4.8 Experimental Results on Randomness Improvement
We use the following experimental setup to study the impact of the maximum number of
iterations, IPN node size, IPN chain length, and IPN connection methods. 1,000 different
IPN instances were simulated. For each configuration, we collected 10, 000 bits of results.
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Protocol 2 Evolution Strategy in IPN
Require: (1) An IPN with n nodes and n− 1 shuﬄers. (2) A set of configuration vectors
V = {V1, V2, ..., Vn−1} that configures each shuﬄer. (3) A randomness scoring function
f(x) where x is a sampled binary string of size s. (4) A scoring function threshold Θ
and a near-passing threshold θ < Θ (5) A swap ratio α ∈ (0, 1], initially, α = 1. (6) A
backtracking counter β = 0 and a backtracking threshold λ. (7) Total number of iterations
L.
Ensure: A set of configuration vectors V = {V1, V2, ..., Vn−1} that enables IPN to produce
outputs that passes f(x). If no such set of vectors can be found in L iterations, returns
nothing.
while L > 0 do
Sample a binary string x of size s using IPN.
if f(x) < Θ then
if f(x) > θ then
Decrease the swap ratio α, α > 0.
Save f(x) and V as f ′(x) and V ′.
else
if f ′(x) > θ then
β = β + 1
end if
Increase the swap ratio α, α ≤ 1.
end if
if β > λ then
V backtrack to V ′
β = 0, α = 1
else
for each Vi in V do
Select 1
2
α|Vi| connections in Vi, swap connections with another 12α|Vi| connections.
end for
end if
else
return V
end if
L = L− 1.
end while
If no configuration is found in L iterations, return nothing.
The scoring function is a weighted composite function of results obtained from the NIST test
suite [73], Diehard-1997 [75], Diehard-2009 [76] and Soto [77]. The result is normalized to
[0,1]. We conduct our experiments with all NIST tests, but we only show the run test result
since it accurately represents the majority of the NIST test. For ES algorithm, the scoring
function pass threshold Θ is set at 0.99 and the near-pass threshold θ is set at 0.9. The
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backtracking threshold λ is set at 10% of the maximum number of iteration. An instance
passes the test if it achieves a score of at least Θ = 0.99.
4.8.1 Number of Iterations
Intuitively, both random search and ES algorithm greatly benefit from a large number of
iterations. For random search, more iterations provide a greater chance of finding a network
configuration that could pass a given randomness test. For ES, more iterations grant more
opportunities to improve from a mediocre configuration.
We conduct our experiment with five different maximum numbers of iterations, respec-
tively 10, 50, 100, 500 and 1,000. For 1,000 IPN instances with two 32-bit homogenous
nodes, the trace of the growing possibility of successfully discovering a configuration that is
capable of passing the scoring function threshold is shown in Figure 4.3.
Max # of iterations Random Search ES
10 48.2% 44.6%
50 57.5% 68.6%
100 76.0% 82.8%
500 88.8% 89.5%
1,000 89.7% 92.1%
Table 4.2: Success ratio of passing NIST run test for 1,000 IPNs. Each configuration collects
10,000-bit result.
When the maximum number of iterations is small, random search shows better results.
We believe that this is caused by the design of backtracking in the ES algorithm. A small
number of iterations leads to frequent backtracking activity, which essentially provides no
room for improvements in any configuration and many iterations are wasted on the back-
tracking process. As the number of iterations increases, ES outperforms random search.
When the total number of iteration is 50, ES is capable of finding 11.1% more good config-
urations comparing to random search. As we increase the maximum number of iterations
from 500 to 1,000, the results for both random search and ES gradually converge. The addi-
tional iterations not only provide very limited improvements in both algorithms but also fail
to differentiate the efficiency between them. This is because a sufficient number of APUF
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(a) Max number of iterations: 10. (b) Max number of iterations: 50.
(c) Max number of iterations: 100. (d) Max number of iterations: 500.
(e) Max number of iterations: 1,000.
Figure 4.3: Cumulative percentage of 1,000 IPN instances that pass the NIST run test:
random search vs. ES using various numbers of maximum iterations. IPN has a chain
structure of two 32-bit homogenous nodes. Scoring function threshold: 99%, near-passing
threshold: 90%, backtracking threshold set at 10% of maximum number of iteration. Results
collected from 1,000 sets of IPNs.
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of 1,000 IPN instances that pass the NIST run test. Maximum
iterations are set to 10,50,100,500 and 1000. Each configuration collects 10,000-bit result.
combinations have already been tested. According to the experimental result, the sufficient
number of APUF combinations is less or close to 500; more iterations would result in very
limited improvement.
In addition to finding more desired configurations, we also observe that the ES method use
less time in discovering a near-optimal configuration when compared to random searches.
Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between cumulative random test passing rate and the
iteration number at which a proper configuration is found. At any given passing rate, the
iteration number at which a proper configuration is found is lower for ES method comparing
to random search method. At any given iteration, the ES method also presents a higher
passing rate as well.
Based on the experiment result we can conclude that when the maximum number of
iterations is too low, random search provides a higher chance of finding a good configuration.
When the maximum number of iterations is too high, both ES and random search method can
discover a similar number of proper configurations. When the maximum number of iterations
is neither too high or too low, the ES method not only finds more desired configurations but
also finds them faster.
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4.8.2 IPN Node Size
The total number of possible configurations of a shuﬄer between every two IPN nodes
depends on the size of the node. Two n-bit homogenous nodes can form a total of n!
different configurations. We conduct both random search and ES on four different node sizes
to observe if both algorithms perform consistently over different node sizes.
We maintain a similar experimental setup as described above except we fixed the maxi-
mum number of iterations to 100. We vary the node size for both homogenous nodes: 16-bit,
32-bit, 64-bit, and 128-bit. The success ratio of passing NIST run test for 1,000 IPNs with
different node size is shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Percentage of 1,000 IPN instances that pass the NIST run test with different
node sizes. Each configuration collects 10,000-bit result.
Interestingly both random search and ES show lower success ratio of passing NIST run
test as the nodes size increases. An explanation for such phenomenon is that the search
space is getting larger and larger, respectively 16!, 32!, 64! and 128! configurations. Since
we fix the number of the maximum number of iterations allowed to 100, the proportion of
explored configurations drops extremely rapidly. The decrease in the proportion of explored
configuration would certainly lead to a reduction in the probability of finding a proper
configuration.
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4.8.3 IPN Structure
We now evaluate the performance of two algorithms on larger IPNs and more complex
architecture.
4.8.3.1 Larger IPN
As the size of IPN chain grows, the search space for all configurations grows significantly
as well. We first simulated larger IPN chains with three, four, five and six homogeneous
nodes and applied both random search algorithm and ES algorithm on the network. The
experiment was conducted on 1,000 IPN instances for each case. The size of each node is set
to be 32-bit, and the maximum number of iterations is fixed to 100.
Figure 4.6: Percentage of 1,000 IPN instances that pass the NIST run test with different
IPN chain lengths. Each configuration collects 10,000-bit result.
Figure 4.6 shows the experimental result of five different IPN chain length. We observe
that as the IPN chain gains more length, both random search and ES methods results in a
slight drop in passing ratio. The reason is similar to the situation explained in section 4.8.2.
The additional IPN nodes increase the configuration search space, leading to a significant
drop in the possibility of finding a proper configuration. Despite the drop in test success
ratio, ES method outperforms random search by 16.8%, 17.8%, 18.2% 18.4% and 22.5%
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respectively in five different IPN settings.
4.8.3.2 Other IPN Connections
In an IPN chain, each node forms a one-to-one connection with another node. We now
investigate more complex network that contains one-to-many, many-to-one and many-to-
many connections.
Figure 4.7: Percentage of 1,000 IPN instances that pass the NIST run test with different
IPN structure. Each configuration collects 10,000-bit result.
Figure 4.7 shows the run test passing rate for one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one and
many to many connections. We define the depth of the IPN as the smallest number of edges
required from the input of the network to the output and all nodes at the same depth is
denoted as a level. We fix the depths for all four different types of connections to 2 and the
maximum number of iterations to 100. We observe that varies types of connections have
little impact on the passing rate for both algorithms. A one-to-many connection is equivalent
to two independent IPN chains where both random search and ES applies uniformly and
independently on them. A many-to-one connection, on the other hand, is equivalent to one
IPN chain since the XOR operation combines all nodes on the same level conceptually. A
many-to-many connection is a combination of both one-to-many and many-to-one connec-
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tion, thus can be abstract to IPN chains as well. In terms of applying both random search
and ES algorithms, the type of connection does not affect the output randomness. The ES
approach provides better output compared to random search over all four types of network
connections.
4.8.4 NIST Test Results
Both random search and ES can handle multiple randomness tests at the same time. A large
scoring function G(x) with N tests can be created by calculating weighted sum of all tests
as shown in Equation 4.3, where each test transforms to a scoring function fi(x).
NIST statistical test suite is commonly used to evaluate different aspects of the random-
ness of a binary string [73]. NIST test suite contains 15 different tests, so we created a
overall scoring function G(x) using Equation 4.3 where fi(x) corresponds to each individual
test and N is set to 15. All scoring function outputs are normalized to [0, 1]. The passing
threshold for G(x) should be no less than the passing ratio of the highest threshold for all
fi(x). In our experiment we set the passing ratio for all fi(x) and G(x) to be 0.99. We
evaluate both random search and ES methods on 1,000 IPN chain instances with two 32-bit
homogeneous nodes.
G(x) =
N∑
i=1
1
N
fi(x) (4.3)
Table 4.3 shows our experimental results for each test in the NIST suite as well as the
overall passing rate. The overall passing rate is calculated as the possibility of passing all
15 tests. ES outperforms unoptimized configuration by an average of 220.8% and random
search by an average of 21.86% in all test cases.
Both random search and ES algorithms have exploited the potential in generating highly
random outputs in APUFs. By configuring the connections between IPN nodes, both algo-
rithms seek to find the best combination of APUFs so that randomness problems caused by
hardware and structural factors can be fixed and compensated.
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Statistical test Unoptimized Rand. ES
Freq. 36.4% 88.4% 94.8%
Block Freq. 28.5% 82.5% 92.6%
Runs 15.7% 76.0% 82.8%
Longest Runs 13.6% 67.8% 81.1%
Binary Rank 54.5% 99.0% 99.5%
FFT 44.8% 89.7% 92.1%
Aperiodic 6.9% 14.6% 85.0%
Periodic 9.5% 15.4% 95.1%
Maurer 32.8% 79.2% 88.1%
Lin Complex. 85.0% 99.7% 100.0%
Serial 69.4% 80.2% 95.5%
Cusum 44.4% 86.4% 93.7%
Excursions 47.3% 88.4% 94.8%
Variant 37.9% 89.4% 92.7%
Table 4.3: Percentage of 1,000 IPN instances that pass the NIST test suite. The IPN has
two 32-bit homogenous nodes. Each configuration collects 10,000-bit result, the maximum
number of iterations is set to 1,000.
4.9 Experimental Results on Stability Improvement
We reuse the experimental setup in section 4.8 to improve the stability of IPN. Here we
define stability as the possibility of observing a stable response over repeated observation
of 100 times when provided a single challenge. We conduct our experiments on 1,000 IPN
instances of IPN chains and complex IPNs. The result is presented in figure 4.8.
The complex IPN is constructed using a mixture of one-to-one, one-to-many and many-
to-one connections. We fix the total number of IPN nodes to be four in IPN chains and a
total number of levels in complex IPN to be four. We observe that both ES and random
search approach significantly boosts the stability. Specifically, our ES approach outperforms
random search in both IPN nodes and complex IPN as shown in Figure 4.8a and Figure 4.8b
respectively. We noticed that the advantage of ES algorithm is greater as the number of
many-to-one connections increases. An intuitive explanation is that as complex connections
provide more stable candidates comparing to direct connections. Despite the significant
improvement (130.3% in IPN chains and 167.74% in complex IPNs when comparing to
random non-optimized IPNs, 22.62% in IPN chains and 25.38% in complex IPNs when
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(a) IPN chain of 4 levels.
(b) Complex IPN of 4 levels.
Figure 4.8: Stability of 1,000 IPN instances of IPN chains and complex IPNs. Each IPN
node is a 32-bit homogenous node. Both the IPN chain and complex IPN has 4 levels.
Complex IPNs uses a mixture of one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-one connections.
Environmental variance: 0.8∼1.0V, 0∼60 ◦C.
comparing to baseline random search algorithm), additional error correction code might still
be required to generate highly stable outputs for stability sensitive tasks for large IPN.
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4.10 Chapter Conclusion
We have proposed a novel optimization algorithm on a type of PUF structure that inter-
connects APUFs to build a network in this chapter. We show that by configuring the
interconnected network using our proposed evolution strategy algorithm, IPN is capable
of overcoming randomness problems in APUFs as well as showing significant improvement
in stability. Our proposed ES method outperforms the baseline method (random search) in
both speed and quality. The advantage of our ES algorithm remains consistent over different
IPN settings.
Our experimental results indicate that our ES algorithm outperforms unoptimized con-
figuration by an average of 220.8% and standard search algorithm an average of 21.86% in
all NIST randomness tests. We also observe that our method is also capable of improving
output stability by 22.62% in IPN chains and 25.38% in more complexed IPNs.
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CHAPTER 5
Content-driven Reconfigurable Injective Functions
5.1 Motivation
In the world of computer architectural design, cryptography provides the basis of many con-
ventional security approaches. While the statement remains true, the rise of IoT technology
has imposed challenges to the status of conventional security. The compact size and limited
resources of many IoT devices cannot afford expensive cryptographic computations. Also,
conventional cryptographic protection does not provide defense against attacks at the physi-
cal level. As more and more devices are deployed in untrusted environments, attackers could
potentially gain valuable secrets through side-channel information. Thus, the need for low
power, compact and side-channel attack resilient security primitives are highly desired in the
era of IoT.
5.2 Technical Goals and Contributions
Facing these challenges, we propose an ultra-lightweight hardware-based security primitive:
Content-driven Reconfigurable Injective Function (CRIF). A CRIF is a hardware function
that maps an input to an output distinctively, and this mapping can be reconfigured using
contents of historical data while preserving the distinctness of the function. We claim that
the mathematical property of CRIF enables many security applications such as encryption
and decryption operations. We believe that CRIF as a security primitive is advantageous
for security tasks on energy and computation constrained devices compared to conventional
cryptographic primitives in the following three aspects.
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1. CRIF provides security at multiple layers. Unlike many cryptographic methods, CRIF
does not hide a specific secret key in the implementation, similar to [78]. Thus, popular
attacks at the physical level such as side-channel attack are incompetent.
2. CRIF is reconfigurable. The mapping between inputs and outputs can be rewired
from time to time depending on historical secret message contents. Replay attacks and
modeling attacks are extremely inefficient against reconfigurable systems.
3. Hardware implementation of CRIF is simple and energy efficient. CRIF can be ef-
ficiently implemented using a network of Lookup Tables (LUTs) on FPGA with a
low area overhead. When performing tasks such as encryption or decryption, CRIF
achieves at least 75.04% power savings comparing to some modern AES-based schemes.
5.3 Preliminary
5.3.1 Injective Functions
As the name suggests, the fundamental building blocks of CRIF are injective functions.
Injective functions or one-to-one functions are a set of mathematical functions that maps
every element in its domain to at most one corresponding element in it’s co-domain. An
injective function is mathematically denoted as shown in Equation 5.1. In the context of this
chapter, we assume X and Y are finite domain set and finite codomain set of the injective
function f . To be more specific, the distinctness property in injective functions is defined as
Equation 5.2.
f : X 7→ Y (5.1)
∀a, b ∈ X, f(a) = f(b) =⇒ a = b (5.2)
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5.3.2 Properties of Injective Functions
Injective functions have many useful properties for security tasks, among which we utilize
two of them to build CRIF.
First, the composition of injective functions remains injective. If function f and g are
injective, then function h = f ◦ g is injective. The property provides the basis of our
reconfigurable design as we can composite multiple injective functions in different ways to
create different input-output mappings without compromising the injective property.
Second, Injective functions can be made invertible. When the codomain of an injective
function f : X 7→ Y is replaced by its actual range J = f(X), the function became bijective
(invertible). We show that by using bijective function f , either by itself or with it’s clone
f ′ = f , efficient and secure encryption/decryption can be implemented as f−1(f(X)) = X.
5.4 Related Work
Security primitives are low-level algorithms that are used to build security protocols or secu-
rity systems [79]. Traditional security primitives are purely cryptographic involving compli-
cated mathematical operations [80]. However, these standard mathematics-based primitives
are too costly to be used in lightweight mobile IoT devices.
5.4.1 PUF-based Security Primitives
Facing the challenges introduced by energy constraints, the rise of low power hardware
primitives has provided new visions for security researchers. Physically unclonable functions
(PUF), as a type of newly proposed low power hardware functions, have provided the basis
of many energy efficient security primitives. PUF-based designs such as public PUF [81]
and NanoPUF [82] have been proven to be adaptable and energy efficient in numerous
security tasks with an emphasis on physical attack resilience and low power. However, PUF-
based security primitives often suffer from stability issues and vulnerability against modeling
attacks. Our design of CRIF, however, does not depend on noisy analog signals, therefore is
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much more stable than PUF-based schemes. The reconfigurable nature of CRIF also renders
modeling attack useless.
5.4.2 Efficient Implementation of Classical Cryptography
The advancement in efficient arithmetic circuits made energy-efficient hardware-based imple-
mentation of classic cryptography possible. Many hardware implementations of low power
AES [83] [84] [85], RSA [86] [87] and elliptic curve cryptography(ECC) [88] [89] are proposed
and adopted. Even though the energy efficiency of these cryptographic modules has been
significantly improved, we show that our CRIF design is still more advantageous in terms of
area and energy overhead.
5.5 Architecture
In this section, we formally introduce the hardware architecture of CRIF. We first show
the implementation of our overall architecture. We then propose the LUT-based invertible
injective function design. Lastly, we introduce our content-driven reconfiguration mechanism.
5.5.1 Overall Structure of CRIF
Since the composite of injective functions remains injective, we propose to connect multiple
injective functions in a layer-by-layer network structure to increase overall complexity. Figure
5.1 displays the overall architecture of CRIF.
A typical CRIF takes an n-bit input and generates an n-bit output. A CRIF has a
layered structure where each layer consists of a constant number of k-bit LUT-based injective
functions. Multiple layers stacks on top of each other, meaning the output of the previous
layer is used as the input of the next layer. We denote the total number of layers stacked
together as the depth of CRIF and the number of LUT-based injective functions per layer
as the width of CRIF.
To increase system complexity, we propose to insert a shuﬄer between every two layers.
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Figure 5.1: Overall architecture of our proposed CRIF.
The i-th shuﬄer SFi locates between the i-th layer Layeri and i+ 1-th layer Layeri+1. SFi
takes the output of Layeri and shuﬄe the order. The shuﬄing order solely depends on an
m-bit configuration vector. Noted that the shuﬄe operation only changes the order of the
input; the output length and bit frequency remain identical as the input. The shuﬄed input
is then fed to Layeri+1.
5.5.2 Injective Function
Injective functions, as the building block of CRIF, enforces one-to-one mapping from input
x to output y and vice versa. The mapping from y to x should also be one-to-one to ensure
the uniqueness of the inverse function. We propose to use LUTs to implement our injective
functions.
To illustrate the design of our LUT-based injective functions, we show a motivational
example in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2a demonstrate the implementation of forward injective
function fforward : X 7→ Y using four LUTs where X and Y are 4-bit vectors. The corre-
sponding backward function fbackward : Y 7→ X is shown in Figure 5.2b. The memory cells in
each LUTs in fforward is carefully replaced so that requirements specified in Equation 5.2 is
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(a) Forward injective function fforward = X 7→ Y .
(b) Backward injective function fbackward = Y 7→
X.
Figure 5.2: A pair of four bit forward and backward injective function implemented using
LUTs.
fforward
X Y
x0 x1 x2 x3 y0 y1 y2 y3
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
fbackward
X Y
y0 y1 y2 y3 x0 x1 x2 x3
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Table 5.1: Corresponding mappings for fforward and fbackward.
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met. We then reverse the mapping implemented in fforward to construct fbackward such that
fbackward(fforward(X)) = X. An example of the described forward and backward mapping is
shown in Table 5.1.
When a specific forward mapping is known, the assignment of memory cell values in the
backward CRIF is straightforward. For example, in fbackward, when Y = 0101, the corre-
sponding values for X is 1111, thus we assign the memory location 5 in LUT4, LUT5, LUT6
and LUT7 to 1. Using this method, we assign all 16 memory cells in LUT0, LUT1, LUT2 and
LUT3 to 0111000101001011, 1100001101111000, 1000010110101011 and 1101010100010110
correspondingly. Similarly, memory cells in LUT4, LUT5, LUT6 and LUT7 are thus as-
signed to 0110011000111010, 1101100000110011, 0000111011110001 and 0101010001101101
respectively.
5.5.3 Content-driven Reconfiguration
In the case where a security primitive enforces a static one-to-one mapping, an attacker
could exploit the internal structure of the primitive via techniques such as frequency attacks
if enough data is collected. In addition, many existing attacks (e.g., modeling attack) are
developed to compromise security primitives through statistical simulation. Facing these
challenges, we propose to remap the input-output pairs using reconfiguration. Our design of
configurable shuﬄers inserted between two layers allows convenient and low-cost remapping
of CRIF. When a shuﬄer SFi (residing between Layeri and Layeri+1) changes the way it
shuﬄes, the injective function layer Layeri+1 would receive a different input and therefore
generates a different output. This effect would propagate until the last layer, resulting in a
completely different output.
While many existing reconfigurable security applications propose to perform arbitrary
reconfigurations [90] [91], we propose to use the hashed historical contents as configurations
for all shuﬄers in CRIF. Our reconfiguration mechanism is particularly beneficial for encryp-
tion/decryption tasks as it forms a dependency chain between not only current output but
also all previous inputs. If an attacker intends to steal the current input message, he/she
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needs to obtain all historical decrypted input messages, which significantly increases the
effort the attacker needs to make to steal a protected message.
5.5.4 Backward CRIF
Note that CRIF always comes in pairs, though we label all injective functions as fforward in
Figure 5.1, the backward CRIF maintains the identical architecture as the forward CRIF.
The backward CRIF can be easily constructed by replacing all fforwards with corresponding
fbackwards as described in section 5.5.2. Note that the configuration for shuﬄers in the
backward CRIF needs to be inverted to maintain the invertibility of CRIF.
5.6 Security Protocol
The mathematical properties and the reconfigurability of CRIF make it a great choice for
encryption/decryption tasks. In this section, we introduce a CRIF-based protocol for secure
two-party communications.
5.6.1 Assumptions
We assume the there are two parties participating in the protocol, respectively a sensor,
and an IoT hub. The communication is bidirectional, meaning messages can be arbitrarily
transmitted between the two parties. We assume the communication channel between the
sensor and the hub is insecure, meaning an attacker could eavesdrop the channel without
being noticed. We also assume that all actions are taken before the IoT deployment is
secure; no attacker is allowed to interfere or monitor the CRIF initialization process. Lastly,
we assume that the memory used to store the shuﬄer configurations is only secure before
the first message delivery.
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5.6.2 Protocol description
Protocol 3 explains how CRIF-based message encryption and decryption works in a two-
party communication scenario. Before the first message delivery between two parties, a
pair of forward and backward CRIFs are initialized such that both forward CRIF pair are
identical and both backward CRIF are identical. Both parties also agree on an initial shuﬄer
configuration seed δ0 and a hashing function h. The hash of the configuration seed 0 is used
as the first configuration for both forward CRIF at both parties, while it’s inversion is used to
configure both parties’ backward CRIF. Both the encryption and decryption process can be
divided into four steps, respectively decrypting the new configuration from the seed, apply
the new configuration, encrypt/decrypt the private message and update configuration seed.
Noted that the seed stored in the memory is an encrypted message, it does not compromise
the security of CRIF when stored in an insecure memory. Even if the attacker gains the
reading privilege of the insecure memory, he/she would not be able to decrypt it to obtain
the real configuration. The real configuration in our protocol design is the hash of a historical
unencrypted message. Without the correct configuration, it is impossible to model the CRIF
function.
We claim our design is safe and robust because of two reasons. First, even though the
current configuration depends on previous private messages, we never store any plaintext in-
formation in the system. Secondly, current decryption relies on the decryption of a historical
configuration, which in turn depends on a more dated historical configuration. This chain-
like dependency significantly increases the complexity of the work required to compromise
the protocol.
5.7 Security Analysis
We analysis the security properties of our proposed CRIF in this section. We first conduct
tests to examine the statistical tests of CRIF including randomness, avalanche effect, and
bit-wise correlation. We then apply three modeling attacks to show the modeling attack
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Protocol 3 CRIF-based Two Party Communication
Preliminary:
A sensor S possesses a forward CRIF FSf and a backward CRIF FSb .
An IoT hub H possesses a forward CRIF FHf and a backward CRIF FHb .
Both S and H obtains a hash function h.
Initialization:
Injective functions in FSf and FHf are identical.
Injective functions in FSb and FHb are identical.
Both S and H stores the same initial configuration seed δ0 for shuﬄers.
CRIF-based message Encryption and decryption
Message encryption at time τ ≥ 1
1. S uses FSb to decrypt the stored configuration seed δτ−1 to ∆τ−1.
2. S uses h(∆τ−1) as the configuration vector to configure FSf .
3. S uses FSf to encrypt msgτorig to msgτenc. S sends msgτenc to H.
4. S updates the configuration seed to δτ = msg
τ
enc.
Message decryption at time τ ≥ 1
1. H receives msgτenc.
2. H uses FHb to decrypt the stored configuration seed δτ−1 to ∆τ−1.
3. H uses h(∆τ−1) as the configuration vector to configure FHb .
4. H uses FHb to decrypt msgτenc to msgτorig.
5. H updates the configuration seed to δτ = msg
τ
enc.
resilience of CRIF. All analysis is conducted on 100 instances of randomly initialized 64-bit
CRIF with 4 layers on a Xilinx Spartan-6 LX45 FPGA.
5.7.1 Statistical Analysis
5.7.1.1 Randomness
The output randomness of CRIF is a strong indication of how predictable CRIF output is.
We use the statistical test suite provided by National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST)[73] to validate the output randomness of CRIF.
We first collect bit streams by recursively feed CRIF output back to the input to eliminate
the randomness introduced by an external source. The implementation reconfigures itself
based on previous input as explained in the previous section. A total number of 64,000,000
bits were collected and separated into one hundred bit-streams. Table 5.2 shows the NIST
test suite result of CRIF. Our CRIF successfully passes all tests with p-value significantly
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Statistical Test p-value Avg. success rate
Frequency 0.738818 99%
Block Frequency (m=128) 0.319084 99%
Cusum-Forward 0.657933 99%
Cusum-Reverse 0.419021 100%
Runs 0.419021 98%
Longest Runs of Ones 0.350485 100%
Rank 0.574903 100%
Spectral DFT 0.779188 98%
Non-overlapping Templates (m = 9) 0.699313* 98.8%*
Overlapping Templates (m = 9) 0.289667 99%
Universal 0.109188 100%
Approximate Entropy (m = 10) 0.058984 99.5%*
Rand. Excursions - 100%
Rand. Excursions Variant - 100%
Serial (m = 16) 0.275709 99%
Linear Complexity (M = 500) 0.637119 99%
Table 5.2: The average success ratio for the NIST statistical test suite. 100 bitstreams of
100,000 bits are passed to each test. The test passes for p-value≥ σ, where σ is 0.05. Asterisk
sign (*) indicates the average case for all templates.
above the 0.05 threshold, proving our CRIF output is highly random.
5.7.1.2 Bit-wise Correlation
Apart from output randomness, we also study the bit-wise correlations in CRIF shown in
Figure 5.3. Low correlation in input-output or output-output bits indicates high difficulty in
modeling a CRIF. We first investigate the correlation between each bit in CRIF input and
each bit in CRIF output. For the convenience of observation, we generate a heatmap for
the conditional probability of an output bit Oj given a specific input bit Ii, shown in Figure
5.3a. A conditional probability P (Oj|Ii) = 1 indicates output bit Oj stays consistent with
input bit Ii and a conditional probability P (Oj|Ii) = 0 indicates output bit Oj is negatively
correlated with input bit Ii. We expect P (Oj|Ii) = 0.5 indicates no correlation between input
bit Ii and output bit Oi. Our result shows that the average conditional probability between
any CRIF input-output bit pair is 0.5032 with a maximum value of 0.5112 and a minimum
value of 0.4821. We then study the correlation between each pair of bits in CRIF output.
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Figure 5.3: Statistical analysis on 64-bit CRIF implementations (depth = 4).
Similarly we calculate the conditional probability P (Oj|Oi) of any output bit Oi and output
bit Oj. The result is shown ins Figure 5.3b. A white diagonal line shows that P (Oj|Oi) = 1
when i = j. We expect P (Oj|Oi) = 0.5, i 6= j indicates no correlation between any pair of
bits in the CRIF output. The average conditional probability between any output-output
bit pair is 0.4996 with a maximum value of 0.5077 and a minimum value of 0.4908.
5.7.1.3 Avalanche Effect
The avalanche effect is a desirable property in cryptographic algorithms. An algorithm
with good avalanche effect indicates that a slight change in the input causes a dramatic
change in the output. On the one hand, good avalanche effect makes output prediction from
input extremely difficult; on the other hand, good avalanche effect makes sure that little
about the input can be inferred from the output. We propose to use the Hamming distance
distribution between outputs when a single bit is flipped in the input to infer how good
CRIF’s avalanche effect is. In an ideal case, a single bit flip in a CRIF should flip half of the
output bits on average. We conduct such an experiment and show our result in Figure 5.4.
The hamming distances indicate a normal distribution with a mean of 31.273 and variance
of 20.508, showing an excellent avalanche effect in CRIF.
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Figure 5.4: Hamming distance distribution for avalanche effect testing measured on a 64-bit
CRIF implementations (depth = 4).
5.7.2 Statistical Modeling
Aside from randomness, correlation and avalanche tests, we also test our design under three
powerful machine learning algorithms to estimate how robust CRIF stands against modeling
attack. The three machine learning algorithms we select are logistic regression (LR), support
vector machine (SVM) and multilayer perceptron (MLP). Instead of training a multi-bit
model we simplified the problem to single bit prediction. If all methods failed to achieve
accurate single bit prediction, then it is impossible to create an accurate multi-bit model.
We transform the single bit prediction to an equivalent binary classification problem to
create train suitable machine learning models. We believe the prediction accuracy provides
valuable insight in modeling attack resiliency. Our training set size for all three methods is
maintained at least 15% of the input space, which is 2input size. We conduct experiments on
multiple setting including varying the size of each injective functions in CRIF, adjusting the
width and depth of CRIF and also enable/disable our content-driven reconfigurability.
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5.7.2.1 Single Output Bit Prediction
We first study if we could create a model that could accurately predict a single output bit
from inputs. An accuracy of 100% or 0% indicates that the model successfully models the
function the CRIF implements, while a50% accuracy suggests that the algorithm failed to
do so. This experiment is an extension to the bit-wise correlation study conducted above.
The detailed result is shown in Table 5.3.
5.7.2.2 Single Input Bit Prediction
We then look into the reverse problem of how accurate can a statistical model predicts
an input bit from the CRIF output. This experiment is equivalent to train a model that
simulates the backward CRIF and is a direct indication of the encryption complexity. A
prediction accuracy rate of 50% suggests that CRIF system is complex enough to stand
resilient to statistical modeling whereas a high (≥ 80%) or low (≤ 20%) accuracy suggests
that CRIF architecture is simple enough to be modeled. The detailed result is shown in
Table 5.4.
5.7.2.3 Discussion
We conclude from the results that no machine learning algorithm we adopted is capable of
accurately predict single bit input or single bit output, as all prediction accuracy is under
75%, meaning a prediction accuracy for a 32-bit message is below 0.1% even in the worst
case scenario.
We also observe that three factors have a significant impact on the output prediction
accuracy, respectively CRIF depth, CRIF width and injective function size at each layer. All
three factors have a direct negative correlation with prediction accuracy, indicating deeper,
wider and larger injective functions makes statistical modeling significantly more difficult.
Among these three major factors, we believe that depth is the most important one. When
we fix the total number of injective functions, we observe that deeper but narrower CRIF
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outperform wider but shallower CRIF in against all three modeling methods. Note that our
content-driven reconfiguration mechanism significantly improves CRIF’s modeling attack
resiliency, providing the most resilient CRIF marked in dark gray in Figure 5.3 and Figure
5.4. The prediction accuracy on a 2-layered 4× 4 CRIF with reconfigurability is as low as 4
layered 8× 8 CRIF without reconfigurability, proving our mechanism to be successful.
5.8 Overhead Analysis
We implemented the hardware support for CRIF-based communication protocol on Xilinx
Spartan-6 LX45 FPGAs to measure the area and power. In our implementation, we use a
128-bit CRIF with 4 layers. Each layer has sixteen 8-bit injective functions implemented
using MUXs and LUTs. The hash function we use to generate the configuration is an
efficient SHA-1 FPGA implementation described in [92]. Table 5.5 shows the area and
power overhead break down of our implementation. We observe that the majority of the
area and power overhead comes from the efficient SHA-1 hash function we use, our CRIF
design only occupies 23.17% of the overall area and 37.71% of the overall power consumption.
A much more lightweight hash function could further reduce our overhead.
Our design CRIF SHA-1 [92] Overall
Flip-flops 162 1,151 1,588
Slice LUTs 512 1,590 2,209
Block RAMs 0 0 3
Power(mW ) 19.80 30.42 52.50
Table 5.5: FPGA resource and power characteristics of the hardware support for CRIF-based
encryption/decryption scheme. Power measured for scheme running at 5 Mhz.
We also compare our scheme horizontally with efficient AES designs on FPGAs as shown
in Table 5.6. All power data are measured and verified based on the result reported in [93].
Even though all three compared designs are optimized for high throughput and high speed
instead of low power, they are still widely adopted. Our design achieves 75.04%, 77.70%,
and 84.01% power reduction respectively. On energy constrained IoT devices, where the
data transmission is small in size and infrequent, our design is more suitable for the security
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tasks.
CRIF-based design [94] [95] DOR[96]
Power(mW ) 52.50 210.38 235.45 172.43
Table 5.6: Power comparison with other power efficient AES design on FPGA. Power mea-
sured for scheme running at 5 Mhz.
5.9 Chapter Conclusion
We present a compact and low power security primitive, CRIF, for message encryption/decryption
tasks on IoTs. We show that our design of CRIF is secure as it shows excellent security
properties in output randomness, bit-wise correlations and avalanche effect. We have also
demonstrated that the content-driven reconfigurability significantly increases the system
complexity, rendering popular statistical modeling useless. Lastly, our implementation of
the hardware support for our proposed CRIF-based security protocol shows that our de-
sign is small and low power, achieving at least 75.04% power savings compared to popular
AES-based schemes.
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CHAPTER 6
Hardware Sharing between PUF and Digital Logic
6.1 Motivation
There are two major concerns for modern logic designs: power and security. The prevailing
portable devices such as mobile phones, tablets, and laptops impose high requirements on the
low power design and applications due to the highly constrained power supply. Protecting
mobile devices is more challenging than securing non-portable devices not only because of the
emergence of novel attack methods such as malicious mobile software, mobile phone trojans,
and even electromagnetic side-channel attacks, but also due to the fact that traditional
security approaches usually demand high power cost, and thus are not applicable to mobile
devices due to limited power supply. Therefore, the desire for lightweight security primitives
is stronger than ever.
A PUF, as a unique type of hardware security primitive, has excellent low power, high
speed, and unclonablity properties. An individual PUF is a piece of hardware implementing
a one-way function which takes advantage of the inevitable process variation to guarantee
uniqueness of the function. The input-output mapping function of an individual PUF is
deterministic but unpredictable, due to the fact that process variation is not predictable.
As a hardware security primitive, PUF employs lower overhead comparing to traditional
software-based cryptographic approaches. More importantly, a PUF itself is unclonable
which provides protection at the physical level.
However, PUFs suffer from significant drawbacks as well. Two of the most critical con-
cerns are related to output throughput and randomness. As an example, an arbiter PUF
has an n-bit challenge vector and only a single output bit. When used to encrypt and de-
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crypt messages in real applications, n is usually set to be at least 64, in which case the ratio
between the PUF output and the PUF input is 1 : 64 or lower. The other concern is asso-
ciated with the randomness of PUF outputs. The unpredictable and uncontrollable nature
of process variation creates unbalanced delay path routing in PUFs. The frequency of 0s
and 1s in the outputs are usually not equal which compromises the security of PUFs. Other
randomness problems such as repeated patterns in outputs and strong PUF input-output
correlations can also be observed in some implementations.
6.2 Technical Goals and Contributions
We propose a novel PUF design which avoids the above PUF problems while keeping it
low-delay, low-power and physically unclonable. We focus specifically on arbiter PUFs. Our
design is motivated by the following observation. Traditional arbiter PUFs focus on the
analog properties of circuits, for example, delays in the case of arbiter PUFs. Two signals
are sent as inputs to the two paths of the PUF, and depending on which path has a longer
delay, one signal arrives at the arbiter first, thus producing a 1 or 0 accordingly. However,
the PUF circuit itself is capable of serving beyond racing delay signals; it can also be used
to convey meaningful digital information. In arbiter PUFs, each delay component is made
of transistors/gates. Therefore, when connecting these gates in a particular manner, the
overall design can compute specific functions.
Our key idea is to use the same piece of hardware to compute digital logic while racing
analog signals at the same time. With only small extra area overhead, our circuit design
generates two types of outputs, respectively analog outputs from the PUF, and digital out-
puts from the digital logic. Moreover, both outputs are generated in the same clock cycle.
By combining the above two outputs, we expect to keep the unclonability of PUFs while
gaining the advantage of digital circuits.
The digital portion of the circuit can be designed to implement any functionality. In our
design, we have specifically chosen leap-forward linear feedback shift registers (leap-forward
LFSRs) for the following reasons. First, a leap-forward LFSR is a pseudo-random number
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generator; by combining PUF outputs with leap forward LFSR outputs (e.g., XOR the
two outputs), the combined result will be highly random. Second, a leap-forward LFSR
generates large outputs in a compact area; thus, without introducing extra hardware or
delay, the output throughput is highly boosted.
To summarize our contributions, we propose a power efficient PUF design by combing
traditional arbiter PUFs with leap forward LFSRs. Our design only introduces a small area
overhead as the arbiter PUF, and the leap forward LFSR share a majority of hardware and
signal resources. With a single execution of the circuit, both outputs are generated simulta-
neously. By combining the arbiter PUF outputs with the leap forward LFSR outputs, the
system gains higher throughput as well as better randomness. Our design and implemen-
tation is based on, but not limited to, FPGA platforms. We have described our detailed
implementation in Section 6.7.
6.3 Desiderata
Our work is the first effort to take advantage of both analog properties as well as digital
properties of a circuit to create a security primitive. The analog properties are used to build
an arbiter PUF while the digital properties are realized by creating a leap-forward LFSR.
Before discussing our detailed design and implementation, we identify the architectural,
operational, and security desiderata of our work.
• In terms of architecture, we have created a “one circuit, two outputs” design. The PUF
portion and the LFSR portion of our designed circuit share almost the same hardware
resources, consequently, it saves area and lowers the power consumption.
• In terms of operation, our design achieves high throughput by employing only small
delay since the digital outputs and the analog outputs are generated in the same clock
cycle without timing overhead.
• In terms of security, by combining the arbiter PUF output with the LFSR output, the
final system output has kept the unclonability of the original PUF while the randomness
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is enhanced from LFSR.
6.4 Related Work
6.4.1 Hardware Random Number Generators
Random number generators are widely used in many security applications. James has re-
viewed a majority of commonly used random number generators [97]. In the past, random
number generation was mostly done by software. However, as hardware systems become
cheaper, faster, and more lightweight, it is feasible and more power efficient to implement
the random number generators directly in hardware. A number of HRNGs are proposed
based on different technologies. Intel has developed HRNGs for use in cryptographic appli-
cations [98]. The work by Petrie et al. has applied noise as a random seed to create HRNGs
[99]. Additionally, an FPGA-based HRNG is proposed by Kohlbrenner and Gaj by using
the intrinsic jitter contained in digital circuits[100]. Using PUFs to build an HRNG was
first proposed by O’Donnell from MIT [65]. Our work implements the design of leap-forward
LFSRs which is an extension of the standard LFSR by allowing all shifts in the standard
design to be applied in a single clock cycle [101].
6.5 Preliminaries
6.5.1 PUF Model
The PUFs we use for signal racing are standard arbiter PUFs. Figure 6.1 shows the schematic
diagram of the PUF model. The basic structure of an n-bit PUF consists of n delay segments.
The two propagation delays in the ith segment are denoted as d0i and d
1
i respectively. The two
delays are designed to be nominally equal to each other, but after manufacturing, the effect
of process variation will cause unpredictable delay difference between them. When built on
an FPGA, the upper delay and the lower delay in each segment are directly implemented
using LUTs with the same size. Two identically designed paths are generated by connecting
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delay components from each segment, and an arbiter is placed at the end of the two paths.
The two paths can be modified using the control bit of each segment. When the control
bit is 0, the two paths will not shuﬄe. When the control bit is 1, the two paths swap. For
example, in Figure 6.1, if the control bit of the ith segment is 0, then d0i stays with the upper
path and d1i stays with the lower path. However, if the control bit is 1, d
0
i shuﬄes to the
lower path and d1i shuﬄes to the upper path. Note that when the shuﬄing happens, all the
delays that connect prior to d0i (d
1
i ) will be shuﬄed at the same time.
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Figure 6.1: The model of arbiter PUFs with an n-bit challenge.
The vector consisting of all control bits is denoted as the PUF challenge. When an
n-bit challenge (c1c2...cn−1cn) is provided to the PUF, two identically designed paths are
generated. To retrieve a response, an impulse signal is fed into the system to excite both
paths simultaneously. Because of process variation, the signal traveling along one of the two
paths will reach the arbiter earlier, generating a corresponding arbiter output denoted as the
PUF response.
6.5.2 Leap-Forward LFSR
An LFSR is a commonly seen pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). The leap-forward
LFSR method utilizes only one LFSR and shifts out several bits. This method is based
on the observation that an LFSR is a linear system and the register state is expressed as
Q(i+ 1) = A ∗Q(i). Q(i+ 1) and Q(i) are the initial values at (i+ 1)th and ith steps; A is
the transition matrix.
To calculate the content in shift registers after k steps, the equation transforms into:
101
Q(i + 1) = Ak ∗ Q(i). We can compute Ak and determine the XOR structure accordingly.
The new circuit leaps k steps in one clock cycle while the circuit uses identical shift registers.
D Q
D Q
D Q
D Q
q3
q2
q1
q0
Figure 6.2: A 4-bit leap forward LFSR example.
To illustrate the idea, Chu et al. proposed a motivational example of a 4-bit leap-forward
LFSR [101]. The derived new transitional matrix A4 is calculated from A, which is obtained
from a single-bit LFSR random number generator.
A =

0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1

, A4 =

1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0

After performing the operations, we can derive the feedback equation for each signal as
Equation 6.1 - 6.4:
q0 next = q0 ⊕ q3 (6.1)
q1 next = q0 ⊕ q1 ⊕ q3 (6.2)
q2 next = q0 ⊕ q1 ⊕ q2 ⊕ q3 (6.3)
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q3 next = q0 ⊕ q1 ⊕ q1 (6.4)
The corresponding block diagram is shown in Figure 6.2, requiring 4 flip-flops and 5 XOR
gates.
Note that the final transition matrix depends only on the initial transition matrix, thus,
different initialization values in shift registers will lead to a different number of XOR logic
required in a multi-bit leap-forward LFSR. A 64-bit leap-forward LFSR takes at most 125
XOR gates to build.
6.6 Architecture
6.6.1 Observations
We observed some opportunities that can be taken to further improve a conventional FPGA-
based arbiter PUF implementation.
6.6.1.1 Signal Encoding
In a conventional arbiter PUF implementation, the pair of racing clock signals clki1 and clk
i
2
after the ith segment is always synchronous with the original input signals clkorig1 and clk
orig
2 .
One observation is that the synchronization is not strictly enforced, as long as clki1 and clk
i
2
are in phase, the arbiter appended at the end of the PUF is able to accurately catch the
faster signal. This observation enables us to encode racing signals to digital signals. For
example, if clki1 and clk
orig
1 are in phase, we encode clk
i
1 as a 0 and if they are in antiphase
we encode it as a 1.
6.6.1.2 LUT Utilization
FPGA implementation of arbiter PUFs utilizes LUT6 2 to race signals. A LUT6 2 is a 6-
input, 2-output look-up table that is able to act as two LUT5s that shares the same inputs
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or just a single LUT6 depending on the control bit. Among the six inputs bits, the control
bit (most significant bit) is set to 1 in order to transform the LUT6 2 into two LUT5s. The
second most significant bit is usually used as a selection bit that decides the traveling path
inside the LUT. This bit serves as a challenge bit of the arbiter PUF. The next two bits are
fixed to constant 1s. The two least significant bits are used to take two racing clock signals.
We observe that a conventional arbiter PUF implementation does not fully utilize all the
possible resources of LUT6 2. If we allow anti-phased signals between PUF segments, we
could change the 3rd and 4th bits from static 1s to user-defined values. The conventional
design of enforcing two static bits is equivalent to leaving a LUT2 unused for every LUT6 2
in the delay chain.
6.6.2 Overall Design
We propose producing logical output and signal racing results simultaneously on the same
hardware. Our design takes a pair of impulse signals as input, and because of process
variation, two racing signals do not arrive at the finish line (arbiter) at the same time.
Meanwhile, logical computations are performed based on the logical input and the result is
carried on the bypassing racing signals using an encoding. Thus, we generate two outputs,
each of which is completely uncorrelated. Consequently, an advantage of our design is that
we are able to reduce overall power and area by sharing hardware and wires.
We propose to load leap-forward LFSRs on top of a conventional arbiter PUF as shown
in Figure 6.3. The arbiter PUF and multiple LFSRs share the same hardware but generate
different outputs. The arbiter PUF takes PUF challenges to configure internal paths for the
delay signals to race. Meanwhile, leap-forward LFSRs are designed on top of the arbiter
PUF to generate digital random numbers.
Eventually, the leap-forward LFSR output and the arbiter PUF response are combined
using a post process module (in our case we use XORs and a Von Neumann corrector). The
final output leverages advantages from both sources: it inherits high throughput and high
randomness from leap-forward LFSRs and physical unclonablity from arbiter PUFs.
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Figure 6.3: High level illustration of proposed design.
6.7 Implementation
We utilize LUT6 2 on FPGAs to demonstrate the feasibility of our design. Figure 6.5 shows
our overall implementation. Our design maintains the LUT chain structure and some LUT
input pin assignments from the conventional arbiter PUF implementation. However, the
third and fourth input bit of each LUT6 2 are no longer restricted to constant 1s. Instead,
they are now open to any user-defined values. We use these two bits along with unconstrained
initialization vector (INIT) bits to implement an additional XOR gate on top of the LUT6 2.
We then use these XOR gates to implement leap-forward LFSRs. The output of the XOR
gate is encoded from the racing signal using a flip-flop. Depending on if the signal is in phase
or antiphase with the clock signal, the result of the XOR gate is encoded as 0 or 1.
6.7.1 Implementation of Arbiter PUF
The arbiter PUF retains the same structure as a conventional FPGA-based design. Each
LUT6 2 implements a single segment of an arbiter PUF. We have made modifications to
the implementation to allow racing signals to carry additional digital information. Note that
our modification still maintains signal synchronization by keeping two racing signals in phase
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throughout the racing process.
LUT6_2 LUT6_2
Figure 6.4: The two output signals from LUT6 2 are required to be in phase, but can be
inverted simultaneously.
LUT6_2Challenge bit
Logic inputs
Racing signals
D Q Logical output
Logic inputs
Challenge bit
Arbiter Response
...
LUT6_2 LUT6_2
D Q Logical output D Q Logical output
Figure 6.5: Overall implementation using LUT6 2 on FPGA.
6.7.1.1 Allowing Antiphase Signals
In our design, we no longer require signals traveling between LUTs to be synchronous with
the clock signal. Figure 6.4 shows a possible scenario where the signals are inverted after
traveling through the first LUT and inverted again after the second LUT. Our encoding
scheme (in-phase encoded as 0 and antiphase encoded as 1) allows us to carry computational
output on racing signals that are traveling through the arbiter PUF chain.
Additional constraints on the INIT value of LUTs need to be applied to allow such
functionality. All INIT values must fulfill both requirements below:
• The most significant 32 bits must be mirrored to the least significant 32 bits in units
of 4 bits. For example, the mirror image of 1100 1010 would be 1010 1100.
• INIT [4k] ⊕ INIT [4k + 3] = 1 for k (k ∈ {0, 1, ..., 15}). The value of INIT [4k] and
INIT [4k + 3] are decided by the computational logic.
The first constraint is applied to guarantee the upper and lower LUT5s within the LUT6 2
to be the same, thus creating theoretically identical racing paths. The second constraint
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is enforced to create racing paths that signals can propagate through. These constraints
together guarantee that the two outputs of each LUT6 2 are two in-phase clock signals
instead of static outputs or out of phase signal pairs. All bits that are not restricted by the
rules can be customized to program arbitrary logic.
6.7.1.2 Arbiter
The arbiter used to capture the faster-racing signal is as simple as a SR latch. However,
since we allow the signals to be inverted, the phase of the final output of each chain now
relies on the implemented logic instead of staying unchanged. Whether the racing signals at
the “doorstep” of the arbiter are in phase with the clock signal or not, our original SR latch-
based arbiter is still able to produce the correct result. Thus, the original PUF functionality
is not compromised.
6.7.2 Implementation of leap-forward LFSRs
Leap-forward LFSRs are implemented using XOR gates and flip-flops. A 64-bit leap-forward
LFSR requires only 64 flip-flops and 125 XOR gates. However, the wiring complexity of a
64-bit leap-forward LFSR is nontrivial. As the size of leap-forward LFSRs grows, the wiring
complexity grows dramatically. To avoid the wiring overhead, we implement multiple 64-bit
leap-forward LFSRs on top of our arbiter PUF design.
6.7.2.1 XOR Gates
According to our modification on the arbiter PUF design, it is possible to implement an
additional XOR gate on the LUT6 2. Table 6.1 shows the rules needed to implement the
XOR logic in addition to the constraints described in section 6.7.1.1. For example, a valid
assignment of INIT[31:0] is 8518C3EA, the mirrored INIT[63:31] would be AE3C9158.
The XOR results are then encoded according to rules described in section 6.6.1.1. The
two outputs of LUT6 2 are guaranteed to be identical based on the constraints we set, so
the XOR result can be retrieved by encoding either of them.
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Position in INIT[0:31] Init value
0,7,11,12,16,23,27,28 0
3,4,8,15,19,20,24,31 1
Other -
Table 6.1: INIT value rules for implementing XOR gates.
6.7.2.2 Flip-Flops
The flip-flops serve two purposes. First they are used to extract digital information from
the racing signal. Second, they are used to store the results of leap-forward LFSRs. In our
implementation, we reuse some flip-flops for both purposes to save area and power. Each
leap-forward LFSR requires at most 125 flip-flops.
6.7.3 Post Process
64 LUT6 2s and an SR latch are needed to implement a 64-bit arbiter PUF while a 64-
bit leap-forward LSFR implementation uses 125 XOR gates and 125 flip-flops. This means
that we can load four 64-bit leap forward LSFRs on top of eight 64-bit arbiter PUFs. The
throughput ratio of arbiter PUF and LFSR is then 1:32 (8 : 4× 64). We claim that simple
XOR operations to combine both outputs provide sufficient randomness. The XOR operation
is done between the concatenation of all leap forward LFSR outputs (4×64bits), and a string
consists of self-concatenation of arbiter PUF outputs (32 times, which makes it 8× 32bits).
By combining the two outputs, we are able to boost the system throughput by 32× compared
to conventional eight 64-bit arbiter PUFs. Note that the randomness can be further improved
by applying Von Neumann correction on the arbiter PUF results before the XOR operations.
Randomness is evaluated in section 6.8.2.
6.8 Experimental Results
In our implementation, we combine leap-forward LFSRs with an arbiter PUF by sharing
hardware and wires. Our motivation is to create a security primitive that inherits the
advantages of both while staying free of their drawbacks. We carefully evaluate area, power
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and output randomness of our proposed implementation in this section.
6.8.1 Area and power
We claim that by sharing hardware and signals, we are able to utilize area and power more
efficiently. To evaluate our design, we implement four 64-bit leap forward LFSRs and eight
64-bit arbiter PUFs using the same hardware resources on a Spartan-6 XC6SLX45 FPGA.
In each clock cycle, our design generates 256-bit post-processed output. We compare our
design with standalone leap-forward LFSRs and arbiter PUFs that generate the same output
throughput (256 bits). We have also compared our hardware sharing design with non-sharing
designs on four 64-bit leap forward LFSRs and eight 64-bit arbiter PUFs. The comparison
result is shown in Table 6.2.
Our design LFSR PUF Non-share
Throughput 256+8 256 256 256+8
Flip-flops 532 256 512 320
LUTs 544 250 16,384 764
Slices 288 135 8192 402
Unclonable yes no yes -
Power(mW ) 6.92 3.39 117 7.38
Power/bit 0.026 0.013 0.457 0.028
Table 6.2: FPGA resource and power characteristics: our design (four 64-bit leap forward
LFSRs loaded on eight 64-bit arbiter PUFs) vs. four standalone 64-bit leap forward LFSRs
vs. 256 64-bit arbiter PUFs vs. four 64-bit leap forward LFSR and eight 64-bit arbiter PUFs
that do not share hardware resources. Power per bit unit: mW/bit.
Even though we spend more power and area than leap-forward LFSRs, our design gains
the advantage of physical unclonability. When compared to arbiter PUFs, we have reduced
LUT cost by 30.1× and reduced power by 16.9×.
When compared to four independent 64-bit leap-forward LFSRs and eight 64-bit arbiter
PUFs that do not share hardware as shown in the last column of Table 6.2, our design also
does better in terms of both area and power.
The result shows that our design uses more flip-flops compared to the non-sharing scheme.
This is due to the fact in order to capture the digital information on the racing signals we
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use additional flip-flops for signal encoding. However, we are able to save 40.4% of LUTs
and 39.58% of occupied slices. Considering flip-flops are much smaller than LUTs in size on
FPGA, we claim our design improves in terms of area.
As of power consumption, our sharing scheme reduces overall power consumption and
power per bit by 7.69% comparing to the non-sharing scheme. This number is relatively
small considering the large area improvement. This is caused by the larger number of flip-
flops used in the implementation. Flip-flops tend to dissipate more switching power than
LUTs while in our sharing scheme the majority of shared hardware resources are LUTs.
Figure 6.6: NIST Statistical Test Suite success ratio, one thousand 10,000 bit-streams are
passed to each test. The test passes for p-value ≥ σ, where σ is 0.05. The black line indicates
a threshold of success ratio of 96%. All test results below this line are considered test failure.
Arbiter PUF results without Von Neumann correction have success rate below 5% in most
tests, thus are not shown in the figure.
6.8.2 Randomness
We quantify the statistical randomness of our design by applying the industry-standard Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Statistical Test Suite to post-processed
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outputs [73]. An output stream is generated in such a way that the output of the system in
the current clock cycle is fed back to the design as a challenge in the next clock cycle. We
repeat this stream production process until all output bits (1, 000 × 10, 000) are collected.
Figure 6.6 displays the lowest success ratio of outputs generated by leap forward LFSRs, ar-
biter PUFs with Von Neumann correction, and our design. Three conclusions can be drawn
from the figure:
• The output of our design shows excellent randomness, passing all tests in the test suite.
• Our results is at least as random as leap-forward LFSRs.
• Our results outperform arbiter PUF and Von Neumann correction in block frequency
and approximate entropy. In all, our proposed method provides better randomness
while maintaining physical unclonability.
6.9 Chapter Conclusion
We propose a mechanism to combine signal racing and logic computation through signal and
hardware sharing. Employing such a mechanism greatly reduces the area overhead and power
consumption. We illustrate our idea by combining leap-forward LFSRs and arbiter PUFs on
a Spartan-6 FPGA. The evaluation shows that our sharing design saves 40.4% LUTs while
achieving 7.69% of power improvement compared to the non-sharing scheme. Our design
maintains the physical unclonability inherited from arbiter PUFs while, as suggested by
NIST statistical test suite, achieving much better randomness. We conclude that by racing
signals and computing logical operations simultaneously, we are able to create a power- and
area-efficient PUF design with unclonability and high randomness.
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CHAPTER 7
Lightweight Environmental Anomaly Detection
7.1 Motivation
The massive deployment of mobile reconfigurable devices has imposed a high-reliability re-
quirement. It has become necessary that these devices should operate reliably irrespective
of the change in the external operating environment. In order to monitor the reliability of
these mobile reconfigurable devices, measurement of physical operating parameters like on-
chip power supply voltages and die temperatures are desired in many situations. An alarm
should be raised whenever the reliability is compromised due to the abnormal or extreme op-
erating environment. Environmental abnormalities are dangerous because, on the one hand,
sudden change in the environment could indicate faulty hardware (circuit short) or logic
failure (excessive switching); on the other hand, abrupt variation could also be caused by a
variety of physical attack methods, putting the integrity of the operation and the intellec-
tual property embedded in the hardware at the fringe of danger. In both cases, notification
of such changes is desired to avoid further damage. Conventionally, detection of abnormal
variations requires on-chip temperature and voltage sensors. However, sensor-based monitor
system has its drawbacks such as relatively high power consumption and low sample rate. As
a matter of fact, many low-end reconfigurable devices like the Internet of Things (IoT) nodes
do not have such sensors embedded. Thus, a low cost, high accuracy abnormal environment
detection method is desired to monitor mobile devices without the help of temperature and
voltage sensors.
APUF, a unique type of hardware security primitive that has been used in many se-
curity applications, has excellent properties include low power and high speed. However,
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APUFs suffer from the notorious reputation of instability and environmental sensitivity.
Challenge-response mapping for a specific APUF is usually not stable: the mapping changes
as environmental factors varies. A slight change in temperature and voltage could lead to
the unpredictable remapping of many CRP. Several APUF-based security applications in-
tend to minimize the impact introduced by instability using stable CRP selection or error
correction code (ECC). While considerable efforts are seeking to eliminate the problem, we
see the environmentally sensitive nature of an APUF as an opportunity. The instability
due to environmental changes can be exploited to detect abnormalities during the operation
cycle of protected hardware.
7.2 Technical Goals and Contributions
We propose to use an APUF as an environmental anomaly detector. The core design idea
is based on the observation that changes in an APUF’s challenge-response mapping imply
a highly probable variation in operating voltage or temperature. We propose to monitor
the remapping activity of only ESCRPs instead to save additional energy and latency. Our
design is advantageous comparing to current sensor-based system monitors for the following
three reasons:
• Implementation is flexible. Detection of environmental variation is not a must for all
applications. Sensors, once embedded, occupy space and drain power regardless of
application needs. Our detection framework, however, can be implemented or removed
easily on reconfigurable hardware depending on user’s demand.
• High sample frequency. Many modern reconfigurable devices such as Xilinx Virtex
family have system monitors that provide information on both internal voltage VC-
CINT and core temperature. The problem with these sensor-based system monitors
is that the sampling frequency is relatively low. Many abnormalities only affect the
device for a few clock cycles, the current system monitor sample rates on Xilinx Vir-
tex devices (200kHz maximum) fails to detect these variations. Our APUF-based
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framework is capable of sampling at a much higher frequency (around 10 Mhz in our
implementation).
• Low power and compact size. Our detection framework requires only a single APUF
to detect abnormalities, which grants us a huge advantage in terms of area and power.
After careful off-line ESC seed generation and alarm threshold calibrations, the system
provides comparable detection rates with state-of-the-art detection mechanism.
To our best knowledge, our work is the first effort to take advantage of environmental
sensitivity in APUF CRP-mappings to accurately detect abnormal environmental variations.
7.3 Related Work
7.3.1 System Monitor
Many efforts have been made to monitor the physical parameters of a reconfigurable system.
Xilinx has embedded its System Monitor in its recent FPGA products [102]. The System
Monitor function is built around a 10-bit Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) and a number
of on-chip sensors. The sensors are used to measure FPGA physical operating parameters like
on-chip power supply voltages and die temperatures. However, Xilinx System monitor has
a relatively low sample rate. Many variations occur within a few clock cycles and the 200k
sample rate is not enough to detect short variations. Le Masle and Luk introduced a ring
oscillator-based attack detection system that monitors the core power of a circuit through
observing the behavior of embedded ring-oscillators. The system reports any suspicious
drop in internal voltage and handles the threat accordingly [103]. Even though the ring
oscillator-based power monitor framework is capable of detecting abnormalities at a much
higher sample rate, it is also much larger in size. Despite the existing studies, our proposed
APUF-based anomaly detection framework is capable of achieving a high sample rate while
remaining simple, compact and low power.
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7.4 Preliminaries
7.4.1 Unstable APUF
Again the PUF we use in our anomaly detection framework is standard delay-based APUFs.
An n-bit APUF takes an n-bit challenge as input and produces a 1-bit response as output.
When an n-bit challenge is provided to the APUF, two identically designed paths are gener-
ated along a chain of multiplexer pairs. Each challenge bit controls whether the pair of paths
should swap positions. A pair of multiplexers is denoted as an APUF segment. To retrieve
a response, an impulse signal is fed into the system to excite both paths simultaneously.
Because of the uncontrollable process variation, the signal traveling along one of the two
paths will reach the arbiter earlier, generating a corresponding arbiter output.
Assuming an APUF maps challenges C to corresponding responses R. The APUF has n
segments meaning all challenges C are n-bit long. We assume no delays on the connection
wires and all delays are contributed by the APUF segments. Given a specific challenge c ∈ C,
the ith APUF segments generates a pair of delays with delay difference of ∆dci . In a stable
environment, the corresponding response r ∈ R can be mathematically represented as:
r =

0 if
∑n
i=1 ∆d
c
i > 0
1 if
∑n
i=1 ∆d
c
i < 0
(7.1)
In real life, however, environmental variations change the delay difference in each APUF
segment. For simplicity purposes, we assume that a minor change in environmental would
change the delay difference in the ith segment by ∆dei where ∆d
e
i ∈ [−e, e], e is the maximum
change each delay difference could be altered in a normal operational environment. ∆dei is a
function of temperature t and voltage v. Due to on-chip temperature and voltage gradient,
t, v are different from segment to segment. When provided with a specific challenge c ∈ C,
the response r ∈ R can be mathematically represented by
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r =

0 if
∑n
i=1 ∆d
c
i + ∆d
e
i > 0
1 if
∑n
i=1 ∆d
c
i + ∆d
e
i < 0
(7.2)
Noted that our anomaly detection framework is not limited to only standard APUF,
many other delay-based PUFs like ring oscillator PUFs serve our need as well. However,
APUF is more environmentally sensitive, more compact and low power comparing to ring
oscillator-based PUFs, so in this work, our design and implementation are entirely based on
the above APUF structure.
7.5 CRP Environmental Sensitivity
Physical properties of transistors vary as environment changes, thus a large number of APUF
CRPs are sensitive to fluctuations in physical parameters. In this section, we first discuss cor-
relations between CRP consistencies and physical parameters in the operating environment.
We then present a method to collect a set of ESCRP with a strong correlation with environ-
mental parameters. We intend to show that the CRP inconsistency in APUFs can serve as a
good indicator of environment variations. We define CRP inconsistency as the probability
for a corresponding response being inverted when the challenge remains unchanged.
7.5.1 Environmental Variation
Operating environment is a general concept that includes all on and off-chip physical condi-
tions during the process of operation. Humidity, room temperature, supply power all play
an important role during the process of logic operations on a reconfigurable device. In this
chapter, we mainly focus on studying on-chip voltage and temperature. We carefully examine
the core temperature and voltage levels in a reconfigurable platform and their relationship
with the on-chip APUF CRP inconsistency.
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7.5.1.1 Core Temperature vs. CRP inconsistency
Core temperature can be fluctuated by many factors including but not limited to circuit
switching activity, room temperature, heat sink efficiency, etc. A sudden, unintended and
significant increase or decrease in the core temperature is defined as temperature anomaly.
Temperature abnormalities could result in circuit behavior alternation, hardware malfunction
or even physical damage. APUF serves as an excellent temperature anomaly detector because
transistor delays are sensitive to temperature. Change in transistor delays potentially invert
the signal racing results between two delay paths in an APUF.
We first randomly selected 1,000,000 64-bit binary strings as our test challenge set. Each
challenge within the test challenge set is repeatedly fed to the 64-bit APUF implemented on
a Virtex-5 FPGA. We adopt the majority voting scheme to decide on a standard response.
For a challenge C, if a majority of the corresponding responses is R, the tuple (C,R) is
recorded as the reference CRP. All reference CRPs are stored in a dictionary DictCRP . Core
temperature is being sampled and recorded simultaneously using on-chip sensors. A set of
100 challenges were being evaluated between every two sensor samples. Each set is being
evaluated for 1,000 samples until being replaced by a new set of 100 challenges. The result
is shown in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1a shows a snippet of our experiment. The blue line is the core temperature
gathered from the built-in SYSMON hard macro. The red line is the average inconsistency
of a set of 100 test CRPs. After the 50th sample, we intentionally increase the core temper-
ature by 5 ◦C using excessive switching circuits [104]. An intuitive conclusion can be drawn
from the figure that the pattern of both core temperature (blue line) and average CRP in-
consistency (red line) are correlated. Analysis of the entire CRP test set shows that the CRP
inconsistency and collected core temperature are correlated with a correlation coefficient of
0.7461. When the core temperature increases, a rise in CRP inconsistency occurs. The
inconsistency falls back as the core temperature recovers. The 5 ◦C increment in the core
temperature leads to approximately 13.5% increment in CRP inconsistency.
However, the CRP test set is chosen at random in our experiment; a large number of
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(a) Core temperature(◦C) vs. average APUF
CRP inconsistency(%) for a set of 100 randomly
selected challenges.
(b) VCCINT(V) vs. average APUF CRP incon-
sistency(%) for for a set of 100 randomly selected
challenges.
Figure 7.1: A snippet of core environment change vs. inconsistency of randomly selected
APUF CRPs. The y-axis on the left is core temperature corresponding to the blue line, the
y-axis on the right is the average CRP inconsistency corresponding to the red line.
stable and ultra unstable CRPs were included. Stable CRPs are always consistent regardless
of the increment in the core temperature, thus greatly reduces the environmental sensitivity
of the APUF. Ultra unstable CRPs on the other hand always provide near 50% inconsistency,
which adds additional noise to our evaluation.
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7.5.1.2 Core Voltage vs. CRP inconsistency
Core supply voltage inside a reconfigurable device is not static. In most cases, core supply
voltage VCCINT varies in a tolerable range. Many events could lead to abnormal varia-
tions in VCCINT: simple power analysis(SPA) could lead to an abnormal decrease in the
VCCINT since power measurement tool introduces additional resistance to the power rail;
Electrostatic discharge(ESD) could lead to abnormal increment on VCCINT, etc. APUF
serves as a good VCCINT detector because a slight variation in supply power results in the
remapping of some CRP in APUF, thus by actively monitoring the mapping of APUF CRP
inconsistency, variations in internal supply power can be detected through calculation on
CRP inconsistency.
We produce a SPA scenario that results in a sudden decrease in VCCINT. The experiment
Virtex-5 board uses a power module(TI TPS54620) to provide power to FPGA core with the
internal supply voltage(VCCINT). The power module is essentially a buck converter that
generates output voltage 0.8V < Vout < 15V. Figure 7.2 shows a simplified diagram of the
module modified by us. We produce a SPA attack by adding an additional switch resistor to
modify VCCINT directly through the power module. VCCINT can be instantly decreased
by opening the switch SW to add a resistor RSW into the circuit. The output voltage of the
power module before opening the switch SW can be calculated using equation 7.3. When
mimicking the probe insertion, we open the switch SW , and the output voltage VCCINT
can thus be calculated using equation 7.4.
VCCINT =
R1 · Vref
R2
+ Vref (7.3)
VCCINT =
(Rsw +R1) · Vref
R2
+ Vref (7.4)
Xilinx Virtex-5 allows VCCINT to vary as much as 5% [105]. We use three configurations
of RSW . The replacement of resistors is capable of changing the VCCINT by 2.08%, 4.26%,
and 5.37%. We apply the same evaluation as the previous experiment on the same 1,000,000
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Figure 7.2: VCCINT Power Module, when switch SW is open resistor RSW is inserted into
the power rail.
randomly selected test challenges and observe the relationship between CRP inconsistency
and VCCINT. A visualized result for CRP inconsistency for a sudden change of 5.37%
in VCCINT is shown in figure 7.1b. After the 150th voltage sensor sample, the switch is
opened so that VCCINT decreased from 0.986V to 0.935V. We observe that the average CRP
inconsistency increased from 23% to roughly 41% inconsistency, which later drops back to
22% as we closed the switch and restored VCCINT to 0.986V.
7.5.2 Environmentally Sensitive CRP
The above evaluation above shows that CRP inconsistency in an APUF is correlated with
core temperature and supply voltage. However, the correlation is not strong enough to meet
our application needs. After review the whole CRP set, we conclude that not all CRPs are
equally sensitive to the environment. Based on the notation given in equation 7.1 and 7.2,
we define stable, ultra unstable and ESCRPs as below.
A stable challenge produces consistent response regardless of operating environment. A
stable CRP appears if one or more segments dominate over all remaining segments so that
the final delay difference is sufficiently large enough to overcome delay variations. Stable
challenges can be defined in Equation 7.5.
|
n∑
i
(∆dci)|>
n∑
i
|∆dei | for all possible ∆de (7.5)
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so that the APUF generate the same response regardless of environmental variation. Our
APUF implementation shows that roughly 30% of CRPs are stable.
An ultra unstable challenge on the other hand creates two paths with near zero delay
difference. This can be represented by Equation 7.6:
n∑
i=1
∆dci + ∆d
e
i ≈ 0 for ∆de ∈ [−e, e] (7.6)
With the given challenge, there is a near 50% probability that the corresponding response
would be a 1 or a 0. Our APUF implementation shows that roughly 5-10% of CRPs are
ultra unstable.
To be an indicator of environmental changes, we are primarily interested in searching for
environmentally sensitive challenges(ESCs) that neither produces a stable nor completely
unpredictable response. An ideal ESC should at least fulfill the following two conditions
described in Equation 7.7 and 7.8:
1.
|
n∑
i
(∆dci)|<
n∑
i
|∆dei | for ∆de ∈ [−e, e] (7.7)
when so that no dominating segment group exists in the APUF, and environmental
variations could possibly invert the response.
2.
n∑
i=1
∆dci + ∆d
e
i ≈ 0 for ∆de ∈ [−e, e] (7.8)
At a given environment the response is stable in a normal operating environment.
In addition to the previous two requirements, an ideal ESC should be able to obtain an
inverted response when the environment varies to an abnormal range:
3.
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sign(
n∑
i=1
∆dci + ∆d
e
i ) = −sign(
n∑
i=1
∆dci + ∆d
e′
i )
for ∆de ∈ [−e, e] and ∆de′i > e or ∆de′i < −e.
(7.9)
In our experiment, we defined normal operating environment as: 1. core temperature
T = 30.5± 5 ◦C, 2. VCCINT = 1± 0.5V . From the 1,000,000 test challenge set, we observe
that no challenge fulfills all three requirements for ESCs. Non-uniform physical properties
over the chip makes qualifying both equation 7.8 and 7.9 extremely difficult. We relaxed
the requirement on these two conditions by 30% meaning allowing at most 30% violations in
both equations. Thus we are able to collect 10,000 qualified CRPs out of a 1,000,000 random
challenge set. We repeated the evaluation with only these challenges again, and a snippet of
the result can be seen in figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3a shows that the CRP inconsistency of the ESCRPs (red line) dramatically
increases when the core temperature (blue line) is intentionally increased through circuit
switching. The correlation coefficient between CRP inconsistency and core temperature in-
creased from 0.7461 to 0.8722, much higher comparing to using a random challenge set.
The average CRP inconsistency increased from 23% to roughly 79.8% inconsistency when
we increase the core temperature to 37.5 ◦C, which later drops back to 22% as switching
circuits cool down. A similar observation can be made in Figure 7.3b as we close the switch
and change VCCINT instantly. The average inconsistency of the selected CRPs instantly
changed to over 80%. Comparing to randomly selected CRPs, these sensitive CRPs response
much faster and dramatic because stable CRPs have been eliminated. We conclude that ES-
CRPs are much efficient and environmentally sensitive when using APUF as environmental
variation indicator.
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(a) Core temperature(◦C) vs. APUF CRP incon-
sistency(%) for a set of 100 ESCs.
(b) VCCINT(Volt) vs. APUF CRP inconsis-
tency(%) for a set of 100 ESCs.
Figure 7.3: Core environment change leads to variations in inconsistencies of ESCRP. The
y-axis on the left is core temperature corresponding to the blue line, the y-axis on the right
is the average CRP inconsistency corresponding to the red line.
7.5.3 ESC Set Generation
APUFs serve as a good environmental variation detector when ESCs are applied. Since
ESCs are different from APUF to APUF, and there is no general pattern in them, acquiring
a large set of ESCs at run time is no trivial task.
We present an efficient, two-step method to collect such a large set of ESCs. We first do a
random search to collect a single ESC seed using evolution strategies (described in Protocol
4). Evolution strategies method is inspired by the evolutionary adaptation of a population
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of individuals to certain environmental conditions. When applying evolution strategies on
ESC generation, one individual in the population is a specific challenge vector and mutation
on an individual is defined as randomly flipping multiple bits. The environmental fitness of
the individual is determined by the consistency of the corresponding PUF response under a
small environmental variation benchmark where environmental factors vary beyond tolerable
range using switching circuit/power rail resistor. The tolerable range is defined by the user
based on the nature of the application. The pseudocode of ESC exploration is described in
Protocol 4)
Protocol 4 Explore ESC seed
Require: (1) Number of candidates in the parent generation µ. (2) Number of candidate
solutions generated from the parent generation λ. (3) Expected ESC set size κ (4) A
fitness evaluation function EvaluatePopulation(). (5) A mutation rate τ . (6) Maximum
number of generations M .
Ensure: A set of ESCs Sbest.
Population ← InitializePopulation(µ).
EvaluatePopulation(Population)
Sbest ← GetBest(Population, κ)
while i < M do
Children ← ∅
for j = 0 to λ do
Parentj = GetParent(Population, j)
Sj ← Mutate(Parentj, τ)
Children ← Sj
end for
EvaluatePopulation(Children)
Sbest ← GetBest(Population+Sbest, κ)
Population ← SelectBest(Population, Children, µ)
i = i+ 1.
end while
Return(Sbest)
We observe that when inverting a small number of bits in an ESC seed, the new challenge
is most likely to stay environmentally sensitive due to the fact that nearby transistor process
variations are somewhat correlated. We thus generate more ESCs by randomly inverting a
small number of bits in the ESC seed (described in Protocol 5).
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Protocol 5 Generate ESC set
Create empty challenge set ESC, define the number of the size of the ESC set m, and a
growth index i. An ESC seed esc is taken as an input
Count = 0
while Count < m do
for k in range(i) do
Randomly flips k bits in esc to obtain ckCount
Add ckCount to ESC
end for
Count += 1
end while
7.6 The Detection Framework
7.6.1 System Design
Figure 7.4 shows a high-level implementation of APUF-based anomaly detector on FPGA
platforms. The detector consists of three major modules.
The challenge querier is used to generate challenges, and feed them into the APUF
at run-time. Before the actual run-time detection, a calibration process generates an ESC
seed off-line using Protocol 4. The challenge querier generates a set of ESCs using Protocol
5 at run-time. A random number generator embedded inside of the challenge querier decides
at each clock cycle which bits should be inverted. The challenge querier is placed at the
furthest end of the logic blocks to minimize errors.
The APUF process the same challenge multiple times and send all generated responses
to the response verifier module. The APUF itself resides immediately next to the logic being
monitored to achieve the best accuracy.
The response verifier calculates the CRP inconsistency by counting the frequency of
response inversion, and raise an alarm if the inconsistency exceeds a user-defined threshold.
Since all ESCs are correlated, the 0 and 1 distribution are also very similar, thus a single
counter is enough for counting and recording bit inversions. The alarm threshold is recom-
mended to be set to the selected ESC’s fulfillment rate of equation 7.8 and 7.9, however it is
adjustable as the definition of the normal operational environment may be subject to change
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based on user requirement. The response verifier is placed at the furthest end of the logic
blocks to minimize errors.
Monitored Logic APUF
Challenge Querier & 
Response Verifier
Memory
Empty Logic Block
Interconnection
I/O Cell
Figure 7.4: APUF-based anomaly detection framework on FPGA.
7.6.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we carefully evaluate our anomaly detection framework.
Our experiments are conducted on two Genesys boards. The Genesys board has a Virtex-
5 LX50 FPGA. The system is tested with the implementation of an RSA-1024 and an AES-
128 crypto-system [106]. A mixture of 1,000 abnormal core temperature and VCCINT was
applied during a 10-hour long operation. In our setting, an anomaly in core temperature
is defined as a variation of over 5 ◦C and an anomaly in VCCINT is defined as a variation
of over 5%. We generated three distinctive challenge sets, respectively 1,000 random chal-
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SYSMON[102] Our Design(Virtex-5) [103](Spartan-6) Our Design(Spartan-6)
Sample rate 200kHz 200kHz 8MHz 8MHz
LUTs 251 92 3300 49
Flip-flops 139 69 unknown 57
Slices 63 36 825 22
Power(mW) 653 569 1953(estimated) 29
Table 7.1: FPGA resource and power characteristics: Virtex-5 SYSMON vs. our design on
Virtex-5 vs. RO-based on-chip power monitor vs. our design on Spartan-6. ADC and analog
sensor area and power are not included in calculation.
lenges(RC), a single ESC seed, and 1,000 ESCs derived from the ESC seed. The ESC seed
is generated based on our requirement on core temperature and VCCINT, which in our case
is our definition of the normal range of temperature and VCCINT defined above. The alarm
threshold is set to raise an alarm when CRP inconsistency reaches 40% for 1,000 random
challenges, 70% for both single ESC seed and 1,000 ESCs case. A UART core is used to
monitor the real-time CRP inconsistency and communicates with RSA/AES cores. The
results are displayed in Table 7.2.
Circuit 1,000 RC Single ESC 1,000 ESC
AES-128 69.4/0.7 98.1/5.9 100/2.1
RSA-512 78.4/3.0 100/3.9 100/1.1
Table 7.2: anomaly detection: true positive rate (%)/false positive rate(%) using 1,000
random challenges vs. single ESC vs. 1,000 ESCs as challenge set per sample. APUFs are
placed immediately besides the monitored circuit. A mixture of 1,000 abnormal temperature
and VCCINT were applied to the protected circuit.
We observe that 1,000 ESC challenge set provides the best detection rate while random
CRPs provides the worst. ESCs benefit from the elimination of stable and ultra unstable
challenges. With a good ESC seed, we are capable of achieving a true positive rate of 100%
with 1,000 generated ESCs at run-time, while the false positive rate is as low as 1.1%.
7.6.3 Area and Power
We compare our design’s area and power overhead with both Xilinx System Monitor [102]
and ring oscillator-based power monitor[103]. Since Xilinx System Monitor only supports
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Virtex family product and Le Masle’s ring oscillator-based power monitor was originally
implemented on Spartan-6 LX45, we implement our design on both platforms for compar-
ison purposes. The sample rate for Virtex-5 implementations is fixed to 200kHz while the
implantation on Spartan-6 devices has a sample rate of 8MHz. The FPGA resource and
power characteristics for Xilinx System Monitor, ring oscillator-based power monitor and
our design are shown in table 7.1.
Our design uses 63% less FPGA area comparing to Xilinx System Monitor logics while
achieving 13% of power savings. To be noted that we do not include the area and power
of both analog sensor and ADC in the SYSMON hard macro in our calculation due to lack
of information. The actual saving is expected to be more. Comparing to Le Masle’s ring
oscillator-based power monitor, our design is 98.4% smaller. Since APUF does not impose
high switching activities like ring oscillators, our design consumes only 1.5% of the power.
7.7 Chapter Conclusion
In conclusion, we discovered that APUF CRP inconsistency is highly correlated with the
core temperature and voltage on reconfigurable platforms. Based on the observation we
designed a framework to utilize the environmental sensitivity of APUFs to detect suspicious
operational environment variations. We propose to apply only ESCs on a given APUF to
efficiently and accurately detect environmental abnormalities. When integrated with an
AES-128 and an RSA-1024 implementation, our framework is capable of detecting 100%
of applied abnormalities with a false positive rate as low as 1.1%. Our design provides
competitive detection rate with both sensor-based Xilinx System Monitor and Le Masle’s
ring oscillator-based power monitor while reducing 63% and 98.4% of area as well as 13%
and 98.5% of power.
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CHAPTER 8
Efficient and Secure Group Key Management in IoT
using Multistage Interconnected PUF
8.1 Motivation
Internet of Things (IoT) has been envisioned to be a revolutionary network that connects
physical devices around us to perform intelligent tasks such as monitoring, communication,
operation, and optimization. The advancement in IoT technology has enabled a wide spec-
trum of applications in a variety of environments to measure the various environmental
parameters [107]. While IoT technology has greatly improved the efficiency and quality of
our lives and works, various security challenges have become a major concern and doubt
for further adoption of the technology. Security improvement in IoT system has become an
increasingly popular topic in both academia and industry due to its urgency and profitabil-
ity. In this chapter, we are particularly interested in efficient and secure key management
schemes in group communications in an IoT setting.
8.2 Technical Goals and Contributions
Group communication through multicast/broadcast enables direct communication with the
whole group, which is more efficient when compared to an equivalent unicast-based solution.
Securing group communications consists of providing confidentiality, authenticity, and in-
tegrity of messages exchanged within the group [108]. Among all security problems in IoT,
group key management is one of the fundamentals in securing group communications. A
group key essentially is a secret key shared by all members of a group so that all group
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communication packages are encrypted before they are being transmitted using this group
key. An unauthorized user may receive group communication packages due to a network er-
ror or intentional interception; however, without the right group key, the illegal user cannot
decrypt the received packages [109].
Group key management schemes in IP networks, though have been studied for decades,
cannot be directly applied to IoT as IoT devices are heavily constrained by the limited
resource and energy capacity. Limited resources impose new challenges regarding storage and
computation requirements, meaning each node is incapable of storing a large key database
or conduct heavy cryptographic computation. The energy constraint additionally requires
key verification and computation procedures to be energy efficient.
For the above two reasons, physically unclonable functions (PUFs), a type of low-power
security primitive with unclonable and unpredictable properties, naturally appears as an
ideal solution to the problem. In this chapter, we propose to apply a novel low power
PUF structure called Multistage Interconnected PUF (MIPUF) to the domain of group key
management in IoT. We believe the low power and unclonable, unpredictable nature of
MIPUF not only improves the security of group key management protocols but also meet
the tighter energy requirements on IoT nodes. Our design of interconnection reconfiguration
in MIPUF is robust and secure against modeling attacks by changing the challenge-response
mapping. The group key is stored and managed by a new set of PUF functions every
time we reconfigure the MIPUF in every IoT device, creating an additional layer of security
and protection. We also show that our key management scheme including key distribution,
key storage and rekeying is resilient against a wide range of attacks. Lastly, we show that
our group key management protocol is power and energy efficient. Our simulation results
show that we are 47.33% more energy efficient comparing to state-of-the-art ECC-based key
management schemes.
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8.3 Related Work
Numerous group key management frameworks have been proposed historically including but
not limited to VersaKey, GKMP[110] [111]. Several efforts have been made in creating effi-
cient group key management protocols for group communications in IoT and wireless sensor
networks (WSN) to meet the energy and computation constraints. Kung et al. proposed
GroupIt to address the scalability problem in GKMP [112]. Zhu et al. proposed an efficient
security mechanism for large-scale distributed sensor networks [113]. Roman et al. ana-
lyzed the applicability of public-key cryptography based protocols and link-layer oriented
key management systems (KMS) in IoT settings [114]. Abdallah et al. proposed a novel
efficient and scalable key management mechanism for wireless sensor networks and proposed
to reduce power and energy consumption by using ECC [115]. Parrilla et al. proposed an
ECC-AES co-processor to handle security tasks in IoT group management [116]. Kandi et al.
specifically focus on rekeying schemes in IoT key management [117]. Gebremichael proposed
to use One-way Accumulator to handle key establishment [118] while Ferrari suggests more
efficient key establishment methods in [119]. Lastly, Lei et al. suggest that blockchain tech-
nology is also applicable to IoT group key management in [120]. All work listed above utilize
expensive cryptographic primitives to secure their group key management protocols without
investigating the possibility of utilizing some novel low-power hardware security primitives
to meet the energy requirements.
Recently, PUFs, as a popular type of low-power security primitive, have been proposed to
be used in a number of key management subtasks in IoT settings [121]. Gu et al. proposed
multiple PUF architectures that provide compatibility to secure authentication. [122] [29]
[26]. Mukhopadhyay proposed a novel device authentication method that takes advantage of
the unclonable property of PUFs [123]. Rahman proposed an RO-PUF-based key generation
scheme that is aging resilient [124]. Most recently Huang et al. investigated a key distribution
protocol assisted using ring oscillator PUFs (ROPUFs)[125] which significantly reduces the
storage overhead and latency for securely distributing secret keys. Unfortunately, these works
only focus on a specific subtask of key management and fail to provide detailed security or
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overhead analysis. We differentiate ourselves by design a novel PUF architecture that can be
applied to the entire key management lifecycle including key distribution, key storage and
rekeying in IoT. We have also performed a security and overhead analysis to prove that our
work is both secure and efficient.
Besides ECC and
8.4 Multistage Interconnected PUF
In this section, we propose a novel PUF structure called Multistage Interconnected PUF
(MIPUF). We borrow the idea of multistage interconnection networks (MINs) from com-
puter networks field. MINs allow the processing elements (PEs) to be interconnected using
Switching Elements (SEs) such that the interconnection provides high configurability and
speed with low cost. We propose to use such a structure to interconnect PUFs so that the
interconnected PUFs can be configured easily. The interconnected PUFs significantly in-
crease the system complexity as well as break the linearity, resulting in increased difficulty
in modeling the system. The configurability also allows the challenge-response pairs (CRPs)
of the network to be remapped from time to time, protecting the system from modeling
attacks.
8.4.1 Processing Elements (PEs)
We name the PE in a MIPUF a MIPUF node. A MUPUF node is the most fundamental
building block of the network. A MIPUF node is a single or a group of strong PUFs that
take an n-bit challenge and generate an m-bit response. A strong PUF is defined as a
PUF that supports a large number of CRPs and there exists a number of implementation.
For the sake of implementation easiness, our implementation of a MIPUF node consists of
m n-bit arbiter PUFs running in parallel and sharing the same pulse signal and challenge
vector. Even though arbiter PUFs are known to be weak against various modeling attack,
our experimental results show that multistage interconnection significantly improves the
resilience against them. In this chapter, we merely use MIPUF node implemented with
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arbiter PUFs as an illustrative example and a proof of concept. Security properties of MIPUF
implemented using more advanced strong PUFs such as LRR-DPUF [126] are expected to
exceed our collected results.
8.4.2 Switching Elements (SEs)
Similar to the concept of SEs in computer networks, the SE in MIPUF serves as a way to
route and switch signals. In our implementation, an SE is a set of multiplexers that switch
or not switch n signals based on a configuration bit. In our case, we use SEs to connect
the response of a previous MIPUF node to the next node as the new challenge. The SEs
between two nodes are controlled by a configuration vector.
8.4.3 Multistage Interconnection
Multistage interconnection networks find a balance between the cost and configurability. We
believe a blocking multistage connection is the most cost-efficient for MIPUF implementation
and provides sufficient configurability. A blocking multistage connection cannot realize all
possible connections between inputs and outputs since a connection between one free input
to another free output is blocked by an existing connection in a network; however, it is much
cheaper to implement. While there are different interconnection styles such as Clos [127], we
propose to implement a blocking interconnection in a MIPUF in an Omega network style [128]
which consists of 2×2 SEs. Each input has a dedicated connection to an output, providing
2N different switchings and having a complexity of O(N log(N)) for an N×N connection
between two MIPUF nodes. An example of such interconnection is shown in Figure 8.1. To
be noted that we do not allow port rearrangement in MIPUF, each input should be routed
to a unique output and each output should be directed from a unique input given a specific
configuration.
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Figure 8.1: Network structure in Omega network style. rki−1 indicates the k-th response
(output) bit of the (i− 1)-th MIPUF node, cki indicates the k-th challenge (input) bit of the
i-th MIPUF node.
8.4.4 Protecting Network Configuration
The signal routing between any two MIPUF nodes is controlled by a configuration vector.
We propose to secure the configuration vectors using existing MIPUF nodes in the system so
that the real interconnection configuration remains hidden. The configuration vector for the
interconnection between node i and i+1 depends on the encrypted result of the user provided
configuration bits using the nodes from node 1 to node i− 1, for i > 1. To note that we use
MIPUF nodes in the previous levels to encrypt SE configurations to reduce the correlation
between the output of a node and it’s immediate SEs. The user provided configuration is
passed to the SEs between the first two nodes and propagate along the network to configure
the remaining SEs connected to the later nodes. An attacker or even the user who provided
the configuration, cannot obtain information on the real interconnection between MIPUF
nodes without characterizing each node. Besides, we also significantly reduce the number
of bits a user needs to provide. In a key management protocol, our proposed method could
also significantly reduce the communication cost.
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8.4.5 Security Evaluation of MIPUF
8.4.5.1 Uniqueness and Reliability
Two most important properties of PUFs are uniqueness and reliability. Uniqueness means
that the responses for a specific PUF design implemented on different devices should be sig-
nificantly different when provided with the same challenge. Reliability indicates the response
should be stable enough when repeating the same challenge on the same device. Since our
design of MIPUF depends on existing PUF implementations, our focus is that our multistage
interconnection does not compromise the security properties of the PUF implementation we
depend on. We modify the definition of uniqueness and reliability as follows.
• Inter-configuration variation (uniqueness). How many MIPUF output bits are different
between two different configurations of the same MIPUF? Ideally, this variation should
be 50%.
• Intra-configuration variation (reliability). How many MIPUF output bits differs when
re-generated again from a MIPUF with a specific configuration? Ideally, this variation
should be 0%.
We directly compare these two metrics with intra-chip variation and inter-chip variation
metrics in regular PUF evaluations. As a proof of concept, we compare our arbiter PUF
based MIPUF implemented using arbiter PUFs with regular FPGA-based arbiter PUFs
implemented on five different FPGAs. The results are collected from the Xilinx Spartan-6
XC6SLX45 platform using the implementation described in [24].
Figure 8.2a illustrate the probability distribution of the inter-configuration variation of
a MIPUF. The x-axis is the number of output bits that are different between two different
interconnection configurations; the y-axis is the probability. The bars show experimental
results collected on 1,225 pairs of outputs collected from 50 different configurations. Our
experiment results (47.9%) is very close to the ideal case of 50%. Our results even show a
slight improvement comparing to the inter-chip variation of arbiter PUFs implemented on
FPGAs (47.0%).
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(a) Inter-configuration variation for MIPUF is 47.9% (Avg = 30.7 bits / 64 bits).
(b) Intra-configuration variation for MIPUF with fuzzy extractor is 2.67% (Avg = 1.71 bits /
64 bits). Environment range from 20 ◦C, 0.95V to 65 ◦C, 1.2V.
Figure 8.2: Inter-configuration and intra-configuration variation of a MIPUF with four nodes.
Each node is implemented using 64 32-bit arbiter PUFs. The interconnection between nodes
is designed in a blocking fashion as shown in Figure 8.1.
We calculated a 35.37% intra-configuration variation when no error correction is applied.
Consider the intra-chip variation of 64 128-bit arbiter PUFs implemented on five different
FPGAs is only as little as 2.90%, MIPUF is very unstable without error correction. The
reason is simple and intuitive, as all MIPUF nodes are connected in such a way that each
node takes the output of the previous node as the input, an error in the first node could result
in avalanche effect in intra-configuration variation. Thus, we propose to use a lightweight
fuzzy extractor between every MIPUF node as an error correction mechanism [129], and
the resulting intra-variation is significantly reduced to 2.67%. Since a MIPUF with n nodes
requires n clock cycles to generate the result, the fuzzy extractors can be shared for all node
outputs.
Figure 8.2b illustrates the probability distribution of the intra-configuration variation
of the same MIPUF implemented using arbiter PUFs and 32-bit of help data in the fuzzy
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extractor. The environments parameters ranging from 20 ◦C, 0.95V to 65 ◦C, 1.2V. The
bars show experimental results collected on 50,000 different random interconnections. Each
configuration is performed on 10,000 challenges and repeated 20 times. Noted that the
major contributors to the intra-configuration variation are two extremely rare (< 0.5%) case
of Hamming distance greater than 40, in this case, a blacklist mechanism could be applied
to improve stability. With the help of larger helper data, existing literature proves that the
unreliability could be significantly reduced to 10−9 [129].
Our measurements are conducted on analog PUF which are unreliable by nature. In
real-world applications digital PUFs, which is as stable as SRAM, are more suitable for
applications with extremely high-reliability requirements at the cost of higher power con-
sumption.
8.4.5.2 Resilience Against Modeling Attack
Several PUF-based systems are vulnerable to a variety of modeling attacks [56] [130] [131]
[132] [133] [134] [135]. We observed that MIPUF significantly boost modeling attack re-
silience by increasing the system complexity and breaking the system linearity. Table 8.1
shows the best prediction accuracy on MIPUF vs. a variety of PUFs implemented on FPGA
using attack approaches described in [56] and [58]. We observe that all prediction accuracies
for a single-bit in MIPUF outperforms other designs and are all close to the ideal case of
50%. Noted that the evaluated MIPUF in this section has only four nodes. We have shown
in Chapter 3 that deeper and wider interconnections between PUF systems would result in
lower modeling attack accuracy, which eventually converges to 50%.
In addition to high resilience against modeling attacks, MIPUF also allows cheap and
fast reconfiguration. Frequent reconfiguration of MIPUF renders modeling attacks almost
impossible. We investigate this topic in more detail in Section 8.4.5.2.
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Architecture LR ES DL
MIPUF - 4 nodes 51.33% 59.18% 50.59%
256-bit 4-XOR PUF 97.21% 76.02% 78.42%
1024-bit arbiter PUF 96.57% 98.28% 88.98%
1024-bit 64-ff PUF 58.29% 95.68% 87.70%
Table 8.1: Best single-bit prediction accuracy on different PUF architectures using logis-
tic regression (LR), evolution strategies (ES) and deep learning (DL) attacks out of 100
runs. Each attack uses 100,000 CRPs. Total number of arbiter PUF segments used in all
architectures are fixed to 1,024.
8.5 Group Key Management
In this section we show that we can utilize the MIPUF structure to securely establish a group
key management protocol with three major components, respectively key distribution, key
storage and rekeying. Key distribution is the process to securely deliver the shared secret key
to every authorized group member. After the group key has been successfully distributed,
the most important task would be to securely store the secret key so that the user could
easily access the key when needed, but an adversarial is forbid to peek or tamper with the
secret key. Lastly, rekeying allows a group to renew or replace the group key from time to
time.
To illustrate our protocol, we first define an IoT model consists of a control unit with
higher computational power and multiple IoT device/nodes that are constraint by both
computational power and battery life. Each IoT node embeds a MIPUF, a hardware hashing
function and a very compact AES implementation.
8.5.1 Key Distribution
According to the model described above, a well-designed group key distribution protocol is
proposed. The protocol is shown in Protocol 6. For each node, a group key can be delivered
securely with an exchange of two messages.
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Protocol 6 Group Key Distribution Protocol
• Input: A list of group member in group G = {N0 · · ·Nn} ⊆ N n being the total number
of IoT nodes in the group. A random group key keyg.
• Goal: Securely deliver keyg to all Ni ∈ G.
1. Preliminary Phase
(a) Before the deployment of an IoT node, the control unit assigns a unique ID (Ni)
to it. Initially the node derives the interconnection configuration γi = H(Ni) from
Ni and generates a CRP (c
γi
i , r
γi
i ) using the MIPUF Fi where r
γi
i = F
γi
i (c
γi
i ).
(b) The control unit securely store the tuple (γi, c
γi
i , r
γi
i ) in the database, and node
Ni securely stores c
γi
i and γi.
2. Key Delivery Phase
(a) When a group G is formed, the control unit first check if all group members exists
based on the unique ID. If not, the protocol is aborted.
(b) For IoT node Ni ∈ G, the control unit generates a random new configuration γ′i.
(c) For IoT node Ni ∈ G, a group key hint pi = rγii ⊗ keyg and a new configuration
hint fi = r
γi
i ⊗ γ′i are generated.
(d) An encrypted message msgki containing pi and fi is transmitted using unicast to
each group member Ni ∈ G. msgki = {Erγii (Ni‖pi‖fi)‖H(Ni‖c
γi
i )}, “‖” indicates
the concatenation operation, E is the encryption operation using AES and H is a
hashing operation.
3. CRP update Phase
(a) Upon receiving msgki , IoT node Ni first decrypts the message using r
γi
i :
Drγii (Er
γi
i
(Ni‖pi‖fi)), D being the AES decryption operation. Ni verifies the va-
lidity of the message by comparing the hash H(Ni‖cγii ). If there exists a mismatch
in the hash, report error to the control unit.
(b) The group key keyg and the new interconnection γ
′
i are derived from pi and fi
decrypted from the decrypted msgki .
(c) Ni generates a new CRP (c
γ′i
i , r
γ′i
i ) where c
γ′i
i = H(c
γi
i ), r
γ′i
i = F
γ′i
i (c
γ′i
i ). Ni sends an
encrypted message msgui = Erγii (Ni‖c
γ′i
i ‖rγ
′
i
i ) back to the control unit.
(d) The control unit decrypt msgui using r
γ
i and updates the database by replacing
the tuple (γi, c
γi
i , r
γi
i )with(γ
′
i, c
γ′i
i , r
γ′i
i ). If the control unit has not received an
update message msgui after some predefined timeout or c
γ′i
i = H(c
γi
i ), an abort is
called.
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8.5.2 Key Storage
After the key distribution, the group key can be extracted from the MIPUF when the
correct challenge and interconnection configuration are provided. Unlike other crypto-based
key management systems, we do not directly store the group key in the memory. Instead,
the group key is extracted on the fly from the group key hint pi. We believe this approach
is secure because an attacker can only obtain the real group key if he has access to both
the storage (containing pi, fi and c
γi
i ) and the MIPUF (Fγi , compromising either the storage
or the MIPUF does not compromise the security of the whole design. Also, the group key
is only used upon receiving or transmitting group messages, thus storing the real key using
low-power MIPUF is also highly energy efficient.
8.5.3 Rekeying
Group keys need to be regenerated, redistributed or updated whenever there is a dynamic
change to the group to preserve security. One important motivation to rekey is that groups
are not always static. When a member leaves the group, it should not be able to decrypt
future group communications (forward security); when a new member joins, it should not
be able to decrypt past group communications (backward security). Group key should
also be completely rekeyed when potential leakage is detected for security considerations.
Here we discuss all three possible cases.
8.5.3.1 New Member Joins the Group
Without loss of generality, we assume a new IoT node Nα intend to join a group G, Nα /∈ G.
For efficiency considerations, redistributing a new key to all group members is expensive
and inefficient. Instead, we propose to use the current secret to encrypt the new group
key and this process is leakage free. Specifically, the control unit sends out a message
msgjoin = {Ekeyg(key′g)} to ∀Ni ∈ G. The existing group members calculate and store the
new group key hint p′i = r
γi
i ⊗ key′g and deletes key′g upon receiving and decrypting msgjoini .
The new member will have to complete the whole key distribution process described in
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Section 8.5.1. Backward security is preserved using this method since the new member has
no information about the old group key.
8.5.3.2 Existing Member Leaves the Group
Removing an existing member from the group is more complicated than adding a new mem-
ber. Here we propose to divide group G into m subgroups gj ⊂ G = {g1···gm}, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. All
nodes in the same subgroup share the same interconnection configuration γgj . Again, without
losing the generality, we assume an IoT node Nβ ∈ gj ⊂ G intend to leave the subgroup where
all members in the subgroup use the same MIPUF interconnection configuration γj. The
control node first multicast/broadcast m−1 messages msgleavei = {Eγi(key′g‖H(γi)} contain-
ing the new key to all the subgroups encrypted using the configuration γi, i 6= j, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Upon receiving the message, each node first decrypts the message using its own configuration
γi and check if H(γi) matches the one in the decrypted msg
leave
i . If so then the decrypted
new group key key′g is valid, otherwise, discard the message. No member of gj including the
leaving node have any knowledge of the configurations of other subgroups, thus incapable of
decrypting the message correctly. The control unit should then perform unicast communi-
cations to all members of gj by distributing the new group key key
′
g and a new configuration
γ′j to replace γj.
8.5.3.3 Complete Rekeying
MIPUF can still be modeled if a significantly large enough set of CRPs is collected. However,
MIPUF can be reconfigured to neutralize modeling attacks by completely remap the input-
output mapping. We propose to perform a full rekeying once the total number of CRPs
generated exceeds a calculated sample complexity lower bound that equals to the sufficient
training set size to break the MIPUF. Equation 8.1 describe a sample size lower bound
in terms of the IPN model parameters, where m is the number of nodes in MIPUF and
n is the maximum number of PUFs in a MIPUF node. k = V C(F) where VC is the
Vapnik-Chervonenkis-dimension and F is the largest single PUF in MIPUF. δ is the failure
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probability and  is the learning error.
Sample complexity ∼ (m · k +m) · n+ ln(
1
δ
)

(8.1)
8.6 Evaluation
8.6.1 Security Analysis
We make the following assumptions for our security analysis. The physical security of the
MIPUF is secured; however, an attacker is allowed to query the CRPs as much as needed.
The wireless channels used for communication are not secured after the initial preliminary
phase. The hash function and compact AES on each node are secure. The control unit key
database is secure. We summarize our security analysis against several popular attacks as
below:
Eavesdropping Attack: During the key distributing and rekeying process, all messages
containing γi, c
γi
i , r
γi
i or keyg are encrypted by AES. Thus eavesdropping attack is invalid.
Man-in-the-middle Attack: Before updating the new CRP in 3c in Protocol 6, the
new challenge is a one-way hash of the previous challenge which is checked by the control
unit, thus rendering the attack useless.
Replay Attack: Neither the IoT node nor the control unit would be able to correctly
decrypt a message encrypted using a previous response since old responses are discarded after
the update.Thus the hash check in 3a, 3d in Protocol 6 would fail during key distribution.
Forward security in the rekeying process is designed to protect the system from such attacks.
Impersonation Attack: Based on our assumption, the preliminary phase is secure thus
the initial key and MIPUF configuration are secured. Also, the modeling attack resilience
and the reconfigurability of MIPUF prevents an attacker to impersonate an IoT node even
if we allow him to query the CRPs.
Comparing to other designs (e.g. ECC-based scheme) our group key management scheme
enjoys at least the same level of security while adding an additional level of security at the
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physical level utilizing the unclonability properties of MIPUF.
8.6.2 Overhead Evaluation
In this section we assume that there are N nodes in the group and the group is split into
M subgroups. The MIPUF we use in each IoT nodes takes an a-bit challenge, a b-bit
configuration vector and generates a c-bit output (assuming b ≥ c ). Node ID is a l-bit
vector. The hash function hashes any input to an a-bit string. The group key has length of
c-bits. The random number generator cost ER units of energy per operation. The energy
consumption of MIPUF, hash function, random number generator, XOR operation and the
very compact AES are EP , EH , ER, EX and EA.
Communication Cost: The length of messages: msgki , msg
u
i , msg
join andmsgleavei
are: a + b + c + l, a + c + l, a+c and a+c. Thus the total number of messages need to
be sent for key distribution and node join/leave rekeying are: N, 3 and (2NM -2) + (M-1).
For node leave rekeying, minimum cost is achieved when M =
√
N .
Storage Overhead: The control unit stores the Node ID, CRPs and the current config-
uration of all nodes; thus the storage overhead at the control unit is N ·(a+b+2c+l) bits.
Each IoT node stores the Node ID, current challenge, current configuration and the group
key hint which has a storage overhead of a+b+c+l bits.
Energy Cost: The control unit spends 2EA+ 2EH + 2ER+ 2EX units of energy to
distribute the group key to one node. Each node spends 2EA+2EH +EP +2ER to receive
the key and update the CRP. During member join rekeying, the control units spendsEA+ER
units of energy to update the group key to existing members and 2EA+2EH+2ER+2EX
to the new member. The new node spends 2EA+2EH+EP +2EX and old members spend
EA+EX units of energy respectively. During member leave rekeying, the control unit spends
(M−1)·(EA+EH+ER) units of energy to update the group key to existing members that
are not in the same subgroup as the leaving node and (N
M
−1)·(2EA+2EH+2ER+2EX)
to the update all members in the same subgroup. All members that are in and not in the
same subgroup as the leaving node spends (M − 1) · (EA + EH + ER) and EA + EH
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units of energy.
We compare our global energy consumption to two other key management protocols:
Localized Encryption and authentication protocol (LEAP) [113] and Elliptic Curve Public
Key Cryptography (ECPKC) [115] in simulation using the parameters described in [115] for
a fair comparison. The energy consumption parameters for our design are estimated from our
implementation described in Section 8.6.3. The comparison for simulated results for global
energy consumption for three key management schemes can be seen in Figure 8.3. LEAP
uses significantly much more energy than both ECPKC and our proposed scheme as it grows
quadratically. The global energy consumption of both ECPKC and our proposed scheme
grows linearly. Since our proposed design uses low-power MIPUF instead of energy-hungry
ECC to achieve power efficiency. We observe that our proposed scheme uses about 47.33%
less energy for key distribution.
Figure 8.3: Simulated global energy consumption (J) vs. total number of IoT nodes under
the settings introduced in [115].
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8.6.3 Implementation Results
We implemented our key management hardware support for IoT nodes on Xilinx Spartan-6
LX45 FPGAs to measure the area and power. Our implementation consists of a MIPUF
with three nodes each consists of 128 32-bit Arbiter PUFs. The fuzzy extractor, the hash
function and the AES module are implemented based on [129] [92] and [136] accordingly.
Table 8.2 shows the area and power overhead break down of our implementation. Our
hardware support design is 4.3× smaller and 4.2× power efficient comparing to state-of-the-
art ECC design on FPGA. Our MIPUF seems to be more expensive due to FPGA-based
arbiter PUF implementations are known to be inefficient. The overhead of MIPUF and the
hardware support are expected to be significantly reduced if implemented on ASIC. We are
also expected to see further improvement if MIPUF is built using more efficient and advanced
strong PUFs.
Our design MIPUF SHA-1 AES Overall Efficient ECC alone [137]
LUTs 3,717 1,151 598 4,553 16,090
Flip-flops 7,028 1,590 501 9,219 3,747
Slices 1,626 544 222 3,401 11,777
Block RAMs 0 0 3 3 0
Power(mW ) 123.7 30.4 16.2 175.7 515.9
Table 8.2: FPGA resource and power characteristics of the hardware support of our proposed
key management scheme implemented on Spartan-6 FPGA.
8.6.4 Impact on IoT Design
According to Singele´e et al. [138], the communication energy cost should be the major
component in the total energy budget. We believe that power and energy per bit are good
indications of how low energy security modules should be. Table 8.3 shows that the numbers
vary by different standards
In our key management protocol, the MIPUF needs to be executed whenever there is
a message needs to be transferred or received. Regardless of the size of the message, the
execution of MIPUF is only performed once. The total amount of MIPUF energy consumed
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Wireless Throughput Freq. Power Energy/bit
TX RX TX RX
(kbps) (Ghz) (mW) (mW) (nJ/bit) (nJ/bit)
802.11G[139] 54,000 2.4 2,300 1,900 42.59 35.19
Zigbee[140] 250 2.4 46.44 33.30 185.76 133.20
Bluetooth Classic[141] 2,100 2.4 99.90 67.50 47.57 32.14
BLE[142] 1,000 2.4 48.90 39.20 48.00 39.20
Table 8.3: Performance and energy comparison of different wireless standards in IoT.
is measured at as low as 17nJ per MIPUF bit, which is 64.58% lower than the 48 nJ/bit of
the most energy efficient wireless standard - Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). In addition, we
expect the power and energy consumption to further drop by at least 10× when implemented
on ASIC [143]. We estimated that if MIPUF is implemented on ASIC and the key length
is 255-bit (commonly used in Curve25519 [144]), the total amount of energy consumed per
transaction is at most 433.48 nJ, and this amount of energy is 108× lower than the minimum
Bluetooth 4.0 transaction of 45,000 nJ on a 1.5V battery [145]. We claim that it is safe to
conclude that our key management design is indeed low power, low energy and applicable
to real-world IoT device designs.
8.7 Chapter Conclusions
In this chapter, we first proposed a novel PUF structure: MIPUF that is both secure and
reconfigurable. We showcased the uniqueness, reliability, modeling attack resilience and
reconfigurability of MIPUF. We then proposed a group key management scheme in IoT
consists of key distribution, key storage and rekeying based on MIPUF. Security and overhead
analysis on the scheme show that our design is not only secure against multiple attack
methods but also low power. Our simulation result indicates that our proposed scheme
spends 47.33% less energy compared to the state-of-the-art crypto-based scheme ECPKC
[115] since we use low-power and energy efficient MIPUF instead of power-hungry ECC.
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CHAPTER 9
Concluding Remarks
Decades of development in IoT technology has already turned ”connect everything” from
a motivational slogan and an inspiring vision to reality. What comes alongside with IoT
prosperity are also challenges and opportunities in infrastructure, device design, and appli-
cations at multiple levels. In this thesis, we sought to make exploration in a critical but
often overlooked aspect of IoT research: hardware security. While many traditional security
approaches and mechanisms seem applicable on IoT, the compact and energy constrained
nature of IoT devices greatly challenges the compatibility of these existing methods. Modern
IoT devices require low-power, small area, reliable and low maintenance security subsystems
to protect and the sensitive information that are collected, stored or flowed through them.
At the beginning of this thesis, we established three objectives, respectively the security
objectives, the energy objectives, and the applicability objectives. To meet these objectives,
we focus on proposing new security primitives and protocols, applying energy reduction
techniques and designing secure and low-power security applications throughout the entire
thesis.
When addressing the security objectives, we first studied a promising low-power hard-
ware security primitive - PUF. We first conduct a thorough evaluation of analog PUF and
its variations by creating a stable emulation platform. We exposed the randomness and
reliability problems in analog PUFs and proved that we could create a stable clone of an
analog PUF with at least 87.42% of accuracy. Realizing the vulnerability against modeling
attack and the environmentally sensitive problem of many PUF designs, we propose two
solutions to resolve the issue. The first one is enhancing modeling attack resilience through
PUF interconnection and reconfiguration. Interconnecting smaller PUFs dramatically boosts
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the system complexity and linearity, increasing the difficulty of accurate statistical modeling
by several magnitudes. Besides, we propose to reconfigure the interconnection whenever
the total number of CRPs generated by PUF exceeds the lower bound of the sampling
complexity. This approach guarantees that no attacker could collect sufficient amount of
training data, resulting in less than 53.19% of single-bit prediction accuracy against a wide
range of modeling attacks. The second solution we propose to address PUF’s weakness is
to optimize PUF connections using evolution strategies. We observed that different PUF
connections often lead to different output randomness and stability. Utilizing our proposed
evolution strategies algorithm, we could quickly find a near-optimal connection that achieves
220.8% improvement in output randomness and 22.62% improvement in reliability. Aside
from PUFs, we also proposed content-driven reconfigurable injective functions that achieve
secure encryption/decryption between IoT devices with 75.04% power savings comparing to
cryptographic approaches.
In an attempt to meet the energy objectives, we propose the idea of logic free-riding. We
modified the current PUF implementation on FPGA platforms and allowed an arbitrary logic
to share the hardware with an existing PUF implementation through signal phase encoding,
saving 40.4% of area and 7.69% of power.
Lastly, to meet the applicability objectives, we introduced two novel security applica-
tions. The first application is a PUF-based anomaly detection device that reports suspicious
environmental variations inferred from changes in environmentally sensitive CRPs. Com-
pared to commercialized Xilinx SYSMON, our design uses 63% less FPGA area and 13%
of power, detecting 100% of applied abnormalities with a false positive rate as low as 1.1%.
The second application utilized MIPUF to provide a robust, secure and low-power solu-
tion to all process in the group key management process. Our simulation result indicates
that our proposed scheme spends 47.33% less global energy compared to the state-of-the-art
crypto-based scheme while providing additional protection at the hardware level.
Though challenges remain in the domain of hardware-oriented IoT security, we have
made our contribution towards a more robust and energy efficient hardware security system
in IoT.
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